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Is there a constitutional solution for the problem of ensuring a relatively seamless fit between political 
goals and military means in a national security crisis?  Can the executive branch be constituted in such a 
manner that political ends and military means will be more closely aligned – that factionalism inside the 
executive branch will be better controlled and the tyranny of misalignment rendered less costly – 
without undermining the political advantages of doing so?  As valuable as it may be for citizens in a 
democracy to promote the principles upon which they believe an enlightened national security policy 
should be founded, it is at least as important to determine how the institutions involved in the 
generation and execution of national security policy work, and to identify which types of human 
behavior need to be restrained or encouraged if any particular vision of national security is to be 
realized.  In this dissertation I engage with the constitutional theory of James Madison and Alexander 
Hamilton and argue that the intelligence of war – the relative consistency of political ends and military 
means – must be understood as a constitutional problem.  If we want to minimize the tyranny of 
misalignment – if we want to reduce the cost in lives and treasure of misaligned ends and means – we 
must think constitutionally about the structures of the national security state.   
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We take, and must continue to take, morally hazardous actions to preserve our civilization.  We must 
exercise our power.  But we ought neither to believe that a nation is capable of perfect disinterestedness 
in its exercise, nor become complacent about particular degrees of interest and passion which corrupt 
the justice by which the exercise of power is legitimated. 
- Reinhold Niebuhr 
 
Wars then must sometimes be our lot; and all the wise can do, will be to avoid that half of them which 
would be produced by our own follies, and our own acts of injustice; and to make for the other half the 
best preparations we can. 
- Thomas Jefferson 
 
War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and 
designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. 




Is there a constitutional solution for the problem of ensuring a relatively seamless fit between political 
goals and military means in a national security crisis?  Can the executive branch, to be more precise, be 
constituted in such a manner that political ends and military means will be more closely aligned – that 
factionalism inside the executive branch will be better controlled and the tyranny of misalignment 
rendered less costly – without undermining the political advantages of doing so?
1
  
                                                           
1
 I use the adverb “relatively” in the first sentence and the phrase “more closely” in the second not to be evasive 
but because a seamless fit – a perfect fit between political ends and military means – is beyond the capacity of 
even the most gifted statesmen and military strategists to secure.  Angels might conceivably be able to ensure a 
seamless fit between political goals and military means in a national security crisis, but if our decision-makers were 
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Most political theorists, national security experts and defense reformers would argue that we do 
not need to worry about controlling faction inside the executive branch.  They would also argue that the 
executive branch as presently constituted is a political asset that would be severely compromised by any 
violation of its most fundamental organizational principle, which is the principle of unity.  The 
assumption underlying the conventional wisdom on these subjects – a largely unstated assumption – is 
that political ends and military means, despite the strictly hierarchical structure of our executive 
department, will closely align in a national security crisis.  This assumption, I would suggest, not only 
reflects a lack of familiarity with how decisions about the use of force are actually made, but draws our 
attention away from the tyranny of misalignment, which should be at the very center of contemporary 
efforts to reform the national security state. 
Whether the wars our nation fights in the future will driven by choice or necessity – whether 
they will be fought for defensive, humanitarian, preemptive or preventive purposes – whether they will 
be just or unjust – are questions that raise a complex set of ethical issues that a nation with a 
preponderance of international power must constantly debate if it hopes to exercise its military power 
wisely.  As valuable as it may be for citizens in a democracy to promote the principles upon which they 
believe an enlightened national security policy should be founded, however, it is more important, I 
would suggest, to determine how the institutions involved in the generation and execution of national 
security policy work, and to identify which types of human behavior need to be restrained or 
encouraged if any particular vision of national security is to be realized.  What I will argue in this 
dissertation is that the intelligence of war – the relative consistency of political ends and military means 
– must be understood as a constitutional problem.  If we want to minimize the tyranny of misalignment 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
angels, as Madison reminds us, we would not need governments, much less separation of powers systems and 
formal deliberative bodies. 
3 
 
– if we want to reduce the cost in lives and treasure of misaligned ends and means – we must think 
constitutionally about the structures of the national security state. 
 The alternative to studying the politics of national security from an institutional perspective is to 
engage in one of a variety of forms of normative analysis.  But even scholars who identify themselves as 
“realists” in international politics share with interventionists and isolationists of all stripes an affinity for 
the “kind of analysis that first posits certain values or norms derived from abstract analysis … and then 
proceed to apply these values to the political realm without serious consideration of whether they could 
be incorporated into a workable regime.”
2
  In this sense most students of national security are idealists:  
they concern themselves with when and how America should use military force in defense of its national 
interests and not on whether its political institutions as presently constituted are capable of producing 
the outcomes they desire.
3
  This is deeply problematic, I would suggest, because, as an empirically-
minded political theorist cautions us, it is “utopian to think that what happens in politics is a function of 
the normative ideas that circulate in and around the political world.”
4
 
                                                           
2
 James W. Ceaser, “Reconstructing Political Science,” in Stephen Elkin and Karol Soltan, eds., New 
Constutitionalism, (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), p. 56. 
3
 The primary alternative to thinking constitutionally about the national security state is, to make my point 
somewhat differently, to join the many scholars on both sides of the political spectrum who still believe in the art 
of persuasion.  But not only is the attention of most civilian decision-makers elsewhere – usually on the arguments 
of advisors with whom they already agree – but the persistence with which most national security experts defend 
their ideas reminds me of the game in which children have to pass a square object through a square hole, a circular 
object through a circular hole, and a triangular object through a triangular hole.  The difference between the way 
national security experts and children play this game is that whereas the latter eventually figure out which object 
goes in which hole, national security experts tend to expend all of their energy trying to force the same object – 
the same ideal national security policy, the same ideal for civil-military relations, the same ideal for national 
security decision-making – through the same stubbornly unaccommodating institutional structures. 
4
 Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, 1997), p. 1.  I would not dismiss the 
influence of normative ideas, but I share with Alexis De Tocqueville not only his great respect for forms, but his 
understanding of why this respect is not universal.  Tocqueville was deeply worried about the “instinctive 
contempt” citizens in a democracy feel for political institutions – for the “forms” that “serve as a barrier between 
the strong and the weak, the ruler and the people, to retard the one and give the other time to look about him.”  
He feared for the fate of the kinds of political institutions that are tasked with controlling and disciplining 
government power.  “Nothing is more pitiful than the arrogant disdain of most of our contemporaries for 
questions of form; for the smallest questions of form have acquired in our time an importance which they never 
had before; many of the greatest interests of mankind depend upon them.  I think that if the statesmen of 
4 
 
National security is an abstract concept that covers a great deal of terrain, but if we distil the 
purpose of our various national security decision-making processes to a single, fundamental goal, we 
would be left with something resembling the following statement.  We want the outcome of the 
national security decision-making process to make it less likely that we will fight wars we cannot win and 
more likely that we will win the wars we choose to fight.  We could perhaps amend this statement to 
reflect the fact that we often choose to fight wars that we can win but should not have chosen to fight in 
the first place, for reasons other than the odds of success or failure, but the benefit of my original 
formulation is that it keeps political and ideological preferences largely at bay.
5
  Which of our 
governmental institutions are tasked with these responsibilities, and what kind of institutional dynamics 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
aristocratic ages could sometimes condemn forms with impunity, and frequently rise above them, the statesmen 
to whom the government of nations is not confided ought to treat the very least among them with respect, and 
not neglect them without imperious necessity.  In aristocracies the observance of forms was superstitious; among 
us they ought to be kept up with a deliberate and enlightened deference” (Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in 
America (Digireads Publishing, 2007), p. 499). 
5
 Jack Goldsmith argues that “constitutional theory is usually grounded in a theory of preferred outcomes” (Jack 
Goldsmith, “The Accountability President,” The New Republic, February 18, 2010).  Richard Betts indirectly concurs: 
whether professional soldiers have too much, too little or the right amount of influence on defense policy is a very 
important question, but it is a “judgment that depends on one’s political preferences” (Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, 
Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. xv).  I am not convinced that 
objectivity is quite so elusive.  The tragedy of the Iraq and Afghan wars from a planning point of view, for example, 
is that so much military knowledge and experience was frozen out of the decision-making process (other kinds of 
knowledge and experience were neglected as well – cultural and regional expertise, for example – but, as I will 
explain over the course of this dissertation, a constitutional theorist is limited in his ambition by the tools at his 
disposal).  Had informal deliberative bodies worked as designed, political aims and military means would have 
been more closely aligned (alternatively, it is possible that an irreconcilable gap between political ends and military 
means might have been identified and the president persuaded to use means other than force to promote his 
objectives).  It is because this outcome is not unique in American history – because the violence of faction, as 
Madison teaches us, will always prove a stern test for institutions that rely on voluntary cooperation – that we 
need to consider building constitutional mechanisms into the executive department to keep the decision-making 
process open to at least a modest range of perspectives and points of view.  I would like to believe this is a 
strenuously non-partisan approach to constitutional theory and defense reform. 
6
 There is a maxim that applies here, at least indirectly, though my memory has failed me and I am unable to pay 




The challenge for students of national security who approach crisis decision-making from an 
institutional perspective – for those of us who believe that the tools of constitutional theory should be 
able to improve the quality of national security decision-making – has three major components.  First, 
we need to identify the most important institutions involved in formulating and executing military 
actions in a national security emergency.  Second, we need to establish some kind of objective criteria to 
determine how these institutions have performed in the past.  Finally, we need to determine if there are 
any patterns of behavior that will enable us to know roughly what we should expect from these 
institutions in the future, and therefore how best to reform them if we prefer a different set of policy 
outcomes.  The challenges raised by these questions appear at first glance to be impossibly complex.
7
  
Military interventions are relatively few and infrequent, and the power dynamics both inside institutions 
and between institutions are always partly a reflection of irreproducible personalities and contexts.  
History also seems to derive great pleasure from pitting each new generation of military historians 
against the last, and preventing the emergence of a strong consensus on how these institutions 
performed in individual cases.  But the tyranny of misalignment – the need for a process of adjustment 
and adaptation to ensure that political ends and military means are closely aligned – enables us to 
transition from a set of unwieldy abstractions and a dearth of empirical evidence to a specific, concrete 
problem that is amenable to a constitutional analysis.   
 To understand why our government is constituted in the particular way that it is – and how it 
might be constituted differently, if there are things we can agree it does not do well – we need to turn 
                                                           
7
 The difficulty in writing constructively about “national security” is reflected by the range of scholarly work on the 
subject, which includes studies of the role of the presidency in our constitutional order; the struggle between the 
legislature and executive for control of foreign policy; the efficacy and constitutionality of the war powers 
resolution; civil-military relations theory; military history; grand strategy; military strategy and tactics; and the role 
of international law and institutions. 
6 
 
to the essays that James Madison and Alexander Hamilton wrote in defense of the Constitution.
8
  
Madison is widely considered our greatest political theorist.  Hamilton’s reputation may be a notch 
below his colleague’s – he was certainly not as innovative a theorist in terms of devising republican 
remedies for distinctly republican diseases – but he offers us a thorough explanation of how to balance 
the requisites to energy and security in the constitution of the executive department.   What neither 
Madison nor Hamilton offers us, however, is a constitutional theory grounded in a general theory of 
war.  The constitutional theory on which our republic was founded, I will argue in this dissertation, has a 
distinct blind spot, and our constitutional system suffers as a consequence.  Our nation is vulnerable to 
the violence of faction because we are no longer an insulated state and the requisites to energy and 
safety in the executive department are no longer properly balanced. 
Carl von Clausewitz, who has few peers as a theorist of war, insists not only that political ends 
and military capabilities must be tightly, almost seamlessly aligned if the political ends we hope to 
secure through the use of force are to have any chance of being realized, but that war will be an act of 
senseless bloodshed in the absence of such alignment.  Is the executive branch as presently constituted 
capable of harmonizing political ends and military means on a consistent basis?  In both theory and 
practice, I will argue in this dissertation, our republic is presently incapable of ensuring the necessary 
degree of alignment between political ends and military means, and this is largely due to the absence of 
a deliberative separation of power inside the executive branch.
9
 
                                                           
8
 John Jay’s contributions to The Federalist are few in number and, with the exception of his theory of international 
politics, which we will discuss in Chapter 5, do not contribute significantly to our understanding of our 
constitutional system. 
9
 What I will not attempt to do in this dissertation – what the limits of history and statistics may preclude even a 
more sophisticated student of military history from accomplishing – is demonstrate the regularity and extent to 
which political ends and military means have in fact been misaligned in U.S. history.  I will also not attempt to 
pinpoint the precise degree to which misalignment has been responsible for the unnecessary loss of lives and 
treasure.   
7 
 
Even if I have accurately identified a serious weakness in our national security system, there still 
might not be an institutional solution – however modest, however imperfect, as most institutional 
solutions are – for the problem of ensuring a relatively seamless fit between political goals of our civilian 
leaders and the military means employed to secure these goals.  Perhaps democracy has an Achilles 
Heel.  Perhaps there is no way to harmonize political ends and military means without jeopardizing 
other values and objectives – energy, secrecy, dispatch and decision in the executive department, for 
example, or civilian control of the military – that democracy holds dear.
10
  Perhaps we must accept the 
claim of constitutional scholars Joseph Bessette and Jeffery Tulis, who argue that the absence of “formal 
internal checks on the exercise of executive power is no accident,” and that the framers went to great 
lengths to “make the fundamental law hospitable to an energetic executive.”  Perhaps we have to 
accept that the president is free to make effective use of her vast discretionary powers and that “the 
opportunity to act subsequently to combat executive overreaching” is reserved to the legislature and 
judiciary.
11
  Even though the damage done by misaligned political ends and military means is largely 
irreversible – that lives and treasure cannot be recovered by subsequent course corrections – perhaps 
we have to accept the inevitable errors of passion and prejudice that result from one-man rule.
12
  This is 
a possibility that readers are encouraged to entertain over the course of this dissertation.
13
   But readers 
                                                           
10
 James Ceaser is critical of the anti-federalists and many contemporary scholars for refusing to “think 
constitutionally – to realize that certain objectives, perhaps desirable in the abstract, could not be attained without 
producing other, more undesirable consequences; or that certain desirable objectives could not be achieved in full 
without sacrificing other, more desirable ends” (James Ceaser, Liberal Democracy and Political Science (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 125).  My basic argument in this dissertation is that thinking constitutionally 
about the national security state will lead us to embrace a minor departure from the status quo – a minor 
departure from the principle of unity. 
11
 Joseph M. Bessette and Jeffery Tulis, The Presidency in the Constitutional Order (Louisiana State University Press, 
1981), p. 16. 
12
 I will address the subject of one-man rule at length later in this dissertation, but let me state here that I am not 
convinced that the choice we must make is between, on the one hand, “a constitutional arrangement that allows 
for a substantial degree of executive initiative and discretion,” and, on the other, “a set of arrangements that so 
constrains and restricts the executive power as to render it incapable of carrying out its proper tasks” (Bessette 
and Tulis, p. 24). 
13
 Clement Fetovic addresses the issue of the irreconcilability of ultimate ends and values in the context of 
presidential prerogative: “A viable constitution must simultaneously accomplish two inconsistent goals: first, it 
8 
 
should also keep in mind that political institutions are entities that “establish the structures within which 
fallible human beings attempt to solve” political problems, rather than solutions in themselves.  
Institutions perform admirably, and can therefore be judged positively, as political theorist James Ceaser 
puts it, to the degree that “they lessen the probability that decision-makers commit serious errors and 
increase the probability they may make good decisions.”
14
  A deliberative separation of power inside the 
executive branch, I will argue, not only meets these probabilistic criteria, but would do so with greater 
regularity than the system we presently have in place.  
 If this dissertation is to be persuasive – if I am to convince readers to revisit a set of long-held 
and once-defensible assumptions about how decisions should be made inside the executive department 
in a national security crisis – if I am to convince readers that the doctrines of the unitary executive and 
absolute civilian control of the military need to be relaxed and that the best solution to the ends-means 
problem would be to grant the chairman of the JCS a degree of statutory independence over the power 
to ensure that political ends and military means are closely aligned – I will have to flush out the many 
tensions, complexities and contradictions embedded in the following three questions.
15
  First question: 
What is the political theory of The Federalist as it applies to national security?  What, in other words, are 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
must enable statesmen to deal with the ordinary and extraordinary problems of politics; second, it must prevent 
those same statesmen from becoming threats to the liberties and other values they are appointed to preserve. The 
second task requires a diminution of discretionary powers, whereas the first requires the preservation of political 
judgment, which cannot be reduced to legalistic rules or doctrinal formulae. This involves a delicate balancing act, 
but we must not delude ourselves into thinking that it is possible to achieve both objectives without sacrificing 
some cherished values” (Clement Fatovic, “Constitutionalism and Presidential Prerogative: Jeffersonian and 
Hamiltonian Perspectives,” Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48., No. 3 (July 2004), p. 442). 
14
 Ceaser, Liberal Democracy and Political Science, p. 187. 
15
 When delegates to the constitutional convention began to debate the specific features of the executive branch, 
James Wilson suggested that a single person should fill the role of the executive.  A “considerable pause” ensued.  
These are Madison’s words.  The considerable pause that settled over the chamber reflected a deep-seated 
distrust of executive power.  As Herbert Storing reports, “It was as if the delegates were reluctant to enter into 
what they knew was the enormously difficult, perhaps insoluble, problem of establishing an adequate executive 
that would be consistent with the principles of republican government” (Herbert Storing, “Introduction,” in Charles 
Thach, The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789: A Study in Constitutional History (Liberty Fund, reprint, 2007), p. 
163).  When my research led me to the conclusion that a military officer needed a degree of independence to 
ensure that the process of adjustment and adaptation between political ends and military means is sufficiently 
deliberative, the pause that settled over me was similarly disconcerting. 
9 
 
the political principles upon which our republic was founded, and how do these principles apply to 
national security?  Second question: What is the political theory upon which our national security state 
was founded?  To be more precise, what is the largely implicit political theory that informs the 1947 
National Security Act and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986?  Third question: If there are discrepancies 
between these two sets of founding principles – and I am convinced there are – why should defense 
reformers turn to the political theory of The Federalist for inspiration and guidance? 
 Each of these questions presents us with a host of challenges – and each one encourages us to 
think constitutionally about the national security state.  With respect to the first question, does The 
Federalist present a consistent vision of the role of the executive in matters of national security?  What 
did the concept of “national security” mean to political theorists in the late eighteenth century?  Why 
did we inherent a constitutional order that assumes that energy, secrecy, dispatch and decision are best 
secured through a unitary executive?  Why should the greater unpredictability of international politics 
be associated with an increase in the level of trust we are expected to place in the president, rather than 
an additional layer of constitutional checks and balances to control the potential violence of faction?  
Does a diversity of views in the executive open the door to a spirit of feebleness as surely and inexorably 
as a lack of constitutional checks and balances in the legislature opens the door to the spirit of faction?  
Why did Madison and Hamilton, the two principles authors of The Federalist, think it was so important 
to mix government powers, rather than merely separate them?  Are James Madison and Alexander 
Hamilton even of one mind on the subject of executive power and prerogative?
16
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 Madison and Hamilton shared a deep pessimism about human nature and its likely impact on national security 
policymaking.  They both appreciated the frequency with which fallible human beings tend to overestimate their 
analytical skills, underestimate the role of unintended consequences, and forget how often good intentions go 
dangerously awry.  Despite these philosophical similarities, however, most contemporary scholars assume that the 
views of these two theorists on executive power are incompatible.  Madison and Hamilton certainly had strong 
post-ratification disagreements about executive and legislative prerogatives.  But the differences between them, 
as we will see over the course of this dissertation, have been exaggerated.  Among the arguments I will make is 
10 
 
 A central claim in this dissertation is that when a nation is engaged in constitutional choice – an 
activity which, in the words of Vincent Ostrom, “need not be limited to constitutional conventions or 
constitutional amendments pertaining to national government, but can apply to all institutions of 
human governance” – it would be wise for its citizens to begin their deliberations with the principles 
that rightfully obsessed Madison and Hamilton as they analyzed which forms and structures would be 
best suited to a republican regime.
17
  Most contemporary students of political theory and defense 
reform are convinced that the organization of the national security state raises strictly sub-constitutional 
issues, but Madison’s theory of faction – the centerpiece of his constitutional theory – and Hamilton’s 
crucial distinction between insulated and non-insulated states – the centerpiece of his theory of 
international politics – suggest this is a mistaken assumption.   
That we live in a radically different world than American in the 1780s goes without saying.  
Might there still be “basic design principles that are sufficiently fundamental to apply to quite different 
times and places in human societies”?
18
  In general, I would like to believe I share Professor Ostrom’s 
professional modesty and reserve.  On this particular occasion, however, I think a fairly bold and 
assertive answer is in order.  There are indeed basic design principles set forth in The Federalist that are 
widely if not universally applicable and that defense reformers and national security experts have, to the 
nation’s detriment, largely ignored.  The irony of the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent 
amendments to this landmark piece of legislation – all experiments in constitutional choice – is that 
defense reformers engaged in debates about the institutional dynamics of the national security state did 
not engage with the same constitutional theory – the same intellectual tools – upon which our republic 
was founded. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that both Madison’s and Hamilton’s constitutional theory support the introduction of additional checks and 
balances into our constitutional system to better control the violence of national security factions. 
17
 Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of a Compound Republic (Lexington Books, 2007), p. 8.  
18
 Ibid., p. 9. 
11 
 
 Why do most defense reformers claim fidelity to our written constitution but largely ignore the 
constitutional theory upon which it was founded?  Part of the explanation for this neglect surely lies 
with the fact that very few political theorists have studied the creation and reform of the national 
security state.  How do we explain this disciplinary rigidity?  We would need the help of sociologists and 
intellectual historians to provide a thorough answer to this question, but political theory has largely 
ignored defense reform, I would suggest, because the discipline assumes that energy and deliberation 
represent a legitimate and illuminating dichotomy.
19
  Political theory does not seem to appreciate the 
profound difference between the strong executive, singular, and a strong executive department, and 
that, at least in a national security crisis, an executive branch properly designed can be both energetic 
and deliberative. 
Well-executed national security policies, as defense reformers are well aware, actually depend 
upon these supposedly antagonistic principles being integrated, and it is because of this widely 
recognized need for a process that is both energetic and deliberative that I argue we need to look 
beyond the conventional understanding of the executive department.  If we assume that a strong 
executive and careful deliberation are incompatible – if we assume that energy and deliberation is an 
                                                           
19
 The human mind seems somewhat addicted to these kinds of sharp juxtapositions.  The danger of “dualisms,” I 
would suggest, is that they obscure as much as they illuminate.  “If there’s anything we philosophers really hate it’s 
an untenable dualism.  Exposing untenable dualisms is a lot of what we do for a living.  It’s no small job, I assure 
you.  They (the dualisms, not the philosophers) are insidious, and they are ubiquitous; perpetual vigilance is 
required” (Jerry Fodor, “Where is my mind?” London Review of Books, Vol. 31, No. 3, 12 February, 2009, p. 13).  
Energy and deliberation may have represented an illuminating dichotomy at a certain stage in the development of 
republican theory – when legislatures were insufficiently deliberative and executive were practically impotent – 
but it is an impediment when we turn our attention to the improving the quality of statecraft in a state that has at 
least as much to fear from the tyranny of misalignment as the tyranny we associate with the abuse of political 
power and the loss of individual rights.  
12 
 
inflexible either / or and that the two problem-solving methods cannot coexist – it would never occur to 
us to think about introducing a deliberative separation of power inside the executive branch.
20
 
If we study the legislative and executive branches through a comparative lens, the energy / 
deliberation dichotomy makes sense.  Deliberation is slow and unwieldy, and therefore best suited to an 
procedurally patient, inclusive legislature.  Energy is characterized by speed and efficiency, and 
energetic decision-making, as we know, is a necessary characteristic of the executive.  But this 
theoretical juxtaposition rests on a misleading assumption: that, on the one hand, national emergencies 
require a unified executive – a branch of government that would only be bogged down by careful 
deliberation – and that, on the other hand, non-emergencies alone are amenable to a deliberative 
process.  But the great challenge for a nation in a national security crisis is not only to determine what 
poses a genuine threat to its security but, if civilian leaders decide that military force is required to meet 
this threat, to ensure that political aims are military means are properly aligned.  The later part of this 
fundamental challenge, Madison teaches us, can only be achieved through a formal deliberative 
process.  Unless the power to ensure a reasonably close alignment between political ends and military 
means is intermixed – unless this power is shared between civilians and soldiers – the national security 




                                                           
20
 I will make a distinction in Chapter 3 between legislative bodies, which are poorly equipped to participate in a 
national security crisis, and constitutional devices that are incorporated into a constitutional system to increase 
the odds that a decision-making process is genuinely deliberative. 
21
 Political scientist and national security scholar Richard Betts argues that policymakers tend to “lack sufficient 
awareness of how limitations of the means complicate and often derail the ends” (Richard K. Betts, “From Cold 
War to Hot Peace: The Habit of American Force,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 127, No. 3 (Fall 2012), p. 354.  To 
assume that the process of adjustment and adaptation is primarily one-directional – that only means have to adapt 
to ends – is, as I will argue in Chapter 3, as misguided as it is commonplace.  As historian William Emerson puts it, 
“The relationship of policy to strategy is a reciprocal one, for military requirements, as the military history of the 
twentieth century so clearly attests, impinge upon and often dislodge political purposes” (William Emerson, 




In his contributions to The Federalist, Hamilton offers a series of stinging rebukes to anyone 
inclined by temperament or experience to over-estimate the intelligence of deliberative processes.  He 
was certainly a passionate advocate of a strong, unitary executive department.  But we must not forget 
that his animated theoretical defense of unity reflected a distrust of state and national legislatures and a 
conviction that good administration is synonymous with good government.  No matter how attractive 
certain traditional republican principles might be, he argued, a government that was not well executed 
would flounder.  Hamilton, as a noted student of the founding era remarks, defends the idea that 
“administration is the beginning and end of government.”
22
  Given the strength of this conviction – his 
unshakeable belief that a good government is first and foremost a well administered government – it is 
not hard to imagine that if Hamilton were alive today, he would be unnerved by the level of 
incompetence in the planning and execution of our wars.   What is good administration in a national 
security crisis, after all, if not ensuring that political ends and military means are adequately aligned?  
Mismanagement was once the province of the legislature: hence the need for a strong executive 
department.  Today, in the domain of national security, mismanagement is an attribute of the executive, 
and unfortunately we cannot turn to the legislature to improve what it has never demonstrated a 
propensity to do well.
23
  The problem with our constitutional system, I would suggest, is that the authors 
of The Federalist did not anticipate the leverage future presidents would possess over national security 
                                                           
22
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 Is there a viable alternative to presidential supremacy in national security?  Even if we were convinced that 
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a different model of executive-legislative decision-making would produce better results?  Robert Dahl, for one, is 
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Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform (Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 85-86).  My argument 
in this dissertation is that we need to look inside the executive department for viable alternatives to presidential 
supremacy in national security, rather than search for new models of legislative-executive decision-making. 
14 
 
decision-making and thus sharply underestimated the need to control executive-branch faction.  
Hamilton and Madison were both cognizant of the enormous benefits that would accrue to the new 
nation as a result of its relative isolation from the tumultuous power struggles that characterized 
European affairs in the late eighteenth century.  But they mistakenly presumed that the basic laws of 
geography – the relative impermeability of oceans, mountains and deserts – would forever define the 
national security interests of the American republic.  As scholars in a radically non-insulated republic, 
the question we must therefore ask ourselves is this: Can the present constitution of the executive 
branch could be altered in a manner that would better keep factions better under control – that would 
add wisdom and stability to decision-making in a national security crisis – and do so without imposing 
the kind of restraints on executive action that would destroy energy and make a mockery of the idea of 
limited self-government?  Can we discover, as Schlesinger put it in the midst of the Vietnam War, a 
“middle ground between making the President a czar and making him a puppet”?
24
  
The second broad question this dissertation addresses – What is the political theory upon which 
our national security state was founded? – presents an elusive challenge, since few scholars approach 
the national security state and defense reform from the perspective of constitutional theorists.
25
  The 
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 Two examples of thoughtful political theorists who largely ignore defense reform: Robert Dahl, Congress and 
Foreign Policy (Norton, 1950); and Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2004).  
Two examples of thoughtful political scientists who do not engage in serious constitutional analysis: Richard 
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notion that civilian control over the military is essential for protecting the republic against tyranny goes 
back to the debates at the Constitutional Convention, and it has been the dominant principle in civil-
military relations ever since.
26
  With the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, our nation’s 
commitment to this principle was strongly reaffirmed.  The Hoover Commission report of 1949 
concluded that civilian control over the military needed to be strengthened in order to “safeguard our 
democratic traditions against militarism.”  In 1953, the Rockefeller Committee on defense organization 
made recommendations based on two overlapping principles: the challenge reformers faced was to 
provide the nation with “maximum security at minimum cost,” and to do so “without danger to our free 
institutions, based on the fundamental principle of civilian control of the military establishment.”
27
  
Conventional wisdom today also states rather calmly and unequivocally that civilian control of the 
military is a fundamental principle of good republican government. 
Scholars who write about a crisis in civil-military relations are usually referring to one of two 
things: either a vast disconnect between civilian and military cultures, or the complicated relationship 
between senior military leaders and their civilian counterparts in the legislative and executive branches.  
In the latter case, the crisis is described as a product of fraught relations between political actors 
competing for power and influence.  In this dissertation, civil-military relations are approached from a 
different perspective.  What we will focus on is the civil-military decision-making nexus – the top 
echelon of civilian and military leaders who plan and execute military actions in a national security crisis. 
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Defense reformers who study the relationship between top civilian and military leaders in the 
executive department tend to focus on two interrelated concerns: first, how effectively do existing 
institutions provide professional military advice up the chain-of-command, on budgeting and 
procurement issues as well as war planning and fighting; and, second, how well does the military 
conduct military operations.  These are serious and fundamental issues, but we will not be able to 
combat the tyranny of misalignment if we look at the military side of the civil-military equation in 
isolation.  The principle role of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is to provide military advice 
to civilian leaders.  The quality of advice moving up the chain of command certainly matters.  But 
factionalism inside the executive branch renders the quality issue somewhat mute: only when 




Although most defense reformers recognize the need for a constructive relationship between 
top civilians and military leaders, they have struggled mightily to identify ways to cultivate a more 
deliberative decision-making environment.
29
  Reformers focus most of their attention on eliminating 
service parochialism, improving joint operations, and promoting interagency cooperation.  The 
conundrum: civilians must exercise absolute control the military, and yet it is counterproductive when 
they dominate their military counterparts.  Absolute civilian control of the military requires strictly 
hierarchical decision-making structures, and this leaves us without a structural alternative to civilian 
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 The danger of political power is not simply that those who possess it are relatively free to act on their impulses 
and are less likely to have the patience to listen to opinions that differ from their own.  Power also exacerbates our 
noted inability to easily differentiate between praise that is warranted and praise that should be flagged for being 
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 Christopher Gibson and Don Snider defend a common normative ideal for civil-military relations.  The quality of 
national security policy would likely improve, they argue, as a consequence of a healthy debate “between well-
qualified and experienced civilians and military decision-makers sharing the responsibilities of national defense 
(Christopher Gibson and Don Snider, “Civil-Military Relations and the Potential to Influence,” Armed Forces & 
Society (Winter 1999), p. 213).  The question we should be asking ourselves, I would argue, is not what is the ideal 
for civil-military relations, since this is fairly easy to agree upon, but how can we design institutions so that our 
national security system will approximate this ideal with some regularity. 
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dominance.  If we take absolute civilian control as a foundational doctrine – if we agree with Peter 
Feaver that, “Regardless of how superior the military view of a situation may be, the civilian view trumps 
it” – we are left arguing for a new normative framework to manage civil-military relations.  But it is 
unrealistic to expect decision-making norms to change significantly and durably in the absence of 
significant structural reform – in the absence, in other words, of constitutional reform. 
 The underlying assumption of most defense reformers (not to mention most constitutional 
theorists) is that the decision-making structures and processes a president uses to design and execute 
defense policy are sub-constitutional features of government.
30
  This is why they place great emphasis 
on the importance of informal deliberative institutions within the executive branch but rarely explore 
the possibility that a subset of national security problems might be best addressed by introducing a 
formal deliberative body into the executive.  Many students of national security recognize the supreme 
value of having a president who is intellectually gifted and naturally inclined to deliberate, but this 
judgment has not led them to challenge the hierarchical relationships that presently define the national 
security decision-making nexus.  The constitutional problem – the fact that when groups within an 
administration disagree about how to respond to an national security crisis the decision-making process 
gets politicized; the politicization of the system increases the odds of non-deliberative practices 
dominating the decision-making process; and non-deliberative practices increase the odds of poor 
planning and incompetent execution – remains unresolved.
31
 
 The third question – Does the political theory of The Federalist inform the political theory of the 
national security state, as it would be reasonable to assume, or does the largely implicit political theory 
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of the latter represent a significant and potentially dangerous departure? – presented this student of 
the politics of the national security state with his most serious challenge: not only do I lack a set of 
experiences that would have provided me with unique insights into the national security decision-
making process – as an officer in the military, a combatant commander, a member of the JCS, a CIA 
officer, a national security expert working at the Pentagon, a secretary of defense, a national security 
advisor to the president – but a persuasive answer to this multi-faceted question will only be possible if I 
am able to answer the first two questions convincingly. 
 The United States began to play a significant role on the international stage a half-century or so 
before the creation of the national security state.  At the time, the proto-defense community was 
concerned with the challenge of integrating and expanding diffuse elements of national power.  This 
concern appears to be relatively straightforward.  The expansion of national power was somewhat 
controversial at the time – isolationists of various stripes were adverse to the idea of projecting 
American power – but integrating a state’s power resources is clearly a basic responsibility of a 
republican government.  This concern with integrating and expanding national power naturally played a 
significant role in the debates leading up to the passage of the 1947 National Security Act, and was a 
driving motivation in all subsequent defense reform efforts.  The desire to fully harness a state’s power 
resources is certainly a valid preoccupation.  But the resources at the disposal of one branch of 
government cannot be dramatically increased without having an impact on the balance of power in a 
constitutional system, which is delicate by nature.  What I will argue in this dissertation is that our 
superpower status – our evolution into a powerful non-insulated state – puts Madison and Hamilton’s 
constitutional system under stresses they did not anticipate.
32
  This presents a direct challenge to 
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 “Hamilton appears to have reflected the contemporary opinion in describing [the powers of the commander-in-
chief as ‘nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first general 
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“Under modern conditions of war, however, these vague powers have implications broader than any foreseen by 
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constitutional theorists interested in defense reform: if the modern architects of the national security 
state had focused on these new stresses, would they have thought differently about the constitutional 
of the executive branch?
33
 
Clausewitz’s once-innovative argument, that politicians need to be in control of war-planning 
and fighting because “there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, 
or of a purely military scheme to solve it,” is now conventional wisdom.
34
  War, we now understand, 
must be controlled by the “hand of politics.”  But we need to recognize that Clausewitz meant this in a 
very idiosyncratic sense. The hand in question is an abstraction.  Clausewitz was content to bracket off 
the political aspect of war.  This intellectual maneuver of abstraction liberates Clausewitz to focus on his 
theory of war, but a constitutional theorist does not have the luxury of turning his attention to a more 
circumscribed subject.
35
  In a republic, politicians – rather than “politics” or the “political point of view” 
– controls war.  The difference between politicians and politics?  Politicians, Madison teaches us, are 
best understood as individuals animated by the spirit of faction.  And this means we need to focus on 
how factiousness influences national security decision-making and not merely on subordinating the 
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military point of view to the political point of view.  Factions are certainly more likely to be anti-
deliberative than deliberative in character, and therefore pose an indirect, internal threat to national 
security on par with many direct, external threats. 
What political theorists and defense reformers need to focus on are the politics of national 
security: the political realities that constitutional theory has since its conception strived to understand 
and control.  Are the institutions that presently shape the politics of national security more likely to align 
political purposes and military objectives or fudge the gap between them?  The precise distribution of 
outcomes aside – this is a subject that even a supremely confident statistician would probably not want 
to tackle – if the latter is a plausible scenario, which the history of the national security state suggests 
that it is, then our institutions may be designed in a manner that grossly undervalues the need for a 
formal process of adjustment and adaptation.  “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of 
judgment that the statesman and commander have to make,” Clausewitz writes, “is to establish by that 
test the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, 
something that is alien to its nature.”  The present constitution of the executive branch, I would suggest, 
fails to take into consideration “the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”
36
  The 
process of adapting political purposes and military means – do we have such a process formally in place?  
Many scholars insist that civilians have a right to be wrong, irrespective of the just how wrong and how 
anti-deliberative they might be.  If there were no viable alternative constitutional arrangements – if the 
political theory of the Founders offered us no potential remedies for the problem of ends-means 
harmonization – he would of course be correct.  But I am not convinced that our theoretical inheritance 
is quite so impoverished.
37
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Here is the central argument in this dissertation, stated abstractly:  There is a problem with how 
our government works, and constitutional theory offers a potential solution.  The problem, 
unfortunately, has not attracted the attention of many political theorists and, as a result, the military 
historians, national security experts and soldier-scholars who have been searching for a solution to the 
problem have not considered the full range of constitutional devices available to them.  The absence of 
a conversation between political theorists and defense reformers, I am convinced, has left our nation in 
a precarious position. 
 The goal of this dissertation is therefore to begin what I believe is a long-overdue conservation.  
Political theorists have ignored the crucial challenge of ends-means alignment, and defense reformers 
have failed to engage with constitutional theory at a level that would generate potential solutions to a 
seemingly irresolvable problem. 
 Is a conversation between these strangers even possible?  Is the simple fact that a serious 
conversation has not already taken place evidence that defense reformers have no more to learn from 
political theorists, and political theorists have no more to learn from defense reformers, than, for 
example, astronomers and oncologists have to learn from each other?   
 The assumption shared by almost all defense reformers is that the constitutional issues related 
to the national security state were settled 225 years ago.  The assumption shared by almost all political 
theorists is that although there is some ambiguity about the meaning of certain articles and clauses in 
the Constitution, the institutional dynamics inside the executive branch do not lend themselves to 
constitutional analysis.  Both defense reformers and political theorists, I hope to persuade readers, have 
been remiss in their mutual neglect: constitutional theory has a great deal to contribute to 
contemporary defense reform debates.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
his policy choices to the public at large, but he should have to justify and defend his decisions to knowledgeable 
insiders who might not agree with his assumptions. 
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 The constitutional theory on which our republic was founded, I will argue over the course of this 
dissertation, is not the constitutional theory on which our national security state was founded.  This 
claim will undoubtedly strike political theorists as a bit peculiar.  If the legislation that created the 
national security state in 1947 had violated the Constitution, it would surely have been declared 
unconstitutional by the judiciary.  Most defense reformers, I suspect, will respond to my assertion 
combatively.  They are students of the national security state, after all, and firmly believe that its 
complex organization, if flawed in certain respects, nevertheless remains entirely consistent with the 
fundamental law of the land.   
 The discomfort of constitutional theorists, I would suggest, can be largely explained by a lack of 
familiarity with the actual defense reform debates that produced the National Security Act of 1947 and 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986; the stridency of defense reformers, by a preoccupation with the 
basic divisions outlined in the written Constitution that has prohibited a deeper understanding of the 
theoretical arguments that recommend the specific forms and structures in our deceptively simple 
constitutional system. 
 The first part of this dissertation – Chapters 1-5 – has two primary objectives.  It is partly an 
analysis of The Federalist, which is where we find the theoretical arguments behind the specific forms 
and principles that define our constitutional system.  The intent of this discussion is to encourage 
defense reformers to think about the constitutional theory on which our republic was founded.  In these 
essays we find not only a defense of our constitutional system but an explanation as to why other 
competing principles and forms were ultimately rejected, and this is precisely the kind of discussion that 
has not been a part of defense reform debates.   
The second objective is to illuminate aspects of Madison’s and Hamilton’s political thought that 
have been neglected, underweighted or misinterpreted in the political theory literature.  The political 
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problems and personal prejudices that inspire us to return to historical documents obviously influence 
how we interpret them.  If we are concerned with the unequal distribution of capital in contemporary 
America, for example, we are unlikely to wonder why Madison did not seem to pay much attention to 
the problem of national security factions.  Similarly, if we are interested in Hamilton’s defense of 
executive prerogative, we are unlikely to focus our attention on his theory of international politics, 
which distinguishes between insulated and non-insulated states, and explore the implications of this 
distinction for the delicate balance between the requisites to energy and safety in the constitution of 
the executive department. 
I do not know how original my arguments are in these chapters – nor whether my research was 
driven more by the spirit of problem solving or the spirit of prejudice – but I would like to believe that 
my investigations benefit from having approached the arguments in The Federalist from a fairly unique 
perspective.  Does constitutional theory have anything to teach us about how to ensure a reasonable 
alignment of political ends and military means in a national security crisis?   This question, as we shall 
see, translates surprisingly well into the language of The Federalist.  How, borrowing Hamilton’s 
conceptual vocabulary, do we balance the requisites to energy and safety in the executive branch, once 
we transition from an insulated to a non-insulated state?  How, shifting to Madison’s conceptual 
vocabulary, do we control the violence of faction in a national security crisis?  
 Chapter 2 is a fairly lengthy discussion of Madison’s theory of faction.  I pursue two basic 
arguments in this chapter.  In the first section I argue that Madison’s theory of faction has been 
interpreted in two fundamentally different ways, and that only a strong theory of faction is consistent 
with Madison’s broader constitutional theory.  A weak theory of faction, which is popular in the political 
theory literature, prevents us from appreciating the magnitude and multi-dimensionality of the threat 
that the violence of faction poses to republican government.  The second basic argument I make is that 
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constitutional checks and balances are best understood as auxiliary mechanisms designed not merely to 
prevent inter-departmental encroachment and usurpation, as many political theorists assume, but also 
to promote deliberation (inter-departmental and intra-departmental) and thereby minimize the violence 
of faction that emanates from within the individual departments of government.  These two arguments, 
combined, provide the theoretical foundation upon which subsequent chapters build.  When we analyze 
the institutional structures of the national security state with Madison’s theory of faction as one of our 
primary intellectual tools, we realize that the problem of ends-means harmonization is a problem of 
faction.  Ends-means disharmony, to put it somewhat differently, is an unanticipated consequence of 
the violence of faction.  If there is a constitutional solution, therefore, it will involve a blending and 
intermixing of a tightly circumscribed power.  The specific proposal I sketch in Chapter 8 – the 
centerpiece of which is a limited veto for the chairman of the JCS, based on an intermixing of the power 
to declare ends and means sufficiently aligned – owes its genesis to Madison’s insistence that the 
greatest advantage of a well-constructed republic is its tendency to break and control the violence of 
faction, and that we should endorse “any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is 
attached, provides a proper cure for it.”
38
 
 In Chapter 3 I introduce Clausewitz’s theoretical injunction regarding the necessity of aligning 
political ends and military means into the discussion.  At least as important as the decision to go to war 
or not is the process by which political ends and military means are harmonized inside the executive 
department before an armed conflict begins.  In the absence of a process of ends-means adjustment 
and adaptation, war will only be a sensible, intelligent activity if political ends and military means 
fortuitously align.
39
  Can this essential process be formalized?  Clausewitz was not a political theorist.  
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Madison, as we know, was not a theorist of war.  Both theorists, however, were exceptionally astute 
observers of human and political behavior, and it is by putting them into conversation that we are able 
to formulate the central problem this dissertation addresses: How do we ensure that factions within the 
executive branch – be they comprised of civilians or soldiers – are strongly discouraged from initiating a 
war in which political purposes and military means are inadequately aligned? 
I also argue in this chapter that we need to adopt an institutional conception of the national 
interest – that we need to build upon Madison’s institutional conception of the public interest – and 
that the national interest is best understood as the creation and maintenance of a deliberative core 
inside the executive branch.  Political ends and military means can only be harmonized through a 
deliberative process.  We have inherited a constitutional system, however, in which deliberation inside 
the executive takes place only on a voluntary basis.  As a consequence, the process of harmonizing ends 
and means is often only superficially deliberative.  Madison teaches us that constitutional checks and 
balances improve the quality of lawmaking and statecraft by forcing lawmakers and statesmen to 
deliberate.  Madison also teaches us that lawmakers and statesmen must be forced to deliberate since 
human beings in positions of power have an understandable tendency to disdain deliberative processes.  
I argue in this chapter that we need to introduce constitutional checks and balances into the executive 
branch – that the national interest is best understood as the creation and maintenance of a formal 
deliberative body inside the executive department – for precisely these two reasons.  The principle of 
voluntary deliberation is simply no match for the anti-deliberative instincts of most men and women, 
even in a national security crisis. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
foreign to their nature” (Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 608).  It goes without saying that there are few military or 
political geniuses in the world, much less political and military geniuses, and that although republics may on 
occasion win the representational lottery – elect presidents who combine in themselves a set of talents and 
perspectives that almost defy our understanding of human nature – they will not last for long if they are not 
acutely respectful of the odds. 
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Past a certain point, I realize, constitutional checks and balances are as likely to degrade the 
quality of lawmaking and statecraft as to improve them, but I am convinced we have not yet reached 
this point of diminishing returns.  A Madison-Clausewitz synthesis suggests that a deliberative 
separation of power inside the executive branch would offer our nation greater security against the 
danger of ends-means misalignment than the informal mechanisms that presently characterize the 
executive department, and that the risks of formalization would be minimal. 
 The final two chapters in Part I of this dissertation represent a departure from the theoretical 
discussion outlined above.  Chapter 4 is a critique of the argument put forth by Harvey Mansfield in 
favor of one-man rule.  Mansfield offers the most rigorous, systematic defense of the necessity of a 
strong, unitary executive in our constitutional order – of the idea that a great deal of discretionary 
power must be available to the commander-in-chief for a republic to survive and flourish in a dangerous 
world.  What I argue in this chapter is a comparative lens is what enables students of presidency to 
determine whether or not the executive has sufficient power to meet her responsibilities, and that this 
lens leads to the mistaken conclusion that no decision-making process in the executive branch can be 
genuinely deliberative.  Energy, secrecy, dispatch and decision, I argue, can be preserved in a republican 
system of government without yielding to the so-called necessity of one-man rule.  The great theoretical 
innovation of the Founders was not the smuggling of monarchial power into our constitutional order, as 
Mansfield insists, but amending the doctrine of the separate of powers so that the spirit of faction, 
whether it obtained a foothold inside or outside of government, would be frustrated by a combination 
of the constitutional means and personal motives of other political actors.  As Hamilton puts it, 
constitutional checks and balances are the “powerful means” by which “the excellencies of republican 
government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided.”
40
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 In Chapter 5 I argue that the Founders did not think systematically about the relationship 
between constitutional theory and international politics, and that the present constitution of the 
executive branch suffers as a consequence.  Jay and Hamilton make a very strong case for union, based 
on a structural theory of international politics that predicts a disastrous, bloody result if state 
legislatures vote for disunion.  They argue convincingly that any peaceful interlude between the 
disunited states would be destroyed by the interests, enmities, hopes and fears of citizens and leaders in 
these new political communities, but this does not lead them to the conclusion, consistent with their 
own assumptions, that citizens and executives in a united republic might one day be as vulnerable to 
these corrupting influences as those in the disunited states. 
The distinction Hamilton makes between insulated and non-insulated states is crucial for our 
discussion.  Hamilton does not present us with a constitutional system suited to any republic, 
irrespective of its relative international power, but an insulated republic.   In a non-insulated state, he 
argues, too much power will inevitably accrue to the executive, and the requisites to energy and safety – 
safety from the abuse of executive power – will be dangerously imbalanced.  The implication of 
Hamilton’s argument is clear: our constitutional system was designed for an insulated state, and a state 
with standing armies and a permanent military establishment, not to mention hegemonic international 




 Part II of this dissertation – Chapters 6-8 – begins with an analysis of the creation of our national 
security state and ends with a defense reform proposal that I argue is consistent with the political 
theory of The Federalist.  Chapter 6 is a study of the National Security Act of 1947.  A global power with 
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 Most contemporary scholars assume that because our permanent military establishment has not led to recurring 
outbreaks of conventional tyranny – the destruction of civil and political rights – we can comfortably embrace the 
present constitution of the executive department.  But Hamilton’s theory of international politics provides us with 
good reason to question whether the requisites to energy and safety in the executive remain properly balanced. 
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a permanent military establishment, it was widely understood by reformers, could not rely on the 
informal, impermanent national security structures that had previously characterized the state.  
Institutional innovation was needed.  What I argue in this chapter is that the founders of our national 
security state weighed a different set of principles and forms as institutional designers than the founders 
of our republic.  Constitutional theory is rightly obsessed with what I call boundary questions.  Where 
are we to draw the line between what constitutes too much and too little power in the hands of key 
political actors?  The participants in the “constitutional convention” of 1945-1947, I argue, tiptoed 
around these kinds of questions.  They did not ask themselves when the risk of significant power being 
abused is greater than the danger of power being insufficiently concentrated (partly because they could 
not imagine effective civilian control of the military evolving into civilian dominance in matters 
previously understood to belong to the military sphere of authority).  The constitutional problem of 
national security decision-making in a non-insulated state – of balancing the requisites to energy and 
safety in the constitution of the executive branch – was not a subject of debate. 
 Let me elaborate on the admittedly imperfect analogy mentioned above as a way of introducing 
the arguments I present in Chapter 7.  The framers of our national security state, I would suggest, have 
more in common with the framers of the Articles of Confederation than the framers of the Constitution.  
This is why I am more of a respectful student than critic of General Marshall, President Truman, 
Secretary Forrestal, Ferdinand Eberstadt and other leading defense reform figures in the 1940s.  But just 
as the framers of our Constitution had a wealth of experience under the Articles of Confederation to 
draw upon, and we would be critical of them today if they had not relaxed their theoretical allegiances 
to reflect this experience, defense reformers in the 1980s had almost forty years of experience with the 
structures of the national security state, and criticism would be warranted if they failed to respond to 
these experiences creatively.  What I argue in this chapter is that most advocates of the Goldwater-
Nichols Act of 1986 fixated on military reform rather than on the broader and more substantive issue of 
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defense reform, despite mounting evidence that some of the forms and principles on which the national 
security state was founded were not based on workable concepts. 
 Chapter 8 begins with a discussion of the contemporary defense reform movement and ends 
with an analysis of a reform proposal that I argue is consistent with both Madison’s and Hamilton’s 
constitutional theory and that represents only a modest structural departure from the national security 
system we presently have in place.  Most contemporary defense reformers recognize the supreme 
importance of functional civil-military relations.  They believe it is imperative that civilian and military 
leaders maintain a climate favorable to deliberation.
42
  Nevertheless, these same reformers fail to 
appreciate the fact that formal constitutional mechanisms are required to promote the very degree of 
deliberation they consider essential.  As a result, none of the defense reform proposals presently in 
circulation address the problem of reconciling political ends and military means when they do not 
fortuitously align.   
I arrived at a deliberative separation of power inside the executive department – a limited veto 
in the hands of the chairman of the JSC – as a partial solution to the ends-means problem based on the 
importance of four key constitutional issues: the need for constitutional checks and balances to combat 
the violence of faction; the necessity of executive energy; the demand for wisdom and stability in the 
administration of government; and the positive correlation between the independence of individual 
political actors and the caliber of their performance. 
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 The ideal for the civil-military relations – for how statesmen and generals should deliberate on the compatibility 
of political ends and military means – is as unrealistic as it is widely cited.  To take one example, Paul Yingling 
argues that if our nation is to prevail in a war, generals must, to begin with, provide statesmen with an accurate 
estimation of the strategic possibilities.  “The general is responsible for estimating the likelihood of success in 
applying force to achieve the aims of policy.  The general describes both the means necessary for the successful 
prosecution of war and the ways in which the nation will employ those means.  If the policymaker desires ends for 
which the means he provides are insufficient, the general is responsible for advising the statesman of this 
incongruence.  The statesman must then scale back the ends of policy or mobilize popular passions to provide 
greater means” (Paul Yingling, “A Failure in Generalship,” p. X).  Constitutional theory teaches us that the 
expectations embedded in this ideal simply cannot be realized in a strictly hierarchical system.   
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 We can no longer afford to assume, I argue in this chapter, that the president should sit, 
unopposed, unchecked and unbalanced, at the top of the chain of command.  Nor can we continue to 
assume that the ideal for civil-military relations is a clear and enforceable division of labor between 
political and military responsibilities.  We must therefore place more trust in the men and women who 
fight our wars and are most likely to possess the kind of experience and expertise required to ensure 
that military means are properly aligned with the political goals of our civilian leaders.  The chairman of 
the JCS, I would suggest, needs to possess sufficient “energy” to force his civilian counterparts to 
participate in a genuinely deliberative process.  How much trust should we place in such a military 
figure?  How do we create a military officer who would be powerful enough to promote a process of 
ends-means alignment in a national security crisis without being so powerful that he would weaken 
civilian control of the military?  A chairman should only be independent enough – “energetic” enough – 
to defend the nation against the tyranny of misalignment.
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 Only by blending and intermixing of the power to decide on the relative consistency of political 
ends and military means – only by relaxing the doctrines of the unitary executive and absolute civilian 
control of the military – can we ensure that our wars are fought wisely and effectively and not 
characterized by wanton destruction.  “The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us 
take war more seriously, not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of 
humanity.”
44
  I quote Clausewitz here because I want to make it clear that this dissertation was written 
not because I have fundamental moral objections to war but because I am convinced that most defense 
reformers and political theorists do not take war seriously enough. 
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 Even with a deliberative separation of power in place, the president would only “depend” on his top military 
advisor to the extent that he must participate in a formal deliberative process if he decides to deploy military 
forces to pursue his political objectives.  No matter what the chairman advises or recommends – no matter how 
strongly he might disagree with the judgment of his civilian counterparts – the president would be under no 
obligation to use military force if he thinks that doing so would be unwise or ineffective. 
44
 Clausewitz, p. 260. 
31 
 
2 Madison’s Theory of Faction 
 
The aim of every political constitution is or ought to be to first obtain for rulers of men who possess most 
wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of society; and in the next place, to take 
the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold the public trust. 
- James Madison 
 
If a man remembers how very many times he has been wrong in his judgment, will it not be foolish of 
him not to mistrust it ever after? 
- Michel de Montaigne 
 
Who is man?  Is he a rational animal?  If he is, then the goals can ultimately be achieved.  If he is not, 
then there is little point in making the effort.  All the evidence of history suggests that man is indeed a 
rational animal but with a near infinite capacity for folly. 
- Robert McNamara 
 
 
Political theory as an academic discipline traditionally focuses on domestic politics, rather than 
international politics, and this once-understandable bias means that constitutional theorists and 
institutional designers past and present have largely concentrated on creating and maintaining the kind 
of inter-departmental institutions that protect the rights and dignity of citizens against the abuse of 
government power.  Political theory – and this includes the political theory of The Federalist – has been 
much less attentive to the question of how best to protect a liberal democracy from factions inside the 
executive department – from individuals and groups that put lives and treasure unnecessarily at risk by 
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misusing their decision-making power in a national security crisis.  Domestic tyranny, in other words, 
rather than the tyranny of misalignment, has captured the attention of the discipline.  
The purpose of this chapter is to persuade readers that a strong theory of faction should be one 
of our primary intellectual tools when we analyze the institutional structures of the national security 
state.  Over the course of this dissertation I will argue that the principles and forms on which our 
national security state was founded are based on unworkable concepts.  Part of the explanation for this 
unsuitability is that defense reformers and political theorists usually adopt a truncated definition of 
faction and therefore underestimate the forces that must be controlled if a constitutional system is to 
be successful. 
Experience under the Articles of Confederation taught friends of popular government that the 
“principles and forms” that inspired our nation’s first constitution were not based on “workable 
concepts.”
1
  Precisely how unworkable they were – whether or not they could have been salvaged 
through incremental, piecemeal reform – we cannot know with certainty, since this particular 
experiment in constitutional choice was never conducted.  But the delegates to the constitutional 
convention in 1787 did adopt a dramatic, innovative program of reform, and their arguments for doing 
so ultimately proved persuasive.  As Madison argued in The Federalist, No. 37, “the existing 
Confederation is founded on principles which are fallacious,” and we must therefore “change this first 
foundation, and with it the superstructure resting upon it.”
2
 
Was there a single overarching principle introduced into the constitution of the new 
government that illuminates the fundamental differences between our republic before and after it 
adopted a new foundation – and that should play a more central role in the design of our national 
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 I borrow this terminology from Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of a Compound Republic (Lexington Books, 
2007).  
2
 James Madison, The Federalist (Everyman, 1992), No. 37, Paragraph 6. 
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security state?  Patterns of political behavior under our revolutionary-era system of government had 
convinced many friends of republican government that traditional republican theory had to be amended 
if republicanism was to be redeemed.  Merely placing great power directly into the hands of the people 
and their representatives was clearly not the antidote to tyranny and injustice that republican theory 
had promised.  Republican majorities proved they could exercise power as unjustly as absolute 
monarchs.  Representatives of the people proved they could disregard the rights and interests of their 
constituents as readily as unelected government officials.  But what precisely did traditional republican 
theory lack?  What theoretical breakthrough recommended a new set of forms, principles and 
relationships?  What omission – what theoretical blind spot – led to the structural demise of the 
confederacy?
3
   
The greatest weakness of the government structures adopted by the Articles of Confederation, 
the evidence suggests, was their pervasive susceptibility to what Madison identified as the greatest 
internal threat to popular government.  But the problem was not merely that our post-independence 
system of government lacked an adequate remedy for the violence of faction – for the “instability, 
injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils” by factions, the “mortal diseases under 
which popular governments have everywhere perished.”
4
  More critically, it lacked a theory of faction 
that could have illuminated what such a structural remedy might look like.  The principle difference 
between the unworkable concepts that informed the Articles of Confederation and the workable 
concepts that inform our present constitutional system is a better understanding of the forces that must 
be controlled if a popular system of government is to be successful.  A theory of faction – a strong 
theory of faction, rather than a weak theory of faction, as I will explain over the course of this chapter – 
                                                           
3
 I do not want to clutter this discussion with constant references to defense reform, but all of the questions I raise 
in this and next chapter have two basic purposes: first, to clarify the constitutional theory on which our republic 
was founded; and, second, to present a new, alternative theoretical approach to defense reform. 
4
 James Madison, The Federalist, No. 10, Paragraph 1. 
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is what enables us to weigh the inevitable tradeoffs that must be made within any single constitutional 
system.  The structural innovations that would be adopted by the new republic to ensure a just and 
stable republican regime – a self-limiting popular sovereign, which the republic under the Articles of 





1. Extend the Sphere.  Madison served in the Virginia delegation to Congress for three years in the early 
1780s (delegates to the national legislature under the Articles of Confederation could only serve for a 
total of three out of any six years), and the Virginia state assembly for a similar length of time before, in 
the summer of 1786, embarking on a tour of other states to debate the future of the confederacy.
6
  At 
this juncture in his complimentary careers as a politician and a political theorist, Madison understood 
clearly the fundamental challenge the American experience with self-government presented to 
conventional republican theory.
7
  “There is no maxim in my opinion which is more likely to be 
misapplied, and which therefore more needs elucidation,” Madison observed, “than the current one 
that the interest of the majority is the political standard of right and wrong.”
8
      
                                                           
5
 The questions in this paragraph are the kind we will apply directly to defense reform in future chapters.  What 
forces must be controlled in a national security crisis if a popular system of government is to be successful?  Does 
the present constitution of the executive branch expose us to an unnecessary degree to the deleterious effects of 
faction? 
6
 See Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution (Vintage, 1997); Ralph 
Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography (University of Virginia, 1990); Irving Brant, James Madison (Bobbs Merrill, 
1941); Drew R. McCoy, The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy, (Cambridge University 
Press, 1991); and Gary Wills, James Madison (Times Books, 2002). 
7
 I do not think it is a coincidence that the most insightful reformers at the constitutional convention were 
experienced politicians as well as students of political theory and government.  It should also not come as a 
surprise that some of the most insightful defense reformers, as we will see in the second part of this dissertation, 
have been soldier-scholars, men with a solid feel for the realities of war and politics. 
8
 James Madison to James Monroe, October 5, 1786, The Writings of James Madison (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1900). 
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The formula for good government was not quite as simple as the republican revolutionaries had 
assumed: just because citizens elected members of their state assemblies by popular vote and were 
represented at the national level by state delegations did not guarantee that lawmakers would 
deliberate with the general interest of the Union, the particular interest of their individual states, and 
the rights of minorities always and simultaneously in the forefront of their minds.  The Articles of 
Confederation deserved credit for adopting a scheme of representation at the state and national levels, 
but as a comprehensive constitutional system it was incapable of protecting individual rights and the 
public interest against the machinations of factious rulers.  The underlying premise of republican 
government – that the majority could be trusted to rule wisely through a basic scheme of representation 
– had to be reconsidered.   
Power concentrated in the hands of the people, students of popular government discovered, is 
as dangerous as power concentrated in the hands of a monarch or prince.  Madison summarized the 
mood of alarm among friends of popular government: 
 
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, 
equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that 
our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of 
rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of 





The crux of the problem was that the minimal restraints on legislative misrule adopted by the framers of 
the Articles of Confederation proved to be no match for the factious spirit that had brought ruin to so 
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 Madison, The Federalist, No. 10, Paragraph 1.  Majority faction is a disease unique to popular government.  This 
does not mean, however, that minority factions do not present an equal or greater threat to stability and justice in 
a republican regime.  We need to keep in mind that popular governments share this affliction with all other types 
of regimes, and that Madison was concerned with both sources of misrule and instability. 
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many past experiments in self-government.  The indictment had a two-fold character: first, state 
assemblies were infused with a spirit of faction that was responsible for a spate of opprobrious 
legislation; and, second, the parochial interests that animated individual state delegations to the 
national legislature rendered the central government (already weak by design) effectively impotent.  
The political wisdom and self-restraint of the people and their representatives, to state it somewhat 
differently, had proven to be an illusory pillar of popular government. 
Madison’s genius lay not in identifying these disturbing patterns of legislative behavior but in 
proposing a solution to what many other students of politics considered an intractable problem.  A 
popular government must “secure the public good and private rights” against the danger of majority 
and minority factions, and yet it must do so in a manner that preserves “the spirit and the form of 
popular government.”
10
  His ability to reconcile these competing ideals – to find republican remedies for 
republican diseases – is why he is generally recognized as America’s preeminent political theorist.
11
   
Here is how Madison opens The Federalist, No. 10, the essay in which he introduces his theory 
of faction and defends what he considers a partial cure for popular government’s most dangerous vice: 
 
Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves 
to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of 
faction.  The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for 
their character and fate as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous 
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 Madison, The Federalist, No. 10, Paragraph 11. 
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 I do not mean to imply he reconciled these competing ideals to everyone’s satisfaction.  Nor that he is 
universally recognized as our preeminent political theorist.  Hamilton, for example, clearly made an invaluable 
contribution to the theory behind our constitution, but we can safely assert that he was less enamored with the 
republican principle than Madison.  See Lance Banning, “The Hamiltonian Madison: A Reconsideration,” Virginia 
Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 92, No. 1 (January 1984); and Neil Riemer, “The Republicanism of James 
Madison,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 69, No. 1 (March 1954). 
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vice.  He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating 




The violence of faction must be broken and controlled, he argues, because popular governments 
without a cure for faction will succumb to “instability, injustice and confusion,” and ultimately perish.  It 
may seem obvious to readers today that eliminating faction – imposing uniformity of thought and belief 
on a diverse population through force or indoctrination – is merely a rhetorical alternative to breaking 
and controlling faction.  But recognizing the extent to which the causes of faction are “sown in the 
nature of man,” and therefore cannot be eliminated, was merely a starting point for Madison’s 
reflections on institutional design.  What distinguishes Madison as a constitutional theorist is his 
insistence that there is a republican remedy for the kind of intra-societal strife that is inevitable in a 
popular government and that previous theorists had assumed could only be mitigated through non-
republican means.
13
      
 Here is Madison’s definition of faction, which he presents at an early juncture in the essay: 
 
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or 
minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of 
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and 




This is a definition with which most of us are familiar.  A faction is a majority or minority that presents a 
threat to the rights of others or the public good.  What I want to suggest is that this definition of faction 
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 Madison, The Federalist, No. 10, Paragraph 1. 
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 Inevitable in all governments, all societies of men.  Only in theory – utopian theory – is intra-societal strife not an 
enduring political problem. 
14
 Madison, The Federalist, No. 10, Paragraph 2. 
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can be interpreted in two different ways – has in fact been understood by theorists of American political 
thought in two different ways – and that these alternative interpretations (which Madison inadvertently 
encouraged, as I will explain below) lead us to think differently about the magnitude of the problem 
faction presents to popular government.
15
 
Let us recall that a common impulse of passion or of interest can actuate a faction; that a faction 
can be adverse to the rights of other citizens or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the 
community; and that a faction can consist of a majority or a minority.  Let us also keep in mind that we 
rely on theories of human behavior to inform our arguments for and against specific design features in a 
republican regime.  What I want to suggest here is that we end up with two different theories of faction 
depending on how sensitive we remain to the various components in Madison’s definition, and that this 
has significant implications for our understanding of institutional design.
16
  A strong theory of faction 
keeps in circulation all six variables in the definition, while a weak theory of faction neglects one or 
more.  What I will suggest over the course of this chapter is that it is partly because Madison shifts 
somewhat unwittingly between a strong and weak theory of faction at various points in The Federalist, 
No. 10 that so many contemporary political scientists interpret Madison primarily as a defender of 
private property, and so few defense reformers analyze the structures of our national security state in 
terms of their ability to control the violence of faction.
17
  I am not interested in uncovering a causal 
explanation for this neglect – the purpose of this chapter, as I mentioned earlier, is to suggest that a 
strong theory of faction should be one of our primary intellectual tools when we analyze the 
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 I argue later in this dissertation that even Madison underestimated the magnitude of the problem, due to his 
relative disinterest in the constitution of the executive department and his understandable inability to imagine the 
challenges of crisis decision-making in a non-insulated state (in Chapter 5 I elaborate on the fundamental 
difference between insulated and non-insulated states). 
16
 David Epstein also makes a distinction between interested factions and passionate factions in his study of The 
Federalist, No. 10.  See David Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist (University of Chicago, 1984).  
17
 The emphasis on the protection of property has a distinguish legacy that spans the last century.  For early and 
latter versions of this argument, see, respectively, Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of 
the United States (Dover, 2004); and Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American 
Constitutionalism: The Madison Framework and its Legacy (University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
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institutional structures of the national security state – but recognizing that there are two plausible 
interpretations of Madison’s theory of faction, and understanding the difference between them, will 
help clarify my larger claim.  Before I pursue this argument further, however, I think it would be helpful 
to return to Madison’s experience as a legislator under the Articles of Confederation to flush out his 
understanding of what constitutes an actual faction.  It was as a legislator, after all, that Madison began 
to appreciate the enormity of the challenge that the spirit of faction poses to popular government. 
 Biographers of Madison, historians of the revolutionary era, and students of American political 
thought inform us that a broad set of experiences from his tenure as a state legislator, and later as a 
national legislator, weighed heavily on Madison’s mind as he developed his theory of faction.  In “Vices 
of the Political System of the United States,” written early in 1787, Madison summarized his criticisms of 
the Articles of Confederation in a kind of proto bullet-point format that helped structure his thoughts 
without suppressing his palpable frustration with the poor quality of state legislation.  “Paper money, 
instalments of debts, occlusion of Courts, and making property a legal tender” are characterized as 
“aggressions” on the rights of other states.  If a state legislature is presented with a “temptation” to 
encroach on federal authority or the rights of other states it will inevitably do so, embarking on courses 
of action that are “destructive of the general harmony.”  A “want of concert” describes most instances 
in which the national dignity and the common interest require coordinated action.  The “fatal omission” 
responsible for these developments was a “mistaken confidence that the justice, the good faith, the 
honor, the sound policy, of the several legislative assemblies would render superfluous any appeal to 
the ordinary motives by which the laws secure the obedience of individuals.”  In addition to the 
aforementioned problems of inter-state rivalry, state violations of international laws and treaties, and a 
pervasive disregard of federal statutes and appeals, state legislatures had a distinct propensity to over-
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legislate, a habit which led to laws being “repealed or superseded, before any trial can have been made 
of their merits” – an instability in legislation that was a nuisance of the most “pestilent kind.”
18
 
This is a large and expansive catalogue of the mischiefs of faction.  Had lawmakers in the 
thirteen republics proven adept at legislating in a manner that respected minority rights and reflected 
the general interests of society, the Articles of Confederation would have remained the fundamental law 
of the land (if not for two hundred and thirty-five years, at least for an extended period of time).  
Experience taught Madison, however, that whenever a majority faction was presented with an 
opportunity to seize government power and impose its designs on a minority – whether the majority be 
comprised of “debtors, creditors, planters, merchants, manufacturers, members of a certain religious 
sect, inhabitants of a particular region, or some other political, economic, or cultural group” – it would 
rarely refrain from doing so.
19
  Experience also taught Madison that a mere dependence on the people, 
in terms of regular elections, did not mean that representatives would be free of the spirit of faction.
20
  
Representatives might be less factious than the population at large, but under the Articles of 
Confederation this provided little consolation. 
Let us now return to my claim that Madison presents us with the equivalent of two theories of 
faction.
21
  I do not mean to suggest that these theories are incompatible.  For Madison, different 
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 James Madison, “Vices of the Political System of the United States,” available at: hhtp://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/ documents/v1ch5s16.html. 
19
 Charles F. Hobson, “The Negative on State Laws: James Madison, the Constitution, and the Crisis of Republican 
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 I should point out here that regular elections are one of the two requisites to security against the abuse of 
executive power (the other being impeachment).  I argue in Chapter 8 that the requisites to energy and security in 
the executive branch are no longer properly balanced.  If we want to ensure that political ends and military means 
are adequately aligned, we cannot rely on constitutional mechanisms that are designed for an insulated state and 
that are only triggered after the fact – after a war with misaligned ends and means has already commenced and 
significant obstacles exist to rational adjustment and adaptation.  We should not, in other words, rely too heavily 
on corrective mechanisms that take effect only after lives and treasure have already been lost. 
21
 I arrived at this particular conclusion after engaging with Epstein’s sensitive reading of The Federalist, No. 10.  He 
makes a helpful distinction between interested and passionate factions.  I prefer to talk about a strong and weak 
theory of faction because I am interested not only in the nature of factions, but how best to control them in a 
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practical problems forced him to emphasize different aspects of a single theory of faction.  But the only 
way to explain why a weak theory of faction has been so influential in the political science literature is to 
appreciate the extent to which Madison appears to drift between two substantively different theories of 
faction in The Federalist, No. 10.  Madison’s strong, all-inclusive theory of faction, I would suggest, is a 
response to the following historically-grounded prediction: “As long as the reason of man continues 
fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed.”
22
  Madison argues that 
man’s fallible reason presents a grave threat to popular governments because it is frequently an object 
of man’s self-love.  When citizens, legislators or statesmen are heavily invested in erroneous 
assumptions – when identity, ideology and personal convictions collaborate at the political level – 
popular governments are particularly vulnerable.  I call this a strong theory of faction because majorities 
and minorities are implicated; rational, well-intentioned arguments are as potentially destructive as 
irrational (or unscrupulous) arguments; and both the rights of other citizens and the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community are at risk.  It is also a strong theory of faction because the spirit 
of faction is understood to pervade both society and government, and its all-pervasiveness, as we shall 
see later in this chapter, necessitates constitutional checks and balances as well as social checks and 
balances to properly control it. 
 A weak theory of faction has a different point of departure.  “The diversity in the faculties of 
men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle” – along with, I 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
constitutional system.  A strong theory of faction, as I will explain shortly, argues that we need strong set of 
constitutional checks and balances to control them.  A weak theory of faction, in contrast, requires fewer auxiliary 
mechanisms and less blending of powers.  A discussion I did not find helpful, but which once dominated the 
literature on Madison’s theory of faction, took place in the middle of the last century.  Robert Dahl’s claims about 
pluralism were central to this debate.  Dahl argued that extending the sphere is a sufficient defense against the 
violence of faction, and that constitutional checks and balances are therefore redundant at best, and anti-
democratic at worst.  Dahl is obviously a very impressive political theorist, and he has a great deal to say about 
how our constitutional system actually works, but I do not find corroboration for this particular claim in Madison’s 
writings. 
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 Madison, The Federalist, No. 10, Paragraph 6. 
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want to emphasize, the fallible reason of man – “to a uniformity of interests.”
23
  In this passage Madison 
draws our attention to two different causes of faction.  When these causes are treated in isolation, we 
end up with what amounts to two theories of faction, each of which has a different set of implications 
for institutional designers.  A weak theory of faction is primarily concerned with controlling majority 
factions actuated by rational economic interests – interests that are direct descendants of the diversity 
in the faculties of men.  A strong theory of faction, in contrast, is not problem-specific and calls for a 
greater number and variety of design features to protect against the violence of faction.  It is also a 
strong theory of faction, I should add, that we will import into the second part of this dissertation, in our 
discussion of defense reform. 
 Before we explore Madison’s strong theory of faction in greater depth – a theory that I argue we 
would be wise to engage with when we think about the internal structural dynamics of the national 
security state – let us review the logic behind his apparent weak theory of faction (this, I would suggest, 
is what contemporary defense reformers unwittingly reference when they claim fidelity to the 
constitutional theory of the founders).  The most “common and durable source of factions,” Madison 
declares, “has been the various and unequal distribution of property.” 
 
Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests 
in society.  Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like 
discrimination.  A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a 
moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, 
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The interests involved in the kind of factious politics described in this passage are purely economic 
interests.  If a law concerning private debts were under consideration in the legislature, two antagonistic 
parties would naturally form – a party of creditors and a party of debtors – and attempt to impose their 
policy preferences on each other.  The introduction of protective legislation against foreign 
manufacturers would of course be supported by domestic manufacturers who have to compete directly 
with these foreign entities and opposed by importers who would benefit from maintaining an open 
market.  The apportionment of taxes also has obvious impacts on different economic interests and 
invites lawmakers to indulge their self-interest.  As Madison explains, determining the particulars of a 
tax scheme is “an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality,” and yet there is perhaps “no 
legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample 
on the rules of justice.”  The very basic problem here is that a group with economic interests at stake – 
“Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number is a shilling saved to their own pockets” 
– will rarely defer to the cause of justice when it finds itself in the majority.
25
 
 Economic-basic majorities at the state and national level present a danger to popular 
government that previous American experiments in constitutional choice had not sufficiently addressed.  
Popular government seems to demand, at a minimum, a fidelity to majority rule.  Unfortunately for 
friends of republican government, majorities can be as self-indulgent as monarchs and princes.  The 
most consistently unruly majorities, Madison argues, will be activated by the unequal distribution of 
property.  The “principle task of modern legislation” is therefore not merely the broad regulation of the 
great variety of interests that will understandably compete for influence in a diverse commercial society 
but the regulation of a majority that is likely to be particularly factious because of a complete or relative 
lack of property.  In this characterization of factious politics we are firmly grounded in a rational 
political-economy in which factions form for rational reasons and their political agendas are clear and 
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unambiguous.  Majorities may be too myopic to appreciate what it would mean to rule in the public 
interest – to appreciate the distinction between legislation that appeals to a majority of citizens at a 
particular moment in time and legislation that promotes long-term peace and prosperity – but their 
reason need not be fallible, and their self-love need not express itself politically.
26
   
 In short, a weak theory of faction is concerned primarily with the need to control the kind of 
factions that inevitably form in a heterogeneous society in which wealth and property are distributed 
unequally.
27
  These are clearly not the kind of factions we need to worry about in a national security 
crisis.  A strong theory of faction, in contrast, presents us with a significantly more complex 
understanding of the causes behind, and the motivations of, factious groups and individuals, and, I 
should point out here, leads us to different conclusions about the kind of defenses we might need to 
introduce into the executive branch to control faction. 
 
As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, 
different positions will be formed.  As long as the connection subsists between his 
reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on 




Citizens in a republic are at liberty to exercise their reason as voters, representatives and statesmen.  As 
a direct result of our freedom to exercise our mental faculties, our rational economic interests will not 
be the sole driver of our politics.  Citizens may still choose to support a party that promises to put a few 
extra shillings in their pockets, irrespective of where these shillings originally come from and where they 
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might otherwise go, but in a world in which self-love is given free expression, citizens will often be 
passionate defenders of ideas that, unbeknownst to them, testify to their fallibility.  A strong theory of 
faction offers us a constitutional response to two fundamental assumptions, rather than merely one: 
first, that the diversity in the faculties of men produces a broad spectrum of interests; and, second, 
though no less important, that the reason of man is profoundly fallible. 
A republic needs to be designed with a strong theory of faction in mind for a very simple reason: 
when fallible opinions and passionate natures are invited into the political process, as is the case in a 
popular government, the public interest is permanently under threat.  Tyranny is not the only danger 
that must be averted, even though it presents the most direct and immediate threat to a regime.  
Political theorist David Epstein argues that Madison was acutely aware of the magnitude of the threat 
that the alliance of man’s fallible reason and passionate nature posed to popular government: “To be 
passionate about an opinion is to struggle on its behalf and to insist that the opinion be respected by 
others who would deny its worth.”  In the absence of passion, we generally try to persuade other people 
of the merits of our position.  Alternatively, we exempt ourselves from political debate on the grounds 
that either our cause is hopeless or we might be wrong.  “But a passionate opiner feels a stake in his 
opinion because it is his; his desire that his opinion prevail resembles the desire to rule other men.”
29
  A 
strong theory of faction recognizes that politics is driven by passions as much as by interests – a 
particularly acute problem in a national security crisis – and that a republic needs to be adequately 
defended against both kinds of disruptive forces.  Madison may have addressed the problem of class-
based majority factions at length, but we cannot ignore his much broader description of the factional 
threat to self-government.  In Madison’s words: 
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A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many 
other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders 
ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other 
descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions,' have, in 
turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered 





Inflamed zealots trying to vex and oppress each other presents us with a very different image of 
factional politics than that of self-interested majorities understandably, if myopically, pursuing favorable 
tax apportionments.  Factions can form around ideologies as easily as economic interests.  Irrational 
formulations can dominate policy-making processes as easily as rational constructions.  And it is not 
merely a diversity of interests and human fallibility that an institutional designer must address: 
constitutional theorists must understand that men with zealous opinions and attachments are not 
always capable or interested in trying to persuade their fellow citizens of the merits of their opinions 
and cannot always be controlled by structural mechanisms that might effectively thwart class-based 
majority factions.
31
  “So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities,” Madison 
writes, “that where no substantial occasion presents itself the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions 
have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts.”
32
 
At this point in the discussion, we have moved far beyond the realm of self-interest and 
property.  It is not only that self-love, as Epstein puts it, “makes men defend the opinions which their 
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fallible reason adopts.”  We must also defend a republic against the frequency with which “self-love 
seems to prompt men to stubbornly assert themselves, and to adopt whatever grounds of division can 
serve as a vehicle for their belligerence.”
33
  Although extending the sphere might be a strong defense 
against factions that form as a result of the various and unequal distribution of property, it will not 
effectively control factions of a more passionate – more hostile and more vexatious – nature.  We simply 
cannot conclude from the arguments in the essay under discussion that an extended republic and 
thoughtful scheme of representation comprise a comprehensive cure to faction. 
 
2. Constitutional Checks and Balances.  A sophisticated scheme of representation and an extended 
sphere are two structural features that help mitigate the deleterious effects of faction.  The great 
advantage of a representational system of government is that it dilutes the passions of the people and 
refines their interests.  The great advantage of a large, diverse republic is that an extended sphere 
encourages the formation of broad coalitions and thereby diminishes the power any particular faction 
may obtain through electoral processes.  Madison was confident that a large, heterogeneous republic 
would be considerably more likely to provide justice and stability for its citizens than a small, relatively 
homogeneous republic.  But a government with the constitutional fortitude to control the governed 
presents institutional designers with a second, equally profound challenge.  “In framing a government 
which is to be administered by men over men,” Madison writes in The Federalist, No. 51, “the great 
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next 
place oblige it to control itself.”
34
  How is a government that is powerful enough to control the people – 
a government that is sufficiently removed from the people that it can act with a significant degree of 
independence – to control itself?   
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 Madison is an advocate not of smuggling monarchical power into republican theory (an 
alternative method for combating the abuse of governmental power, which we will discuss in Chapter 
4), but of the necessity of “auxiliary precautions” – of constitutional mechanisms that achieve for 
popular government what a system of representation and an extended sphere alone cannot accomplish.  
“A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has 
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.”
35
  Auxiliary precautions are non-electoral, non-
normative control mechanisms built into a constitutional system.  They are constitutional checks and 
balances on governmental power, in contrast to social checks and balances.
36
  Let us briefly return to the 
first part of the equation quoted above: the government must be able to control the governed.  This 
prerequisite for a just and stable republican regime harks back to Madison’s dissertation on faction, with 
its emphasis on the need to diffuse the potential violence of faction.  The second part of the equation – 
the government must be able to control itself – is not quite as clear and transparent.  What kind of 
behavior must be controlled in this latter instance?  What, precisely, is the nature of the threat posed by 
a government insufficiently controlled by auxiliary mechanisms?  
Madison insists that a dependence on the people in a republican system is the primary control 
on government.  The people are equipped to play such a crucial role in a republic because they are 
assumed to command sufficient virtue to choose their representatives wisely, at least on a fairly regular 
basis.  The people, we could say, must be able to choose enough virtuous representatives over the 
course of time to compensate for the less virtuous – less public-minded – representatives who use the 
“vicious arts” to smuggle themselves and their factiousness into office.  This is what Madison had in 
mind when he wrote that without “sufficient virtue among men for self-government … nothing less than 
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the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another.”
37
  Two other 
people-centered control mechanisms come into play in this context.  First, the desire of officials to get 
reelected is a fairly strong incentive to govern responsibly.  Second, in the event that officials do violate 
the trust of the citizenry, they will, with some regularity, at least, be voted out of office.  But a 
dependence on the people alone – even if we invoke all three control mechanisms – is nevertheless 
inadequate to prevent the abuse of governmental power.
38
  What vulnerabilities remain unaddressed?  
Why does Madison insist that auxiliary mechanisms are necessary to fortify a dependence on the 
people?  What can public officials do once in office that the people alone cannot adequately control? 
When elections work to perfection, they “refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them 
through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interests of 
their own country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to 
temporary or partial considerations.”  Unfortunately elections do not always (or even consistently) bring 
to power our most enlightened citizens.  “Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister 
designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray 
the interests, of the people.
39
  Public officials, once they have obtained a degree of independence from 
the people – once they have been elected, in other words – must still be controlled, lest they prove 
better campaigners than representatives and statesmen.  Elections increase the odds that 
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representatives will be wise and virtuous – that the people who govern us will not sacrifice the public 
interest to “temporary or partial considerations” – but an incremental improvement in the quality of our 
leaders does not guarantee sufficiently enlightened leadership.
40
 
This much is perfectly clear: a dependence on the people is insufficient to ensure a just and 
stable government.  What nevertheless remains ambiguous in the text is the precise nature of the threat 
that rulers pose to the justice and stability of a republican regime.  What are the specific intra-
governmental pathologies for which a sophisticated republican theorist must propose adequate 
remedies? 
Madison employs a specific conceptual vocabulary in The Federalist, No. 51, and this makes it 
appear as though he is focused exclusively on the danger of “encroachment” and “usurpation.”  It would 
be understandable to conclude from the conceptual terminology that dominates this essay that it is 
dedicated solely to the problem of government tyranny.  But is a dangerous concentration of power – 
the result of trans-departmental power grabs – the only issue that exercises Madison’s republican 
imagination in this essay?  Are encroachment and usurpation the only threats to a just and stable regime 
that a dependence on the people alone cannot diffuse?  When Madison writes that a government must 
be able to control itself, is he concerned only with preserving the right distribution of power among the 
three great departments?  Let me phrase my concern a bit differently: If a government is able to 
preserve the necessary separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial 
departments, can we safely and confidently conclude that Madison’s design intentions have been fully 
realized? 
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These questions are important, I would suggest, because there are various ways to interpret 
Madison’s constitutional theory, and not all interpretations are equally respectful of the complexity of 
his constitutional system.  Does Madison address the problem of faction in The Federalist, No. 10, and 
focus his attention on a completely separate problem – the danger of inter-departmental encroachment 
– in The Federalist No. 51?  In the political science literature, this is indeed the conventional 
interpretation of the nature of the relationship – largely mute – between these two fundamental essays.   
The former essay teaches us how to control faction, and the latter essay teaches us how to control the 
individual departments of government once the federal government has been granted the power 
necessary to thwart the inevitable factiousness of the people.  Robert Dahl is a widely respected political 
scientist who employs this division of labor.
41
  Dahl claims that Madison was concerned with two 
fundamental threats to republican government: the threat of leadership and the threat of factionalism.  
The challenge that leadership poses to a constitutional theorist is relatively straightforward.  Since no 
electoral system can effectively weed out all men of “factious tempers,” “local prejudices,” or “sinister 
designs,” we need an effective system of separation of powers – not a pure separation of powers – in 
order to impose restraints on those who hold power.  The danger here is the encroaching nature of 
power.  Once parchment barriers are reinforced by constitutional checks and balances – once 
parchment barriers are defensible in practice – the problem of encroaching power – of leadership – is 
solved.  If the departments cannot encroach upon each other, these scholars conclude, the people are 
safe from government.  The problem of faction – isolated from the problem of leadership – is now 
reduced to the problem of majority faction, since minority factions are defeated by the republican 
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principle.  Majority factions pose a threat to individual rights and the public interest, the logic goes, but 
a government free from encroachment and usurpation does not.  What I want to emphasize with this 
brief review of Dahl’s position is that it is commonplace for political scientists to treat leadership and 
faction as two separate, largely unrelated challenges.
42
  The Federalist, No. 51, read in isolation, does 
provide some evidence for this interpretation, but it is nevertheless inconsistent with Madison’s overall 
constitutional theory.
43
  A strict division of labor between these two essays simply does not take into 
account Madison’s concern with the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.  
It will be helpful at this point in my argument to analyze The Federalist No. 51 in some detail.  
This essays contains a defense of a set of principles and forms that are fundamental to our 
understanding of the political theory on which our republic was founded, and therefore provides us with 
invaluable intellectual resources for thinking about the principles and forms that should be incorporated 
into the decision-making structures of our national security state (let me remind the reader that the key 
feature of the reform proposal I will defend in Chapter 8 is a chairman of the JCS with a limited veto over 
a tightly circumscribed power). 
In The Federalist, No. 51, Madison, as we know, defends a constitutional system in which power 
is not merely distributed among its constituent parts, but blended and mixed.  Contrary to traditional 
republican theory, it is not sufficient to define in a written constitution the boundaries of the legislative, 
executive and judicial departments.  Parchment barriers alone will not protect against the “encroaching 
spirit of power.”  Rigidly separate and distinct departments, to phrase it somewhat differently, will not 
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prevent the accumulation of the three great powers of government in the same hands.  Free 
government requires, instead, that these powers be “connected and blended” in such a manner that 
each has a measure of constitutional control over the others.  Here is how Madison frames the problem 
in an early, preliminary discussion of the subject: 
 
It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one of the departments 
ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other 
departments.  It is equally evident, that none of them ought to possess, directly or 
indirectly, an overruling influence over the others, in the administration of their 
respective powers.  It will not be denied that power is of an encroaching nature, and 
that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it.  After 
discriminating therefore, in theory, the several classes of power, as they may in their 
nature be legislative, executive, or judiciary, the next and most difficult task is to provide 
some practical security for each, against the invasions of the others.  What this security 




Power, if it is to be exercised in the interests of the people, must be distributed among a government’s 
constituent parts.  In practice, however, a pure separation of powers is inoperable.  The danger is as 
follows: “unless these departments be so far connected and blended, as to give to each a constitutional 
control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free 
government, can never in practice be duly maintained.”
45
 
 The antidote to government tyranny is not merely the construction of impermeable barriers and 
the enforcement of departmental integrity.  The separation of powers principle has to be relaxed in 
order to reflect, as John Manning, a contemporary legal scholar puts it, “countless context-specific 
choices about how to assign, structure, divide, blend, and balance federal power.”
46
  The only viable 
                                                           
44
 Madison, The Federalist, No. 48, Paragraph 2. 
45
 Madison, The Federalist, No. 48, Paragraph 1. 
46
 John F. Manning, “Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 124, No. 3 
(January 2011), p. 9. 
54 
 
security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, Madison writes, 
“consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and 
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”  The necessary constitutional means and 
personal motives: federal power is balanced when means and motives work in conjunction and can 
defend themselves against the means and motives of public officials domiciled in other departments.
47
  
Good institutional design depends upon the appropriate application of the principle of “supplying by 
opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives.”  Power must be divided and arranged in such 
a manner that “private interests” serve as “centinel over the public rights.”  To assume other, better 
motives on the part of either citizens or statesmen would be unrealistic.  When it comes to the great 
mass of power that resides in modern states, “inventions of prudence” – another term for auxiliary 
mechanisms – serve as our main line of defense against the abuse of power.
48
 
If we wish to maintain in practice the division of power among the three great departments, the 
structure of government has to be contrived in a manner so that “its several constituent parts may, by 
their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.”  To secure and 
maintain this delicate balance, Madison recommends that each department have “a will of its own.”  
The way to establish this vital degree of independence, at least to approximate the ideal, is to ensure 
that members of each department have “as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members 
of the others,” and that they are “as little dependant as possible on those of the others, for the 
emoluments annexed to their offices.”
49
  These two criteria are necessary but insufficient: we still need 
additional constitutional defenses against encroachment.  This is why, to return to a key formulation, 
Madison argues that the only way to prevent the concentration of multiple powers in the same 
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department is to give “to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means 
and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”  This multi-faceted defense of 
independence is one of the distinguishing features of Madison’s constitutional theory.  As Vile puts it, 
there was now a “new body of constitutional doctrine that justified and expounded the system of 
separation of powers buttressed and maintained by the checks and balances built into the 
Constitution.”
50
  A degree of independence, I want to emphasize, is essential.
51
  “More than any 
constitutional theorist before or since,” legal theorist Darly J. Levinson comments, “Madison recognized 
that the central challenge of constitutional design was to convert parchment barriers into politically 
meaningful constraints on government behavior,” and this would be impossible if each individual 
department did not have a will of its own.
52
 
 With the basic arguments in the text now fresh in our minds, let me explain why I am 
uncomfortable with a strict division of labor between The Federalist, Nos. 10 and 51.  Here is the logic 
behind my primary objection: If we embrace a strict division of labor between the two essays, we must 
logically conclude that factional strife inside government is dangerous only because it is a direct driver of 
encroachment and usurpation.  Madison appears to subscribe to this view when he worries, in an earlier 
essay, about “a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department,” and states that 
the “accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, 
a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed or elective, may justly be pronounced the very 
definition of tyranny.”
53
  Madison’s focus on the threat of despotism in The Federalist, No. 51 does 
indeed suggest a narrow concern with the enforcement of parchment barriers.  As I mentioned earlier, 
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readers have ample evidence to conclude that the two essays under discussion do indeed address 
distinct problems.  Ambition must be made to counteract ambition, and the constitutional rights of the 
place must be aligned with the interests of those expected to defend them, in order to preserve a 
necessary and delicate separation of powers.  This is not, I repeat, an indefensible interpretation of the 
text.  It is, however, significantly flawed, and it suggests a lack of familiarity with Madison’s broader 
expectations for a well-designed republic. 
If I may briefly indulge in a metaphor, what comes to mind when I encounter scholars who rely 
upon this division of labor is trench warfare.  Reconnaissance missions and minor skirmishes are routine, 
and major assaults are launched at least once or twice a generation, generally under new and 
inexperienced leadership, but the motives of public officials – some queer amalgamation of honor, 
patriotism, ambition, courage, indifference and greed – combined with row upon row of barbed wire, 
for as far as the eye can see, enable the great departments of government to defend their positions.  I 
do not mean to suggest that the various departments of governments do not need to be able to defend 
themselves against attack.  Government tyranny – the concentration of the powers of the three great 
departments of government in the same hands – is certainly a grave threat.  But interpreting 
constitutional checks and balances as structural mechanisms designed exclusively to prevent 
encroachment and usurpation, I would suggest, only makes sense if inter-department trespass is the 
only kind of governmental behavior that poses a threat to the peace and security of a republic. 
57 
 
My claim is that constitutional checks and balances are expected to do much more than merely 
enforce parchment barriers in Madison’s constitutional system.
54
  In The Federalist No. 37, Madison 
alludes to what else he has in mind: 
 
It is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs, that public measures are rarely 
investigated with that spirit of moderation which is essential to a just estimate of their 
real tendency to advance or obstruct the public good; and that this spirit is more apt to 





In The Federalist, No. 57, he is equally suggestive: 
 
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men 
who possess the most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good 
of society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping 




Madison, I hope to persuade readers, believed that the right collection of constitutional checks and 
balances would, in addition to preventing encroachment, greatly improve the quality of lawmaking and 
statecraft.
57
  In the absence of constitutional checks and balances – even if parchment barriers are not 
breached and individual rights are not under direct attack – factiousness, rather than wisdom and virtue, 
would dominate the individual departments of government and threaten the public interest.  The 
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emphasis that Madison puts on the moral purposes of a republican regime throughout his contributions 
to The Federalist makes it clear that constitutional checks and balances are expected to play a multi-
faceted role in his constitutional system. 
 “Madison’s political and intellectual life was devoted to guarding against the selfishness of 
faction,” Joseph Kobylka and Bradley Carter, two contemporary students of Madison’s political thought, 
remind us.   He understood that humans could “act in accordance with interests larger than their own, 
just as they could behave factiously.”  The task Madison therefore took upon himself was not to “devise 
a theory that explained this ambivalence, but to construct political institutions that check the ignoble 
and promote the noble.”  Kobylka and Carter are certainly correct to emphasize Madison’s deep 
attachment to the moral purposes of a republican regime.  In Madison’s constitutional system, citizens 
must have sufficient virtue to choose representatives who will govern with at least a modicum of public-
spiritedness.  But this is not the whole protection against faction.  “Madison’s constitutional machine,” 
as the authors put it, “is complete with primary systems to promote and facilitate the expression of 
public virtue” – a sophisticated scheme of representation, an extended sphere – “and auxiliaries to 
prevent the destruction of the virtuous whole should public virtue occasionally wane.”
58
  The relative 
wisdom, patriotism and love of justice of public officials make it less likely they will sacrifice the public 
good to temporary or partial considerations, but this relative abundance of virtue does not reduce the 
threat of intra-governmental factiousness to the point at which it need not trouble a constitutional 
theorist.  The focus of The Federalist, No. 51 may be on a new and improved doctrine of separation of 
powers – or, perhaps more accurately, the need to supplement a revised separation of powers doctrine 
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with constitutional checks and balances – but “its argument clearly points to the ability of the separate 
branches to stymie factious actions of the others.”
59
 
This emphasis on intra-governmental factiousness is a valuable corrective to the encroachment-
only bias in the literature.
60
  Madison was certainly not the value-free pluralist mid-twentieth century 
political scientists claimed.
61
  But even if we acknowledge the danger of factious rule and abandon a 
strict division of labor between the problem of faction and the problem of leadership, we have yet to 
identify the particular nature of the threat posed by factious rulers.  If institutional designers prevent 
any one branch from encroaching on the powers of the other branches – from capturing enough 
governmental power to launch factional projects unchallenged – has the problem of intra-governmental 
faction been effectively stymied? 
What I want to impress upon readers is this: the individual departments of department, drawing 
solely upon their own legitimate constitutional power, also pose a factional threat to the welfare of a 
republic.  Let us revisit Madison’s definition of faction: 
 
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or 
minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of 
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community.
62
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The main problem of republican government during the revolutionary era revolved around the absence 
of mechanisms to give wisdom and steadiness to legislation.
63
  Madison was not alone in doubting 
whether a majority of state legislators could ever be “relied upon to act responsibly on either state or 
federal issues,” as historian and political scientist Jack Rakove reports.
64
  This was a near universal 
indictment of the performance of state assemblies under the post-independence state constitutions.  
What distinguished Madison from his reform-minded peers was not his search for an institutional 
solution to this problem that would preserve the republican character of the regime, but his recognition 
that the spirit of faction represented a multi-pronged threat to popular government that required a 
multi-dimensional remedy. 
As all students of government know well, public officials are not always responsive to their 
constituents: they can and do betray the interests of those who elect them (they can also, I should point 
out, be too responsive to their constituents). But this is not the only sense in which a representational 
system fails to support the ideal of representative government.  Unfortunately, the relative virtue of 
candidates is not always easy to assess over the course of a political campaign.  Rhetoric and 
obfuscation probably win as many elections as clarity and honesty.  As a result of this imperfect 
selection process, the factiousness of seemingly virtuous representatives will have ample opportunity to 
express itself once candidates enter public office.  And even if elections were more effective filters, 
many issues that lawmakers and statesmen will encounter as decision-makers have no direct precedent 
(or have illusory precedents, as historians constantly remind us).  This presents a real danger.  We are all 
unimaginative and inflexible in some contexts, and open-minded and deliberative in others, and this is 
why it is terribly unrealistic to expect voters to know ahead of time which combinations of individuals 
                                                           
63
 I will argue in the second part of this dissertation that the main problem with our national security state revolves 
around the absence of mechanisms to give wisdom and steadiness to decisions about the consistency of political 
ends and military means that must always be made in a national security crisis. 
64
 Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution, (Vintage, 1997), p. 40. 
61 
 
and subjects will provoke outbreaks of factiousness.  A constitutional theorist concerned with the 
quality of lawmaking and statecraft must therefore propose auxiliary mechanisms to defend against 
outbreaks of factionalism while representatives and statesmen are in office and acting within the legal 
parameters of their department.  It is as important to control the passions of public officials as it is to 
control the passions of the people.  As Hamilton puts it, “tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage” 
can overwhelm the republic at any time.
65
  Too much damage can be done in between elections to 
safely assume that a dependency on the people alone (through elections and the threat of 
impeachment) is a reliable control on government.  Without constitutional checks and balances – even 
in the absence of inter-departmental encroachment – the individual departments of government would 
inevitably morph into entities that are unlikely to identify, much less act upon, the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community. 
 How does Madison propose to control intra-department faction, given the inadequacy of the 
people as a sole line of defense?  In The Federalist, Nos. 62 and 63, Madison argues that a second 
legislative body – a branch of the legislature with fewer members, longer terms, and different 
qualifications for office would create a very different institutional temperament – would be a republic’s 
most efficacious check against unwise and unjust legislation.
66
  But the judgment of the people, in terms 
of who they regularly choose for representatives, is still too suspect for a single institutional mechanism 
– bicameralism – to work unaided.  To raise the quality of lawmaking to a sufficiently high level, a 
second mechanism is required: a joint executive-judicial council of revision that possesses a limited veto, 
or a select committee of legislators tasked with drafting final bills.  The logic behind this 
recommendation is worth emphasizing: multiple auxiliary mechanisms are required as insurance against 
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mixed motives and compromised legislation.  Madison, of course, would lose this particular debate at 
the Constitutional Convention and have to settle for a limited negative in the executive.  But Madison’s 
defense of bicameralism still provides us with an excellent example of how auxiliary mechanisms are 
expected to work in his constitutional system – and why they might be advantageously introduced into 
the constitution of the executive branch in our national security state. 
In The Federalist No. 62, Madison argues that a constitutional system requires a relatively 
“stable institution in the government” and the suppression of the “mischievous effects of a mutable 
government.”  The calamitous effects of erratic, undependable policy cannot be underestimated, and 
the most deplorable of these, Madison writes, “is that diminution of attachment and reverence which 
steals into the hearts of people toward a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity, and 
disappoints so many of their flattering hopes” (Paragraph 19).  Madison argues that the “nature of the 
senatorial trust” requires greater “information and stability of character” (Paragraph 3) – that the senate 
must be a “salutary check on the government” (Paragraph 9) – that two assemblies are less likely to be 
“seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions” (Paragraph 10) – and that 
senators must be duly acquainted with the “objects and principles of legislation” in order to limit the 
repeating and amending of laws, which “fill and disgrace our voluminous codes” and stand as 
“monuments of deficient wisdom” (Paragraph 11)  All of the above statements speak to the danger of 
factional lawmaking – for the need to control the violence of faction – and make it clear that 
constitutional checks and balances are important not only to protect constitutional borders against 
incursion.  The wisdom and steadiness of legislation – the wisdom and steadiness of government in 
general – depends on auxiliary mechanisms as well. 
63 
 
In The Federalist, No. 63, Madison argues that popular government needs “a select and stable 
member of government” in order to protect against “unenlightened and variable policy.”  It is worth 
quoting the following central passage at length: 
 
As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all 
governments, and actually will, in all free governments, ultimately 
prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are particular moments in 
public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or 
some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of 
interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will 
afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn.  In these critical 
moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and 
respectable body of citizens in order to check the misguided career, and 
to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, until 





Constitutional checks and balances are necessary to improve the quality of lawmaking and statecraft.  In 
a republic under pressure – and, as we know, it is unusual for our republic not to be under substantial 
pressure – we cannot safely assume that a unicameral legislature will be in possession of sufficient 
reason, justice and truth to govern wisely.  Put differently, the problem of faction has not been 
sufficiently addressed by the mere separation of government into three distinct departments.  
Representatives of the people are only marginally less fallible than the people themselves, and they are 
at least as vulnerable to self-love.  As Epstein writes, “Some men’s love of power – together with the 
complementary susceptibility of other men to the charms of the ambitious – preserves the danger of 
oppression by rulers which the popularization of government might seem to have abolished.”
68
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Republican government is unique in that it seeks a republican remedy for the adverse consequences of 
political liberty, but it shares with other forms of government a vulnerability to the adverse 
consequences of the rulers who indulge their selfishness and ambition, do not realize the extent to 
which self-love influences their judgment, or grossly underestimate the extent of their fallibility.  The 
people represent a new tyrant, at least potentially, in a republic.  But the arrival of this new and 
somewhat mysterious actor on the political stage does not imply that the old tyrants – rulers who 
willfully abuse their power or, in the words of political theorist Charles Anderson, those who are unable 







I have developed two basic arguments in this chapter.  In the first section, I explained how Madison’s 
theory of faction has been interpreted in two fundamentally different ways, and argued that only a 
strong theory of faction – based on an expansive definition of faction – is consistent with Madison’s 
broader constitutional theory.  Only a strong theory of faction leads us to appreciate the magnitude and 
multi-dimensionality of the threat that the violence of faction poses to popular government – and this, 
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as I have mentioned in numerous, perhaps unnecessary asides, has implications for how we should think 
about decision-making in our national security state. 
Why do most scholars interpret The Federalist, No. 10 more narrowly than we have in this 
chapter?  Why is a weak theory of faction so well represented in the literature?  This is only speculation 
– and also potentially self-incriminating – but I am tempted to conclude that scholars have let 
themselves be misled by the specificity of their academic projects.  To claim, for example, as political 
theorist Jennifer Nedelsky does, that Madison’s “single most important statement on representative 
government” is his assertion that the first object of government is the “protection of different and 
unequal faculties of acquiring property,” certainly plays to her strengths as a theorist of private property 
(and she is unquestionably very insightful on this subject), but it also transforms an essay on the various 
causes and effects of faction into a narrow defense of property rights.
70
  Was the basic problem of 
republican government that of determining the appropriate relations between property and individual 
rights, as Nedelsky argues, or was it rather, as I would suggest, the rampant “instability, injustice and 
confusion” in public councils, which encompasses a much wider range of subjects?  I do not doubt that 
property was “a paradigmatic instance of the central problem of republican government,” but the 
central problem of republican government for Madison was devising a proper cure for the violence of 
faction broadly understood. 
If a commercial republic need only to control majority factions animated by unequal 
distributions of property, institutional designers would be able to focus exclusively on defending a 
republic against the limited threats predicted by a weak theory of faction.  But extending the sphere and 
implementing a sophisticated scheme of representation are alone insufficient innovations to control the 
kind of factionalism that is a consequence of our general inability as a species to appreciate the fallibility 
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of our beloved reason.  Madison does drift between two theories of faction in one of the essays 
analyzed in this chapter, but we must keep in mind that his weak theory of faction is problem-specific, 
whereas his strong theory of faction is more inclusive, more sensitive to a host of problems that 
threaten the justice and stability of our republic.   
 The second basic argument I made in this chapter is that constitutional checks and balances are 
best understood as auxiliary mechanisms designed not merely to prevent encroachment and usurpation 
but to minimize the violence of faction that emanates from within the individual departments of 
government.  Even in the absence of broached parchment barriers, factionalism poses a severe threat to 
popular government.  Each department, in other words, remains a potential locus for factional projects.  
Madison was shocked by the character of state assemblymen and the quality of their collective decision-
making during the revolutionary era.  Representative bodies under individual state constitutions were, 
to put it mildly, insufficiently dispassionate and disinterested to legislate in the public interest.  Neither 
state governments nor the national government, in other words, could control either the people or 
themselves.  Extending the sphere and adopting a refined system of representation, Madison argued, 
would go a long way toward controlling majority factions.  These same design features would also create 
a dependence on the people that would act as the first line of defense against a wayward government.
71
  
But Madison was not convinced that an incremental improvement in the quality of our elected rulers 
would guarantee a sufficiently enlightened government.  Auxiliary mechanisms would be absolutely 
necessary. 
 Constitutional checks and balances are incorporated into a separation of powers system partly 
in order to prevent encroachment and usurpation.  But enforcing parchment barriers is not their only 
function.  If we want to remain faithful to Madison’s constitutional theory, we must appreciate the 
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extent to which factionalism can undermine the quality of lawmaking and statecraft.  Constitutional 
checks and balances are necessary to control the spirit of faction both inside the government as a 
whole, as well as within each individual department of government.  Encroachment and usurpation are 
not, in other words, the only inter-governmental threats to the permanent and aggregate interests of 
the community.  The broad challenge Madison grapples with in The Federalist, Nos. 10 and 51 is how to 
minimize the violence of faction in all its forms and manifestations, and at all of its multifarious access 
points.  Madison was deeply concerned with the danger of majorities trampling on the “rules of justice 
and the rights of the minor party,” and he knew that the concentration of the powers of government in 
the same hands was the very definition of tyranny, but he also understood that the politics of faction 
could unfold in a variety of treacherous ways.  Only a cocktail of design features – constitutional checks 
and balances in addition to social checks and balances – can offer relief from the violence of faction and, 






3 The Tyranny of Misalignment 
 
 
In the same way a man who has not fully mastered a foreign language sometimes fails to express himself 
correctly, so statesmen often issue orders that defeat the purpose they are meant to serve. 
- Clausewitz 
 
If the domestic population will not tolerate even a moderately high level of casualties among its own 
armed forces, but insists on an immediate show of success, this will put any government under pressure 
to adopt whatever measures promise quick, apparently decisive results, even if they are indiscriminately 
devastating in the short term, and highly counterproductive in the long run. 
- Rayond Geuss 
 
Regardless of how superior the military view of a situation may be, the civilian view trumps it.  Civilians 
should get what they ask for, even if it is not what they really want.  In other words, civilians have a right 
to be wrong. 
- Peter Feaver 
 
 
Let us revisit the basic question this dissertation explores:  Is there a constitutional solution for the 
problem of ensuring a relatively seamless fit between political goals and military means in a national 
security crisis?  
Constitutional solutions do not solve problems so much as they manage and mitigate them.  And 
there are always delicate tradeoffs involved.  As Madison wisely cautioned his readers, there are 
“inconveniences which must be unavoidably blended with all political advantages” and “possible abuses 
70 
 
which must be incident to every power of trust, of which a beneficial use can be made.”
1
  No 
constitutional solution to a particular problem of governance is impervious to human error, 
manipulation or abuse.  No constitutional arrangement is therefore immune to valid criticism.  But 
institutional design, we must remember, deals with probabilities, percentages, balancing acts.  With this 
understanding of constitutional theory in mind – knowing we must proceed cautiously and that even 
effective constitution solutions are vulnerable to valid criticism – let us reformulate the question posed 
above.  Can the executive branch be constituted in such a manner that political ends and military means 
are more closely aligned – constituted in such a manner that factionalism inside the executive branch is 
better controlled – without undermining the political advantages of doing so?   
In the last chapter, we reviewed the factional foundation of Madison’s constitutional theory.  
The forms and principles he defends in The Federalist as necessary to control the violence of faction 
offer us a set of intellectual tools for thinking about the constitution not only of a republic but the 
individual branches of government within a republic (constitutional theory deals with both the 
constitution of the whole and the constitution of the individual components of a particular 
constitutional system).  What Madison unfortunately did not explore in his contributions to The 
Federalist – largely because his attention was elsewhere, on the weakness of the central government 
and the pathologies of state legislatures – is the fact that the spirit of faction, uncontrolled, will 
dominate national security policymaking as naturally as it does domestic policymaking.
2
  Madison may 
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have been “alert to the dangers of minority faction, most especially to the possibility that rulers, once 
independent of the people, could become the most dangerous minority of all,” as Lance Banning points 
out, but he was very much a part of a tradition in political theory that looks almost exclusively at those 
groups, individuals and abstract forces with designs on the liberty of individual citizens.
3
  Constitutional 
checks and balances are certainly necessary to prevent domestic tyranny, and we can understand why 
political theorists have been on a two-and-a-half-millennia crusade to promote the rule of law and 
protect citizens against the arbitrary exercise of power.
4
  But it is important to recognize that a faction 
with a foothold in government – especially with a foothold in the executive department – can wreak 
havoc in a republic even if it does not pose a direct threat to individual liberty.
5
  Madison may have 
designed a system that encourages a struggle between the legislative and executive branches for control 
of foreign policy,
6
 but he was understandably unfamiliar with modern warfare – with national security 
decision-making in a non-insulated state – and did not put in place any constitutional mechanisms to 
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This inexperience with the realities of war – his innocence, we could say – is why we need to put 
Madison in conversation with Carl von Clausewitz.  Clausewitz was primarily a theorist of war, but he 
understood the profound influence politics has on matters of war and peace, and he draws our 
attention to what I argue in this dissertation is one of the great unresolved problems – too often 
unacknowledged and unaddressed – in republican theory.  If a nation is to wage war sensibly – 
discerningly, judiciously, competently – political ends and military means must be closely aligned.  What 
would prohibit or discourage the alignment of political ends and military means?  Clausewitz highlights 
the significance of the problem – the fundamental importance of adjustment and adaptation – but we 
need Madison – an updated Madison – to understand why we should expect the gap between ends and 
means to be unnecessarily wide, and how it might be narrowed.  What Madison teaches us is that 
misalignment is best understood as a reflection of the excessive influence of the spirit of faction.  If we 
want to close the gap between political ends and military means, we need to understand which features 
of Madison’s constitutional system are designed to control faction and, simultaneously, promote the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.  What I will argue in this chapter is that we have 
good reason to believe that a deliberative separation of powers inside the executive branch would offer 
our nation greater security against the danger of ends-means misalignment than the informal, voluntary 
mechanisms that presently characterize the executive department.   
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The Constitutional Challenge 
 
Can reading Clausewitz save us from future military mistakes?  Bruce Fleming, a critic of national 
security “strategists” who he believes overstate the potential influence of military strategy, began an 
essay in Parameters, a military journal, with this question, and answered it quickly and decisively (if a 
touch impetuously).  “No, though to read the commentators, we’d never know it.”  Christopher 
Bassford, a great admirer of Clausewitz’s strategic insights, felt obliged to respond to Fleming, and did so 
in a brisk and confident manner (if a bit ornery).  Fleming argues that Clausewitz’s great treatise, On 
War, is “so satisfying and ultimately so pointless” because, like the Bible, Virgil’s Aeneid, and the works 
of Shakespeare, it is “so broad in scope, so inclusive, even of contradictions internal to themselves, that 
[it] can be used to justify almost anything.”  Bassford is largely bewildered by Fleming’s position.  Does 
the interpretive malleability of a Shakespeare play mean that contemporary literary critics should limit 
themselves to studying and promoting the ideas of less sophisticated dramatists?  “Fleming’s critique,” 
he writes, “is not of Clausewitz but of the misuse of Clausewitz’s descriptive, explanatory theory in a 
prescriptive manner by charlatans and ideologues.”
8
 
It is not entirely clear that Fleming’s and Bassford’s views on Clausewitz are incompatible.  They 
clearly differ on a fundamental philosophical question – on whether great theorists generally enlighten 
future generations or inspire among self-professed disciples a plethora of dangerous misunderstandings 
– but they both have tremendous respect for Clausewitz as a theorist of war.  They disagree not on the 
degree of wisdom and insight to be found in On War but on the capacity of agenda-driven parties to 
read him with the requisite patience, detachment and intelligence.
9
  Political theorists, I would suggest, 
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are fairly well equipped to engage professionally with Clausewitz, even though very few of us have 
chosen to do so.  We are “trained” not to look for definitive interpretations of a text or an historical 
event but to juxtapose various interpretations and to try to make sense of the tension – points of 
friction, we could say – between them.  Having immersed myself in the literature by and on Clausewitz, 
there indeed appear to be in circulation almost as many versions of this Prussian thinker as there are 
interpretations of Plato, Machiavelli and Madison (not to mention Nietzsche, perhaps the most 
projection-friendly secular thinker in history).  There are certainly distinct schools of thought out there, 
schools with seemingly little tolerance for each other, and their respective claims to intellectual integrity 
remind me of the age-old dispute between philosophers and sophists – “sophists” being the derogatory 




 As readers of On War, political theorists have one clear, indisputable advantage over the 
competition (along with all of the obvious and perhaps not so obvious disadvantages, which range from 
inexperience on the battlefield to over-confidence as analysts of contemporary politics).  Unlike military 
strategists, who have to master the entire text in order to properly interpret arguments about particular 
aspects of warfare, we can get away with a single reading of the book and concentrate our energies on a 
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careful, close study of the political issues raised in Book I and Book VIII, Chapter 6.
11
  What political 
theorists find most interesting about Clausewitz – at least political theorists who are interested in 
defense reform and the constitution of the executive branch – is his discussion of the critical importance 
of aligning political purposes and military means.  This subject is of course very familiar to students of 
Clausewitz, and some readers may feel somewhat let down by its evocation.  But political theory, I hope 
to demonstrate, offers a unique perspective on this subject.  What kind of institutional dynamics within 
the executive branch would improve the likelihood that the inevitable gap between political purposes 
and military means is not excessively wide?  Clausewitz teaches us that the politics of national security, 
rather than the caliber of a national army or its internal organization, has the greatest influence on 
whether a particular military intervention is a success or failure, and it is this suggestion – that the 
problem of harmonizing political purposes and military means is a political problem, and therefore 
might also be a constitutional problem – that resonates so deeply with this particular political theorist.
12
  
How might the intellectual tools of constitutional theory be brought to bear on the problem of aligning 
political goals and military means?
13
  What would constitutional theory recommend in terms of how to 
increase the likelihood that ends and means will be adequately aligned and, as a direct result, military 
force employed more wisely and effectively? 
 Clausewitz is famous for, among other things, his discussions of total and limited war; the 
sources and effects of friction; the importance of leadership; the role chance and probability; the 
difference between moral and material factors in combat; the relative advantage of defense; and the 
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relationship between political ends and military means.  Despite such dramatic, revolutionary changes in 
war and military technology over the last two centuries, his value to students of war has not diminished.  
How do we explain the endurance of his ideas and methods?  Clausewitz remains extremely relevant 
today, I would suggest, largely because of his appreciation for the limits of theory.
14
  All theories of war, 
Clausewitz writes in On War, are based on abstract ideas and principles, and the logic of abstraction 
often leads theorists into a world of extremes and absolutes that has little relationship with reality.  The 
danger of abstract thinking is that, though a poor guide for navigating the idiosyncratic, context-specific 
nature of the real world, it has a profound impact on how we understand and interpret our external 
environments.  Theory thus presents us with an acute challenge: we need theory, and yet we cannot 
afford to lose track of its severe limitations.  We must therefore proceed with extreme caution.  When 
we navigate the transition from the abstract to the real world, we must never forget that practice rarely 
if ever conforms to the precision and clarity of theory. 
 In the particular case of war, reality would conform to the “logical subtleties” of a theorist only if 
three conditions were met.  First, war would have to be a “wholly isolated act, occurring suddenly and 
not produced by previous events in the political world.”  Second, it would have to consist of “a single 
decisive act or a set of simultaneous ones.”  Finally, the result achieved would have to be “complete and 
perfect in itself, uninfluenced by any previous estimate of the political situation it would bring about.”
15
  
What makes the fulfillment of these prerequisites so unlikely?  The answer is as humbling for a theorist 
of war as it is simple: politics.  War is not just a craft, but a great socio-political activity: the reason 
nations and communities go to war “always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always 
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due to some political object.”
16
  Politics is ultimately what humbles theorists of war – what should 
humble theorists of war – and it is what leads Clausewitz to insist that if war is to be a sensible 
endeavor, it must be understood as an instrument of policy.   
 At this point in the discussion, political theorists are likely to nod their heads contentedly.  Who 
other than an over-confident prince or a victory-obsessed general would think that the violence of war 
was something other than an instrument of policy?  But the mere fact that most political theorists would 
quietly applaud Clausewitz for insisting on the political nature of war, I am afraid, does not let 
contemporary political theorists off the hook.  War is “something pointless and devoid of sense,” 
Clausewitz writes, unless the logic of war is determined not by its own unique logic but by the “political 
aim” for which military force has been deployed.  The relationship here appears to be fairly transparent.  
War makes sense only when the inevitable death and destruction caused by violent means advances the 
political aim for which a particular war is fought.  And the initiation of war, he insists, does not alter this 
basic premise.  If at some point an ongoing war develops its own unique logic, it loses its purpose and 
descends into the realm of senseless violence.  Now, as important as it may be to clarify the relationship 
between war and politics, how do we move from the realm of theoretical thinking to the kind of real-
world competence that ensures our nation’s wars are in fact meaningful, sensible endeavors from start 
to finish?  “If war is part of policy,” Clausewitz writes, “policy will determine its character.”
17
  Policy, it is 
clear, must dictate the character and parameters of a war.  But merely philosophizing about the 
importance of the relationship does not guarantee its centrality in the political process.  How are we to 
ensure that political ends and military means are in a constructive dialogue before the initiation of a 
military engagement?
18
  This is the question that political theorists have unwittingly ceded to military 
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strategists, defense intellectuals, and students of international relations.  Is political theory as an 
academic discipline justified in withdrawing from this critical terrain?  Has the problem of harmonizing 
political ends and military means already been addressed satisfactorily?  Has constitutional theory 
contributed all that it can to this dilemma? 
At the time Clausewitz was writing and soldiering, it was not obvious to most politicians, soldiers 
or theorists of war that the logic of war should never be allowed to diverge from the political logic that 
endorsed the use of force in the first place.  The absence of clarity on this relationship was a major 
target of Clausewitz’s intellectual efforts.  War is an “act of policy” because the rationale for war 
between civilized peoples “always lies in some political situation and the occasion is always due to some 
political object.”  Most of his contemporaries believed that “war would of its own independent will 
usurp the place of policy the moment policy had brought it into being,” and that it would thereafter 
“rule by the laws of its own nature.”
19
  Many of his contemporaries argued that this metamorphosis was 
not only inevitable but as it should be.
20
  Clausewitz recognizes that war does indeed unfold 
unpredictably, but he insists that it nevertheless remains to a large extent comprehensible and 
controllable and therefore subject to the action of a “superior intelligence.”  We must keep in mind that 
war “springs from some political purpose,” and that it is “natural that the prime cause of its existence 
will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it.”
21
 
When a war is being planned and later fought, should the political point of view at any point 
give way to the purely military point of view, or should the political point of view “remain dominant and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and consequences before an event begins than once it takes on a life of its own.   The politics of war, I think most 
military historian would agree, not only gets more complicated as a war unfolds, but reversing course and 
compensating for mistakes and misjudgments becomes increasingly difficult. 
19
 Clausewitz, Book I, Chapter 1.23. 
20
 Peter Paret covers Clausewitz’s debates with other contemporaneous theorists of war at length, and his study of 
Clausewitz is widely acknowledged to be the touchtone in the field.  See Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State 
(Princeton University Press, 1985).  Michael Howard includes a chapter on the legacy of Clausewitz in his study.  
See Michael Howard, Clausewitz (Oxford University Press, 1983) 
21
 Clausewitz, Book, I, Chapter 1:23. 
79 
 
the military be subordinated to it?”  Clausewitz, as we know, argues that it is logically incoherent as well 
as potentially self-destructive to subordinate the political view to the military.  “Policy is the guiding 
intelligence and war only the instrument,” he insists.  “No other possibility exists, then, than to 
subordinate the military point of view to the political.”
22
  This is the point of view on the relationship 
between war and politics that we have inherited from Clausewitz and now defend rather nonchalantly.  
Most students of national security assume we have already answered persuasively what was once a 
serious constitutional problem.  The president is our commander-in-chief, and he sits firmly and 
unequivocally atop the military chain-of-command.  As a result of this vertical arrangement, the political 
view is guaranteed to dominate in the political-military relationship.  But scholars content with this basic 
structure, I would argue, have missed one of the most important aspects of Clausewitz’s analysis.  Can 
we safely assume that Clausewitz’s “political point of view” is synonymous with the political point of 
view of any particular group of civilian leaders?  Although many contemporary politicians certainly have 
political gifts, this does not mean these politicians have an understanding of what constitutes the 
political point of view or how to adapt a political point of view to military realities.  Why should we 
assume that, in a national security crisis, when external threats or actions raise the possibility of a 
military intervention, our politicians will adopt a strictly “political point of view,” our soldiers a strictly 
“military point of view,” and that by entrusting all decision-making power to civilians in the civil-military 
decision making process, we ensure the sensible use of violence? 
Two profound constitutional problems arise as soon as we try to translate Clausewitz’s 
theoretical injunction regarding political ends and military means into practice.  Not only is it foolish to 
assume that politicians will naturally recognize the “political point of view” when it comes to matters of 
war and peace, but it is equally misguided to assume that we have institutions in place that address the 
problem of closely aligning political aims and military means.  The long-held assumption that absolute 
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civilian control of the military solves the ends-means problem – that as long as generals are fully 
subordinate to their civilian counterparts, all will be well – is as “primitive” as the revolutionary-era 
assumptions that majority rule is the antidote to government tyranny, that representatives of the 
people will faithfully represent their constituencies, that parchment barriers alone can control the 
encroaching nature of power, and that a republic can thrive with a weak executive department.  We 
certainly want the military component to be subordinate to the political component in matters of war 
and peace.  At the same time, however, we do not want the military to jettison its hard-earned 
experience and expertise when there are disagreements about the wisdom and efficacy of the use of 
force.  Hence the question we must ask ourselves is profoundly and unambiguously constitutional. How 
do we ensure that factions within the executive branch – be they comprised of civilians or soldiers – are 
strongly discouraged from initiating a war in which political purposes and military force are dangerously 
misaligned?  This is a profoundly constitutional problem because it directs us to precisely the kind of 
fundamental question – how best to combine constitutional means and personal motives in the various 
departments of government – that exercised the founding fathers. 
 Clausewitz was not at all naïve about the politics of national security.  He knew that the policy 
that ultimately emerges from a decision-making process “can err, subserve the ambitions, private 
interests, and vanity of those in power.”
23
  As a military officer, he had firsthand experience with the 
compulsiveness and irrationality of political leaders.  But he was a theorist of war, not a theorist of 
politics, and he consciously limited the scope of his study.  He chose to largely ignore the 
aforementioned obstacles and inconveniences because he wanted to set aside the political aspects of 
policy formation and concentrate on the operational side of war (in particular, on supreme command).  
Despite the frequency with which he expected governments to botch crucial decisions on war and peace 
– to misjudge the consistency of political ends and military means – he nevertheless proceeded in his 
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theorizing on the assumption that civilian leaders, however misinformed, however incompetent, 
however distracted by the politics of national security, were at least more likely than the passionate, ill-
informed masses to discern the true interests of a state. 
Unlike Clausewitz, those of us concerned with the quality of contemporary national security 
decision-making must think very seriously about the fallibility, ambition, vanity and self-love of both our 
civilian and military leaders – must, in other words, think very seriously about the influence of national 
security factions.  Does it still make sense to defend unwaveringly the principle of absolute civilian 
control of the military?  Is Peter Feaver correct when he argues not only that civilians have a right to be 
wrong but that this right should be unqualified in matters of national security?  General William Y. 
Smith, a participant in the debates that led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, explains that the 
military chain of command “must execute orders from above and issue guidance and orders to 
subordinates.”
24
  This is the part of the equation that leads defense reformers to focus on centralizing 
the organization of the military and fine-tuning the hierarchical relationship between civilians and 
soldiers inside the executive branch.  But to function properly, he adds, “advice and recommendations” 
must also move up the chain of command.  The chain of command, we can safely conclude, though 
strictly hierarchical, cannot function properly unless it is a two-way conduit in the decision-making 
process.  We seem to have reached an impasse.  How can the chain of command be both unflinchingly 
vertical and an effective two-way conduit?  Laurence Korb, a defense reformer and student of national 
security, reminds us of the ideal relationship between soldiers and statesmen within the executive 
branch: the department of defense, he writes, “must be organized and operated to ensure civilian 
control while not undermining or diluting military professionalism.”  This means that, on the one hand, 
“civilian control must not be exercised in such a manner that military opinions and expertise are 
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excluded from or downgraded within the decisionmaking process,” and that, on the other hand, 
“military considerations cannot be allowed to dominate the process.”  This, of course, is the ideal of 
civilian-military relations.  “Maintaining a proper balance or equilibrium in this area,” Korb humbly 
concludes, “has been and will be both a delicate and challenging task.”
25
  An exquisitely challenging task 
– insurmountable, I would argue – if we refuse to engage with the intellectual tools – the principles and 
forms – upon which our republic was founded.  It is, after all, precisely the creation and maintenance of 
delicate balances and equilibriums that is the unique and distinguished provenance of constitutional 
theory. 
 
An Institutional Conception of the Public Interest 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that a strong theory of faction undergirds Madison’s constitutional 
theory, and that fundamental governing structures in a republic need to be designed with a strong 
theory of faction in mind for a very simple reason: when fallible opinions and passionate natures are 
invited into the political process, as they are in our republic, individual rights and the public interest are 
perpetually under threat.  If a republic is to survive and flourish, Madison was convinced, the violence of 
faction must be broken and controlled.  Only when social checks and balances are combined with 
constitutional checks and balances can we be reasonably confident that the potential damage to our 
republic caused by factious legislators and statesmen will be contained (or, in the best-case scenario, 
overcome by the virtue and public spiritedness of other citizens, legislators and statesmen).  Only a 
cocktail of design features, I argued, provides adequate relief for the violence of faction. 
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 In the last chapter I also focused attention on the second part of the basic twofold challenge of 
self-government: a government with sufficient power to control the people will not itself be easy to 
control.  This problem – the untethered nature of government power in the absence of effective 
constitutional checks and balances – will exercise us for the rest of this chapter.  Madison understood 
that public officials had to be granted an almost un-republican degree of independence from the people 
in order to partially insulate decision-makers from the very opinions and passions that self-government 
proudly (if a bit warily) invites into the political process.  The burden on institutional designers would of 
course be significantly lighter if the men and women elected to public office possessed exceptionally 
sharp analytical skills and borderline angelic temperaments – if the “cool and deliberative sense of the 
community” prevailed unaided, based on our electoral judgments alone – but, as we know, 
representatives “of factious tempers, of local prejudice, or of sinister design, may, by intrigue, by 
coercion, or by other means, first obtain the suffrage, and then betray the interests, of the people.”
26
  It 
is because the people will not always choose their representatives wisely that constitutional checks and 
balances must be introduced into a separation of powers system.  Without auxiliary mechanisms – 
without internal devices that limit the power of our leaders to pursue factional projects – our fallible 
representatives would possess outright, or be able to usurp with relative ease, sufficient power to 
violate our rights and undermine the health and stability of our regime.  The primary control on a 
government in a republican system may be the people, but in the absence of auxiliary mechanisms, 
factiousness will dominate the interactions between the individual departments of government as well 
as within each department.  As I explained in the previous chapter, parchment barriers need not be 
breached for factional projects to be launched.  
The violence of faction?  Are not the distinctions between factions and non-factions, and 
between factious individuals and non-factious individuals, being asked to do an excessive amount of 
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work in this analysis?  If we cannot make a clear distinction between factious groups and non-factious 
groups, or between political actors who suppress their factiousness in deference to the public interest 
and those who claim allegiance to the public interest merely for rhetorical purposes or out of ignorance, 
do we gain any intellectual leverage on the nature of the internal dangers against which a republic must 
be adequately defended?  Let me approach this problem from a slightly different perspective.  If 
Madison’s theory of faction depends on the ability of constitutional checks and balances both to control 
faction and to provide avenues for non-factious groups to pursue the public interest, does the ambiguity 
of these fundamental concepts undermine the value of Madison’s constitutional theory?  This line of 
inquiry is particularly relevant to this dissertation because if we have exhausted the descriptive power of 
these central concepts, it would make little sense to base an analysis of the structures of the national 
security state on Madison’s strong theory of faction. 
If a faction is merely a group that promotes a set of policies that is at odds with the 
ideologically-driven preferences of another group – if “faction” is merely a political weapon and the 
“public interest” merely a rhetorical device – then a contemporary student of the national security state 
would have little to gain by engaging with the political theory upon which our republic was founded.  
Madison does offer us an expansive definition of faction, but it is too abstract, I would suggest, to help 
us distinguish clearly between factional and non-factional groups and projects.  And this ambiguity 
presents us with a seemingly irresolvable problem: How can we compare the structures of two different 
republics – or compare two sets of institutional designs for the same department in a single republic – if 
we cannot identify with precision what a well-designed republic must control in order to survive, and 
what it must promote in order to flourish?   




By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or 
minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of 
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and 




This definition of faction invites us to think about faction as a disruptive political force that need not be 
based on self-interest alone.  Factions can rally around principles as easily as interests, and rational ideas 
as easily as irrational ones.  Fallibility and self-love can combine to create a political force as deleterious 
to the health and stability of a republic as the unequal distribution of property.  Madison offers us an 
expansive definition of faction – a definition, as I argued in the previous chapter, which forms the 
foundation for his strong theory of faction – but, as I mentioned, it is nevertheless frustratingly 
imprecise.  Part of the problem here is that Madison thought the difference between groups united by a 
spirit of faction and groups united by public-spiritedness would be fairly obvious to well-educated 
citizens and experienced legislators.  He did not feel compelled to delve directly into the metaphysics of 
truth or express an explicit epistemological position in his writings, and this abstemiousness has 
disappointed many contemporary scholars.  Madison may have insisted that “the public good, the real 
welfare of the great body of the people, is the sole object to be pursued,” and that “no form of 
government whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted to the attainment of this object,” but 
we are not as enamored with the principles of the Enlightenment as he was, and are under significantly 
more pressure to align our arguments with the more rigorous standards of twenty-first-century social 
science.
28
  Madison may have drawn a stark contrast between the disreputable pursuit of narrow 
factional interests and the enlightened pursuit of broad public interests, but, as Robert Goodwin 
remarks, he and his fellow founders “gestured at many meanings” of the common good, some of which 
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are “subtly different from one another,” others of which are “blatantly in conflict, all of which were 
largely unnoticed by these writers themselves.”
29
   
The interests of factions and the public interest, though clearly antagonistic, appear to be mere 
theoretical evasions, crutches.  We know by definition that factions are hostile to the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community, but are they identifiable by objective standards?
30
  Factiousness 
may be a crime of sorts – a crime of passion, we could say – but can we conclude without a reasonable 
doubt that this or that group has committed a bookable offense? 
At this point in the discussion, let me turn to Stephen Elkin, a political scientist and 
constitutional theorist who has demonstrated in his work an admirable respect for the various and 
interrelated components of Madison’s constitutional system.  Elkin is sensitive to the fact that Madison 
abstained from a discussion of the precise content of the public interest.  Contrary to scholars who 
believe this omission points to a major flaw in Madison’s constitutional theory, however, he 
understands it as a distinct strength.  “To attempt to spell out the public interest in detail would not only 
                                                           
29
 Robert E. Goodin, “Institutionalizing the Public Interest: The Defense of Deadlock and Beyond,” American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 2 (June 1966), p. 332-333.  Goodwin partly attributes this to the philosophical 
culture of the time:  “Like virtually all political writers of the period, the Founders tended to employ the phrase 
‘public interest’ with relatively little reflection.” 
30
 After spirited debates on the subject in the 1960s, William Galston reports in a recent essay, the concept of the 
public interest had received a very public burial.  Prior to its latest revival at the turn of the century, the concept 
was widely dismissed as being “so vague, so contested, and so mired in subjectivity and partisanship as to admit of 
no objective and meaningful specification” (William Galston, “An old debate renewed: the politics of the public 
interest,” Daedalus, Vol. 136, No. 4 (Fall 2007), p. 11).  Edwin Haefele tries to gain traction on the public interest 
through a discussion of civic virtue.  A citizen who posssess civic virtue cares about “public purposes and public 
destinations.”  This detour allows him to conclude that “concerns about the long-term good of the polity are 
concerns rooted in civic virtue.”  But how do we distinguish between those who “possess empathy and strive for 
creative resolutions of public problems” from mere political activists who seek “specific outcomes”? (Edwin T. 
Haefele, “What Constitutes the American Republic?” in Karol Soltan and Stephen Elkin, eds., The Constitution of 
Good Societies (Pennsylvania State University, 1996), pp. 211, 222).  Walter Lacquer, another student of politics 
who wrestled with the concept of the public interest, has been credited with formulating a compelling definition, 
but it is admired, I would suggest, only because it is forgivingly abstract.  “The public interest may be presumed to 
be what men would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently” (Walter 
Lacquer, Essays in the Public Philosophy (Little Brown, 1955), p. 42). 
87 
 
be impossible, because impossibly complex, but also unwise.”
31
  Elkin argues that the “broad 
dimensions” of the public interest are suggested by Madison’s arguments in The Federalist and 
elsewhere, and that these include securing individual rights, fostering a commercial society, developing 
a vibrant civil society, and promoting a degree of economic equality.
32
  Elkin, of course, has his critics – 
he has been accused of projecting onto Madison his own particular vision of a good liberal society – but 
we need not visit these arguments here, as they focus on issues that would lead us too far away from 
our focus on national security.
33
  What is relevant to this dissertation is his claim that we should set 
aside our fixation on the specific content of the public interest and focus on the extent to which “the 
substance of the public interest is institutional.”  Elkin’s characterization of the strengths of an 
institutional conception of the public interest is worth quoting at length: 
 
An institutional conception of the public interest has impressive advantages.  For a start, 
it is broad enough to be applicable to changing circumstances.  Whatever else the public 
interest is, it must provide direction across largely unknown circumstances, possibilities 
for action, and political conflicts.  By contrast, a conception of the public interest made 
up of policy goals quickly outlives its usefulness; it provides little guidance once the 
particular world for which it was designed passes away, as it must.  A focus on 
institutions, on modes of association designed to enable members of a community to 




An institutional conception of the public interest is not only consistent with Madison’s constitutional 
theory, I would suggest – with his preoccupation with principles and forms – but it also saves students of 
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government from mistaking their particular policy preferences for the public interest.  An institutional 
conception of the public interest – as well as an institutional conception of the national interest, as I will 
argue shortly – focuses on the long-term capabilities of a constitutional system and is “broad enough to 
be applicable to changing circumstances and political unknowns.”  The public interest – and its mortal 
enemy, factionalism – now appear to us in a different light.  If a lawmaker is committed to defending the 
“constitutive institutions in a regime” – the institutions that give a regime its “characteristic manner of 
working” – we can say she is promoting the public interest, irrespective of her position on any particular 
policy issue.  To serve the public interest means first and foremost to safeguard the political institutions 
in a republic that are deliberative in form and designed to control faction. 
Now, if differentiating between factiousness and non-factiousness – between two incompatible 
conceptions of the public interest – were as hopelessly subjective as differentiating between exceptional 
and unexceptional works of art, we would be at a loss to identify precisely what a popular government 
must be able to control, and what it must be able to promote, in order to govern competently and retain 
the allegiance of the people.  But just as an institutional conception of the public interest rescues us 
from the almost unavoidable danger of conflating our policy goals with the public interest, an 
institutional conception of faction helps us to recognize and overcome our deep-seated “aesthetic” 
prejudices.  A group that attempts to “weaken or eliminate the devices needed to prevent faction,” or to 
“make deliberative lawmaking significantly harder,” reveals through its hostility to necessary republican 
devices its factional orientation.
35
  Deliberation is the lynchpin in this analysis: a republic properly 
structured – one in which each branch of government has the constitutional means to demand 
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persuasive arguments from the other branches – forces lawmakers and statesmen who might otherwise 
be inclined to lecture or bully their colleagues to publically defend their positions.
36
 
 Constitutional checks and balances, recall, serve a twofold function.  First, they provide 
members of each of the three departments of government with the means and motives to defend their 
constitutional authority against inter-departmental incursions.  Second, and no less important, they 
improve the quality of lawmaking and statecraft by mandating a degree of cooperation between public 
officials in different departments.  In Madison’s constitutional system, the powers of the three branches 
of government are shared, rather than strictly separated.  If we had a pure system of separation of 
powers – if the legislative, executive and judicial powers were completely isolated and impermeable – 
not only would the likelihood of inter-departmental encroachment and usurpation increase, but a 
creative intermingling of ideas and ambitions would be precluded.  But how do constitutional checks 
and balances actually work?  How do shared powers control factiousness and improve the quality of 
lawmaking and statecraft?  How do auxiliary mechanisms increase the odds that public officials will 
actually deliberate constructively?  How do auxiliary mechanisms increase the odds that public officials 
will not circumvent or disable whatever deliberative processes get in their way?  
 The danger in any assembly of men – and not merely a large legislative assembly – is that its 
members will “yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions,” and “be seduced by factious leaders 
into intemperate and pernicious resolutions.”
37
  When intemperance and perniciousness characterize 
the actions of a single body in a bicameral legislature, or in a single branch of government in a tripartite 
regime, constitutional checks and balances are designed to play a preventive role.  Whether individual 
rights or the permanent and aggregate interests of the community are at risk, laws and resolutions that 
make a mockery of the ideals of dispassionateness and disinterestedness need to be suppressed.  
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Bicameralism, judicial review and an executive veto are three constitutional checks and balances 
endowed with the requisite counterforce to halt such projects in their tracks.  In this context, the quality 
of lawmaking and statecraft is improved only in the sense that the progress of the most noxious kinds of 
enterprises is inhibited.  But constitutional checks and balances are not merely a set of restraints.  Only 
when public officials prove unwilling or incapable of disinterestedness and dispassionateness in their 
official duties are checks and balances actually tripped.  In a well-designed republic, constitutional 
checks and balances often lay dormant not because the spirit of faction has been exorcised from 
government but because of what we could call a kind of scarecrow effect.  Constitutional checks and 
balances can discourage factionalism by their mere presence alone.  Bicameralism, for example, 
encourages members of the two legislative bodies to work toward accommodation before they submit 
their respective bills because of the necessity of the concurrence of the two bodies in the final passage 
of any law or resolution.  The threat of a presidential veto also promotes a similar kind of strategic 
adjustment.   
 In addition to obstructionism and the threat of obstructionism, there is a third way in which 
constitutional checks and balances are expected to improve the quality of lawmaking and statecraft.  
Constitutional checks and balance force lawmakers and statesmen to deliberate.  Skepticism on this 
subject – on the ability of, and frequency with which, elected officials actually deliberate – is of course 
widespread.  If spouses, university colleagues and business partners often struggle to deliberate 
constructively, why should we expect our representatives – men and women who tend to be more 
ambitious and ideological than the norm – to exercise faculties that few of us seem to possess in 
abundance?  Daniel Epstein captures our reservations well: “While a certain ‘structure’ of government 
may make government unlikely to be tyrannical, it is harder to see how a structure can cause 
government to be ‘good’ in intelligently securing the public safety and encouraging national prosperity.”  
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Is it not more reasonable to assume that “the quality of the government will depend on the quality of 
those who hold its powers”?
38
 
David Epstein, invoking Madison, rejects this assumption, and argues that, in our constitutional 
system, government is expected to serve the public good as well as refrain from the public ill.  Elkin 
concurs: “The existence of permanent and aggregate interests of the community suggests that the 
problem of representative government for Madison was not only to prevent something from happening, 
but also to secure or promote whatever these permanent and aggregate interests might be.”
39
  It is not 
enough, in other words, for government to exercise its powers in a strictly preventive manner, in 
defense of individual rights.  Security from internal and external threats, and the generation of national 
wealth through the regulation of commerce are among the public goods a competent government is 
expected to provide.
40
  Constitutional checks and balances are grafted onto a separation of powers 
system not only to prevent tyranny but to encourage the kind of inter-departmental cooperation that 
promotes the public interest (and that would not occur with sufficient regularity without them).  “The 
same constitution of the regime that would prevent faction,” Elkin reminds us, “would also create the 
active government necessary for securing rights and for securing the permanent and aggregate interests 
of the community.”
41
  Madison insisted that the branches of government “were to be intimates, not 
separate fortresses that could refuse to cooperate with one another,” and that the purpose of 
cooperation is to promote the public interest.
42
  The emphasis cannot be on merely distancing 
representatives from the passions of the people.  Even if representatives are less factious than their 
constituents, in the absence of inter-governmental deliberation – of collaborative problem-solving – the 
quality of lawmaking and statecraft will still fall woefully short of the minimum levels of stability and 
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prosperity the public demands.  And since powerful men and women rarely deliberate voluntarily, 
constitutional checks and balances are embedded in a republican system of government in order to 
force public officials to deliberate on matters of public importance against their will.
43
   
 But do constitutional checks and balances work according to design?  Do they actually promote 
deliberation among public officials and, as a consequence, have a positive impact on the quality of 
lawmaking and statecraft?  The evidence suggests that a fair amount of skepticism is warranted – 
perhaps even a great deal of skepticism – but that pure, unadulterated cynicism is not.
44
  Some public 
officials, no matter how strong the nudge toward deliberation might be, will lack to such an extent the 
three qualities Max Webber argued were of the greatest importance for a politician – “passion, a sense 
of responsibility, and a sense of proportion” – that they will never possess the inner calm and 
composure necessary to allow differences of opinion to impinge upon their private reality.
45
  At the 
same time, no politician is a model of utter senselessness and sterility.  Most politicians – most human 
beings – inhabit the amorphous middle ground between the sublime and the sociopathic, and we can 
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therefore conclude with confidence that facts and rational arguments are not irrelevant factors in 
political debates.  As political theorist and student of the legislature Joseph Bessette observes, politics is 
best understood as a “complex mix of politics” – what he calls bargaining and compromise – “and 
deliberation, of the ‘play of politics’ and the reasoned effort to promote good policy.”
46
  Even in the 
most deliberation-friendly institutional settings, non-deliberative factors will always be influential.  The 
“unforced force of the better argument,” we could say, only routs domination in theory.
47
  But it is 
untenable to argue that politicians only bully, bluster and seduce their colleagues and constituents, and 
that they never deliberate about the merits and demerits of public policy.  The caliber of lawmaking and 
statecraft will certainly reflect in part the quality of those in office.  But if a republic is to survive and 
flourish – if it is to recommend itself to its own citizens – its governing structures must be designed in a 
manner that ensures that the “complex mix of politics” remains complex and is not routinely stripped of 
its deliberative component.   
 
An Institutional Conception of the National Interest 
 
A great and enduring threat to a republic is that a popular leader, often with the support of an energized 
populace, will “throw off regular deliberative procedures.”  The pronounced tendency of power-holders 
to be evasive, shifty and deceptive – the extent to which deliberative processes must be imposed upon 
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those in power – is why I argue in this section that we need to think of the national interest as the 
creation and maintenance of a deliberative core inside the executive branch.  As we shall see in the 
second part of this dissertation, there are, at present, only informal deliberative bodies inside the 
executive branch, even though the political theory on which our republic was founded argues that 
informal checks and balances are as ineffective at regulating the behavior of governments as mere 
parchment barriers.  Formal mechanisms, Madison teaches us, are indispensible in a constitutional 
system.  Voluntary cooperation, in contrast, is a constitutional fantasy: ambitious people in positions of 
power simply do not cooperate voluntary with the regularity good governance requires. 
Constitutional checks and balances, of course, have a limited utility: past a certain point, 
deployed in excess – if they compromise energy, secrecy, dispatch or decision, for example – they are as 
likely to degrade the quality of lawmaking and statecraft as to improve it.  With this understanding of 
the limited utility of constitutional checks and balances in mind, we can now ask ourselves if Madison’s 
constitutional theory offers us a set of intellectual tools that might improve the quality of executive-
branch decision-making in a national security emergency.
48
  Over the next few pages I hope to persuade 
the reader that it does offer us a set of invaluable tools – tools that will enable us to draw illuminating 
parallels between an institutional conception of the public interest and an institutional conception of 
the national interest, as well as between conventional factions and national security factions – and that 
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the advantages of incorporating formal deliberative mechanisms inside the executive branch far 
outweigh the “possible abuses which must be incident to every power of trust.”
49
  
Among political theorists, I realize, there is not much support for this position.  Elkin, for 
example, argues that a “deliberative core” is a necessity in a well-designed republic, and that, for a 
republic to realize its full potential and fulfill its responsibilities, a diverse range of views must 
participate in a “vigorous discussion of the concrete meaning of the public interest.”  He characterizes 
deliberation as “a process of regular and public argument in which there is a premium on making clear 
the reasoning behind their positions.”
50
  Elkin argues that the legislature is the only department of 
government in a republic in which the essential components of a genuinely deliberative process – a wide 
range of views, vigorous discussion, the regular and public use of practical reason – are present.  Unlike 
the legislature, however, the presidency is “not presently structured to function as a deliberative 
institution, and even with the best will in the world, probably and should not become one.”
51
  Although 
the president can contribute to congressional deliberations in a few ways – by recommending 
legislation, for example, or through the threat or actual use of a presidential veto
52
 – the virtues of the 
executive branch are a product of its unity, and this is “not a good foundation on which to build a 
deliberative separation of powers that will give careful consideration to whether governmental action 
serves the public interest.”
53
 
 Are supporters of the status quo correct to argue that the required unity of the executive power 
is incompatible with a deliberative separation of power inside the executive branch?  As Elkin puts it, 
“institutional reform of the presidency ought not be high on the list of things that friends of republican 
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government should worry about.”
54
  He argues, instead, that the present strengths of the executive 
need to be maintained.  But would the virtues that flow from a unitary executive be compromised by 
the inclusion of any kind of pluralist device inside the executive department, however limited, however 
tightly circumscribed?  Is the quality of national security decision-making better left to chance – to the 
wisdom and worldliness of our commander-in-chief – than to the kind of auxiliary mechanisms that 
promote deliberation and help control faction?  If deliberation is defined in part as a process of regular 
and public argument, as Elkin and most other political theorists define it, it is indeed difficult to imagine 
how to integrate formal deliberative mechanisms into a branch of government that obviously requires a 
degree of secrecy and dispatch to perform its functions.  But his definition of deliberation – a definition 
that rests on the once-fruitful dichotomy between energy and deliberation and is contributes to the 
larger argument he makes for increasing the deliberative capacities of the legislature – suggests a lack of 
familiarity with how decisions in a national security crisis are actually made.  National security decision-
making certainly cannot be deliberative in the sense of being public and inviting into the debate a 
comprehensive set of views, but it also cannot be so non-deliberative or anti-deliberative that it gives 
free reign to the violence of faction.
55
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Let us return to the question with which I opened this chapter: Is there an institutional solution 
– however modest, however imperfect – for the constitutional challenge of insuring a relatively 
seamless fit between political goals and military means?
56
  War, Clausewitz taught us, must be 
understood as an act of policy.  This part of the equation is perfectly clear.  Even though war is a 
“pulsation of violence, variable in strength and therefore variable in the speed with which it explodes 
and discharges its energy,” it must nevertheless remain under the control of a “superior intelligence.”
57
  
Military aims must never conflict with the ultimately political purpose for which the military was 
deployed.  This hierarchical relationship between political aims and military means suggests that we 
have good reason to endorse a constitutional system in which military leaders are subordinate to their 
civilian counterparts inside the executive branch and the president presides over a department 
organized hierarchically.  But might the relationship between political aims and military means be too 
complicated – too vulnerable to the violence of faction – to be treated in such a manner?  Must the so-
called political view held by civilian leaders be granted tyrannical power? 
If war is to be sensible, the political objective in war must be thoroughly vetted, disciplined, 
controlled.  As Clausewitz argues, the political objective must “adapt itself to its chosen means.”  This 
may only require minor adjustments, but the process of adaptation must sometimes “radically” change 
the initial political objectives.  The political aim remains the “first consideration,” but it cannot be 
indulged wholesale merely because it is the dominant element in the political-military relationship.  It 
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cannot be wholly indulged both because of the danger of misalignment and because the process of 
adaptation is only partly rational, by which I mean objective and subjective factors will always influence 
the assessment of participants.  The objective factors “comprise the specific characteristics and 
strengths of the state in question,” and the political, economic, technological, intellectual, and social 
characteristics of an age.  The subjective factors “consist in the free will of the leadership, which should 
conform to the objective realities, but sometimes does not.”
58
 
The political objective, in other words, is vulnerable to the spirit of faction.  Ideological and non-
ideological considerations, in other words, are impossible to tease apart.
59
  The political objective 
emerges from the application of the “political point of view” to a particular national security threat only 
in theory.  In reality, we must either control faction in a national security crisis or accept the 
consequences of ends-means misalignment.  The political point of view is not synonymous with the 
policy preferences of any particular group of civilian leaders.  The fallibility, ambition and self-love of our 
civilian leaders prohibit us from drawing such a convenient, symmetrical conclusion.  The national 
interest – an abstraction democratic leaders tend to invoke to advance their policy preferences – is 
unfortunately as malleable a concept as the public interest (if, that is, as I will explain momentarily, we 
forsake an institutional conception of the national interest). 
Alexander George, a life-long student of national security, in a short book in which he presents 
readers with a handful of subjects that had flummoxed him throughout his entire career, asks this 
question about the national interest:  “Is the concept of national interest robust enough to enable policy 
makers, if they are so inclined, to exclude ideological considerations from influencing their foreign policy 
considerations?”  It is impossible, in other words, to conduct foreign policy strictly on the basis of “sober 
calculations of the national interest.”  It would of course be nice for decision-makers if such a super-
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ordinate criterion existed and could be relied upon to justify difficult decisions – to help them “cut 
through the problem of complexity and to cope with the uncertainties affecting choice among 
alternative policies” – but unfortunately the concept of the national interest is “nonoperational” and 
“cannot be employed as a utility function in rigorous policy analysis.”
60
 
The synthesis of Madison and Clausewitz now is almost complete.  Let us return to Elkin’s claim 
that we should set aside our debates about the specific content of the public interest and focus on the 
extent to which “the substance of the public interest is institutional.”  What is a national security 
faction?  A group of civilian or military leaders that attempts to “weaken or eliminate the devices 
needed to prevent faction.”  What is the national interest?  The creation and maintenance of 
deliberative devices inside the executive branch.  What complicates this analogy between the public 
interest and the national interest, of course, is that the deliberative devices in the executive branch that 
are designed to improve the quality of national security decision-making are informal, and therefore 
remain largely at the mercy of faction.  As a result of the premium we have placed on informal 
cooperation inside the executive branch, we have no reason to expect that the “cool and deliberative” 
sense of the community will prevail in a national security crisis.  Constitutional checks and balances, 
recall, are incorporated into our constitutional system to service three purposes: dissuade factiousness, 
prevent the initiation of factional projects, and promote deliberation.  Madison, as I mentioned earlier, 
insisted that the branches of government “were to be intimates, not separate fortresses that could 
refuse to cooperate with each other.”  Can constitutional theory be utilized by defense reformers to 
promote a similar kind of constructive intimacy between institutions inside the executive branch? 
In the light of the aforementioned need for a process of adjustment and adaptation between 
political ends and military means in a national security crisis – in light of the inevitability of national 
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security factions – how comfortable should we be with the present constitution of the executive 
branch?  Does a strictly hierarchical relationship between our civilian and military leaders – the doctrine 
of absolute civilian control of the military – provide us with a mechanism that is likely to secure the 
necessary degree of adjustment and adaptation?  As compelling as the doctrine of absolute civilian 
control of the military is in theory, how does it work in practice?  Does it adequately address the basic 
requirement for waging a sensible, purposeful war, which is harmonizing ends and means?  The art of 
adaptation and adjustment requires creativity and imagination, but most of all it requires objectivity and 
experience.  Where is this objectivity and experience – the cool and deliberative sense of the community 
– most likely to be found within the executive branch?  And if it is not found in any one place – if it 
emerges through a synthesis of knowledge and expertise – can we create a more deliberation-friendly 




Clausewitz believed that the task of military theory was to make soldiers more sensitive to their 
surroundings. 
 
We cannot formulate principles, rules, or methods: history does not provide a basis for 
them.  On the contrary, at almost every turn one finds peculiar features that are often 
incomprehensible and sometimes astonishingly odd.  Nevertheless it is it is useful to 
study history in connection with this subject as with others.  While there may be no 
system, no mechanical way of recognizing the truth, truth does exist.  To recognize it 
one generally needs seasoned judgment and an instinct born of long experience.
61
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Are civilians or soldiers more likely to acquire the experiences necessary to judge the appropriateness of 
particular military means?  Madison’s objective as an institutional designer was to constitute a regime 
that would be more likely to act on seasoned judgment and an instinct born of long experience – to 
formulate policy in a disinterested and dispassionate manner – than to act on unseasoned judgment and 
an undisciplined, unrefined instinct.  My claim is not that soldiers are better able to harmonize ends and 
means than civilians.
62
  My claim is only that a formal deliberative body inside the executive branch 
would be better at ensuring that political ends and military means are reasonably compatible at the 
initiation of a military engagement than the informal deliberative body we rely upon today.  The 
purpose of a deliberative process should be to ensure both that military leaders use violence in pursuit 
of political ends and that civilian leaders are unable to entertain fanciful theories about the 
predictability and manageability of war.  It is because political ends and military means do not naturally 
align – because they must be forced into alignment through constitutional checks and balances – that 
harmonizing ends and means is best understood as a constitutional challenge.
63
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4 Executive Power: A Strong Executive or One-Man Rule? 
 
What will become of a youth so circumstanced, above all if he belongs to a great country and is 
conspicuous there for his birth and wealth, as well as for a tall and handsome person?  Will he not be 
filled with unbounded ambition, believing himself well able to manage the affairs of all the world, at 
home and abroad, and thereupon give himself airs and be puffed up with senseless self-conceit? 
- Plato 
 
The best is he who of himself doth know / good too is he who listens to the wise / But he who neither 
knows himself nor heeds / The words of others, is a useless man.   
- Hesiod 
 
Vital interests, despite common assumptions to the contrary, have only a vague connection with 
objective fact.  A sovereign nation determines for itself what its vital interests are, and its leaders 
accomplish this exacting task largely by using their highly fallible and inevitably biased human judgment 
to interpret the external political environment. 
- Bernard Brodie 
 
 
Even if readers are convinced of two points I made in the last chapter – that political ends and military 
means must be harmonized for a military engagement to be an intelligent, sensible activity, and that 
Madison’s theory of faction explains why we should not expect political ends and military means to 
regularly align in a constitutional system in which the executive branch is organized hierarchically – they 
might nevertheless dismiss my suggestion that a deliberative separation of power in the executive 
branch would improve the quality of national security decision-making.  Advocates of the doctrine of the 
unitary executive, for example, could easily cite Alexander Hamilton’s forceful demolition of executive-
branch plurality in The Federalist, No. 70, and argue that pluralism of any kind – and a senior military 
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officer in the executive branch who possessed a limited veto would violate the principle of unity – only 
conceals faults, destroys responsibility, muddles decision-making and invites disaster.  What I will argue 
in this chapter is that we can endorse a strong executive in the realm of national security – capture the 
benefits of executive energy – without having to gamble on one-man rule.   
In the political theory literature, a strong executive has a distinct profile, is an amalgamation of a 
particular set of characteristics, and strength is generally a measure of two capacities: the ability of the 
executive to initiate actions when emergency conditions demand a timely and forceful response from 
the national government, and the capacity of the executive to impose a long-term vision of society on a 
recalcitrant set of political, social and economic institutions, including the legislature, which generally 
exhibits a strong preference for the status quo.
1
  We may not be able to produce a quantitative measure 
of executive strength – we may lack a precise set of metrics for calculating the power of presidents 
across time and circumstance – but political theory has been less concerned with the precision of this 
concept than with its comparative credentials.  How does the strength of the executive compare to the 
strength of the legislature (or, for that matter, the judiciary) in any particular constitutional order? 
A comparative lens is what enables students of the presidency to determine whether or not the 
executive has sufficient power to meet her responsibilities.  In a national security crisis, we can roughly 
evaluate the power of the executive by reflecting on the following question: Does the executive have 
the leverage necessary to respond forcefully and energetically to a crisis situation – or, on the contrary, 
                                                           
1
 For an excellent introduction to the subject of executive power, see Joseph M. Bessette and Jeffrey K. Tulis, 
“Preface,” and “On the Constitution, Politics, and the Presidency,” in Joseph M. Bessette  and Jeffrey K. Tulis, eds., 
The Constitutional Presidency (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).  For an equally insightful analysis of the 
major constructions of presidential power over the course of U.S. history, as well as a provocative discussion of the 
doctrine of the unitary executive as a development phenomenon, see Stephen Skowronek, “The Conservative 
Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive,” Harvard Law Review, 
Vol. 122.  As Showronek thoughtfully reminds us, “Constitutional construction is an American political tradition, 
perhaps the American political tradition” (p. 2101).  In a slight variation on the second capacity mentioned above, 
Herbert Storing argues that the president’s duty to “check the legislature and even the people, when they are 
wrong, carries a duty, not merely to resist but to lead, to provide the direction that finally only he can provide” 
(Herbert Storing, “Introduction,” in Charles Thach, The Creation of the Presidency (Liberty Fund, 2007), p. 171). 
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is her ability to respond to the emergency hindered by an incorrigibly slow and deliberative body that 
prohibits the government from responding to a national emergency with the requisite speed and 
dexterity?
2
  In theory we may have a government of laws, rather than of men, advocates of a strong, 
unitary executive argue, but the demands placed upon a constitutional government in a dangerous and 
unpredictable world force us to jettison our deep reservations about the rule of men and endorse an 
executive with extra-legal or extra-constitutional power in the name of order and security. 
Among the political theorists who defend a strong, unitary executive, perhaps the most 
sophisticated – certainly the most clever and combative – is Harvey Mansfield.
3
  Before we analyze his 
position in detail, there are of course other theorists who defend one-man rule, just as there are 
numerous scholars who are critical of the “imperial presidency.”
4
  The advocate of executive power who 
has perhaps received the most critical attention over the last few years is John Yoo.
5
  His theoretical 
arguments in defense of executive power in a national security emergency, however, are not particularly 
original (his combination of historical and legal research is what gives his work its distinctive character).  
Another notable contemporary defender of presidential war power is Richard A. Posner.
6
  He argues 
that individual rights cannot always be protected in a national security emergency – that the costs of 
doing so outweigh the benefits – and that, in the name of public safety, they may be temporarily 
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 I should point out here that the deliberative bodies feared in this context are legislative or judicial in nature, as 
well as any power-sharing arrangement between the executive and other two branches of government.  What is 
not considered is a deliberative body inside the executive branch.   
3
 For a review of the broader scholarly landscape, and another widely cited defense of the doctrine of the unitary 
executive, see Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from 
Washington to Bush (Yale University Press, 2008). 
4
 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Mariner Books, Reprint Edition, 2004).  More recently, David 
Adler has developed this critique.  “America’s backward march toward monarchism, characterized by presidential 
usurpation of warmaking and foreign affairs authority, and sweeping assertions of executive privilege, secrecy, 
immunity and prerogative powers, represents contempt for constitutionalism, republicanism, and the rule of law 
David Gray Adler, “The Law: George Bush as Commander in Chief: Toward the Nether World of Constitutionalism,” 
Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Summer 2006), p. 159. 
5
 John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9/11 (University of Chicago 
Press, 2005). 
6




suspended.  NSA surveillance, military tribunals and torture are all examples of practices that we 
unhesitatingly reject in peacetime but that we may have to embrace in a national security emergency.  
Yoo, Posner and other defenders of executive power, I would suggest, do not add clarity or depth to 
Mansfield’s theoretical arguments, though they do apply them to more contemporary issues.
7
  They also 
do not address the subject that interests us in this chapter.  We are concerned not with the power of the 
executive relative to the legislature, but the wisdom – or lack thereof – of introducing a deliberative 
separation of powers into the executive branch to promote the alignment of political ends and military 
means. 
What makes Mansfield theoretical defense of executive power unique – and justifies a close 
study of his treatise on executive power – is his claim that the great theoretical innovation of the 
Founders was the smuggling of monarchial power into our constitutional order. 
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 Three distinguished scholars who strongly disagree with the constitutional and normative arguments made by 
advocates of the doctrine of the unitary executive are Louis Fisher, Stephen Holmes and Harold Koh.  Fisher, an 
expert on presidential war power, writes that in the area of war-making, the “fundamental characteristic of 
American government – the framers’ reliance on checks and balances – has been abandoned.”  Although the 
framers were determined to prevent a single person or set of advisors from making war, “We now have 
presidential wars, set in motion unilaterally by our chief executives and unrestrained by either judicial or legislative 
checks” (Louis Fisher, “The War Power: No Checks, No Balance,” in Colton C. Campbell, et al, Congress and the 
Politics of Foreign Policy (Prentice Hall, 2003), p. 1-2).  Fisher argues that the system of checks and balances 
between the legislature and executive branches of government need to be either tightened or restored (in part 
because the Truman, Reagan, elder Bush, Clinton and younger Bush administrations all claimed they could order 
large-scale military interventions without congressional approval).  Appeals to the original intent of the founders, 
and tinkering with the War Powers Resolution, Fisher believes, are unlikely to discipline the president.  What he 
suggests is that Congress learns to thrust and parry with the powerful weapons already at its disposal, such as its 
prerogatives to authorize and appropriate funds (see Presidential War Power (University of Kansas Press, 2004), p. 
275).   What Fisher fails to consider in his analysis is the frequency with which congressmen willingly conspire with 
the president to ensure that his range of motion remains unimpeded and his powers robust.  And when the same 
party controls both Congress and the White House, the majority, at least at the onset of an international crisis, is 
much more likely to lobby on behalf of the president’s agenda than to question his judgment.  Holmes is equally 
perturbed by the concentration of power in the executive branch and argues that domestic and international law, 
rather than being burdensome, offer necessary protections against the fallacy of rulers.  Contrary to Yoo and 
Posner, he rejects the idea that the demands of national security put a premium on executive branch flexibility and 
that the executive “needs to suspend the rule of law whenever it thinks that it is an obstacle” (Stephen Holmes, 
The Matador’s Cape: America’s Reckless Response to Terror (Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 272).  Harold 
Koh argues that congress has the constitutional authority to determine the nature and timing of a military conflict, 
and that the power to declare war is not subordinate to the president’s power to make war (Harold H. Koh, The 
National Security Constitution: Sharing Power after the Iran-Contra Affair (Yale University Press, 1990). 
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The Long, Sad, Horrifying Experience of Republics 
 
Mansfield’s definition of a strong executive is admirably clear and straightforward.  The American 
president is “a single executive with ample powers not elected by the legislature, hence strong.”
8
  The 
key features here are single, ample, and not elected by the legislature.  A strong executive is a unitary 
executive, independent from the other branches of government, and in possession of powers that 
enable office holders to act in a manner that appears to contravene the idea of a constitutionalized 
executive.  He is still a republican executive, however, rather than merely a popular monarch.  He is 
equipped with the necessary energy to respond to emergencies without being simply an emergency 
device built into the constitution.  The American president is neither a “revived” Roman dictator nor a 
“moderated” British monarch, and our constitution, Mansfield argues, therefore “establishes the first 
republic with a strong executive that is consistent with republicanism.”
9
 
Republican theory prior to 1787 had multiple strains and variants.  Mansfield is dismissive of 
what he calls “primitive” republicanism, and he argues that the authors of The Federalist were equally 
vexed by the endurance of this experience-resistant, self-destructive version of republican theory.  What 
distinguishes the political theory of The Federalist from all previous republican theory, Mansfield claims, 
and what makes it distinctly modern, is its understanding of the power of necessity.  Necessity properly 
understood, he argues, is what mandates the creation of a strong executive power. 
At this point in his argument, most if not all students of The Federalist would be in a receptive, 
agreeable mood.  The concept of necessity, in this limited context, is pleasantly abstract and merely 
evokes the number and diversity of challenges that all nations confront over the course of time.  History 
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 Harvey Mansfield, Taming the Prince (Johns Hopkins University, 1989), p. 147. 
9
 Mansfield, p. 148. 
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certainly presented republican theorists in the late-eighteenth century with plenty of failed experiments 
in self-government upon which to reflect and draw valuable conclusions.  This wealth of history and 
anecdote provided the founding fathers with at least one unequivocal lesson: if the purpose of the 
constitutional convention was to create a stable, secure, long-lasting republican regime, structural 
innovation would be necessary.
10
  But this rather simple, cautionary tale is not what Mansfield has in 
mind.  History, he argues, is more authoritative with respect to the particular structure a constitutional 
system must adopt.  For Mansfield, the fact that all previous experiments in republican rule ended in 
failure demonstrates the necessity of a certain kind of republican regime fronted by a very specific kind 
of executive. 
The United States Constitution, he writes, “constitutionalizes the necessities of republican 
experience – and in no respect more obviously than in the executive.”
11
  History teaches us that human 
affairs are defined by recurrent stresses and strains.  Human nature and the fundamental character of 
political life, if taken seriously, make a mockery of republican faith.  “In its ‘energy’ or quickness, the 
executive deals more than any other branch with the accidents and force that may thwart or disturb 
republican choice,” and therefore must be given preeminence in a constitutional system.
12
  As nice as it 
might be to choose a government that conforms to the principles of “primitive” republicanism – a 
government that places great faith in the judgment and decency of average citizens and in the ability of 
deliberative bodies to respond with the requisite speed and dispatch to issues of pressing importance – 
this is simply not a realistic option.
13
  History informs us that our options are in fact tightly 
                                                           
10
 If I may indulge in a brief aside: Our inheritance of history and anecdote, I would suggest, far surpasses our 
inheritance of wisdom.  An empty, non-operational aphorism, some readers might complain.  But if history and 
anecdote were not so vulnerable to abuse – if wisdom flowed more naturally from the accumulation of history and 
anecdote – men would be far more angelic than Madison assumed, and we would have much less need to place 
our faith in self-government in the subtle balancing acts of constitutional theory.  
11
 Mansfield, p. 255. 
12
 Mansfield, pp. 255-256. 
13
 Political scientist Mark Landy makes a similar point: “Fearful of tyranny, the framers did not give supreme power 
to the president.  But they reluctantly concluded that threats to the safety and well-being of the republic would 
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circumscribed.  The history of republican rule – a history of incompetence, betrayal, implosion – teaches 
us that such a faith-based conception of self-government is untenable.  Mansfield summarizes his 
argument with typical concision and flair: “By finding a place for the necessities of government within 
the framework of government itself, the Constitution corrects the foolish optimism of republicanism 
which thinks, in essence, that men can live by the laws they choose and never have to bow to the 
necessities they do not choose, or learn from their experience of them.”
14
   As republican theorists, if we 
are realistic about our options – if we are not blinded by romantic, primitive notions of political life – the 
logic of history has done the bulk of our work for us.   
What were the specific lessons of history that impressed themselves so forcefully on the 
Founders, the lessons which we must respect with equal commitment today?  The “new republicanism” 
that was forged at the constitutional convention – a republicanism that managed to combine the 
“freedom of republics” and the “strength of monarchies” – drew upon the sad, multi-millennial history 
of experiments in republican governance.  The Founders, Mansfield explains, believed that all previous 
republics, including those that experienced periods of great success, had succumbed to tyrannical 
excesses.  A republic without monarchical strength, the Founders understood, would be unable to 
defend itself from internal and external threats in a volatile world.  The Founders were not great and 
innovative students of history.  They deserve praise because they deferred to common sense and were 
not held hostage by romantic ideas.
15
  They changed the history of republican government by 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
arise that would have to be addressed with the agility that only a lone decision-maker could provide” (Marc Landy, 
“Terror and the Executive,” in National Affairs, No. 3 (Spring 2010), p. 105). 
14
 Mansfield, p. 257. 
15
 There are many ways to phrase the basic argument in this dissertation.  Madison and Hamilton deserve praise, 
Mansfield explains, because they deferred to common sense and were not held hostage by romantic ideas.  I 
would argue that if common sense teaches us anything about decision making in a national security crisis it is that 
political ends and military means must be closely aligned if we are to deploy force sensibly.  Common sense also 
teaches us, I would suggest, that it is terribly romantic to assume that the president has the national interest at 
heart and that we need not worry about executive-branch factiousness in a national security crisis. 
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introducing the world to a republican theory that combined the freedom of republican rule and the 
strength and security of monarchy.
16
   
The experience of self-government under the Articles of the Confederation, Mansfield argues, 
made it perfectly clear that republican theory needed a major overhaul.  Three issues, he suggests, were 
particularly salient.  First, the Revolutionary War taught Americans that state governments needed 
stronger executives.  Second, Shays’ Rebellion, a domestic crisis, taught Americans that secrecy and 
dispatch were essential characteristics of a national government.  Finally, the hostage-taking incident in 
the Bey of Algeria, a foreign crisis, taught Americans that only a powerful executive would be able to 
diffuse and combat international threats.  This brief survey of post-independence politics leads 
Mansfield to make the following claim: “The task of political science in The Federalist was to show that 
an energetic executive could be republicanized.”
17
   The Federalist, No. 70, he would have us believe – 
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 As I mentioned in an earlier footnote, this is a highly contentious claim.  The authors of our Constitution, Louis 
Fisher argues, were determined to prevent a single person or set of advisors from making war.  That we now have 
“presidential wars, set in motion unilaterally by our chief executives and unrestrained by either judicial or 
legislative checks,” cannot be justified with reference to the Constitution (Louis Fisher, “The War Power: No 
Checks, No Balance,” in Colton C. Campbell, et al, Congress and the Politics of Foreign Policy (Pearson, 2002), p. 2).  
Much has of course been written over the last half-century about the expansion of the president’s war-making 
powers.  Madison’s belief that “the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the 
same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means 
and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others,” appears, in this light, to have been somewhat of a 
declaration of faith (The Federalist, No. 51, Paragraph 4).  Legislators should be clamoring to inject themselves 
more forcefully into debates about war and peace – to defend their legislative prerogatives – and yet they have 
been relatively passive at precisely those times when the stakes have been highest.  Appears, I say, because there 
are at least three different ways to interpret the passivity of Congress in the face of this supposed presidential 
power grab: either the necessary constitutional means to resist this kind of encroachment never existed; the 
personal ambition of individual legislators rarely unite in opposition to the national security policies of a president 
unless these policies have proven over time to be deeply problematic; or – my preferred explanation, as we will 
see in the next chapter – our relative position in the world has changed so dramatically since the framers designed 
our constitution that the very tyranny they expected to contain through a sophisticated set of checks and balances 
has seeped through the old foundation. 
17
 Mansfield, p. 250. 
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rather than The Federalist, Nos. 10 and 51 – is the key to understanding both the logic behind our 
constitutional order and the success of our republic.
18
   
 
The Federalist, No. 70 
 
The Federalist, No. 70 begins modestly.  Although some well-intentioned citizens believe that a 
“vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government,” this had better not be 
the case, since in the absence of a rigorous executive, republican government is impossible.  “Energy in 
the Executive,” despite the republican prejudice to the contrary, “is a leading character in the definition 
of good government” (Paragraph 1).  After the decade-long experience of self-government under the 
Articles of Confederation, it was widely understood by the Founders that the executive would have to be 
entrusted with a substantial degree of power and independence for the national government to be 
effective.
19
  That an energetic executive – energetic rather than feeble – is an important component of 
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 Jeremy D. Bailey helps us to understand why Hamilton is such a central figure among contemporary advocates of 
the unitary executive.  “First, unlike Madison, Hamilton seems to offer a consistently proexecutive body of writings 
throughout his career, thereby offering an opportunity to use postratification practice to illustrate preratification 
understanding.  Second, his defense of unity in the executive offers a democratic logic that can transcend history 
and speak to modern political practice, even as it offers a way to understand that history” (Jeremy D. Bailey, “The 
New Unitary Executive and Democratic Theory: The Problem of Alexander Hamilton,” The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 102, No. 4 (Nov., 2008), p. 457-458).  The democratic logic he refers to in this passage is the 
logic of accountability: when power is held in the hands of one person, voters need not be particularly astute 
detectives to determine who is responsible for the success or failure of particular government actions and to 
reward or punish them accordingly, in the next electoral cycle.  I argue in Chapter 5 that it is a mistake to draw 
conclusions about Hamilton’s support for a unitary executive without taking into consideration his arguments in 
The Federalist, No. 8, about the nature of the challenges such a powerful figure would be expected to face.  I also 
argue in Chapter 8 that Hamilton’s other ten essays in The Federalist on the constitution of the executive branch 
express a much more sophisticated understanding of the need to balance the requisites to energy and safety in the 
executive department. 
19
 For an especially thorough and convincing discussion of the debates on executive power and the organization of 
the executive branch executive power at the Constitutional Convention, as well as how the executive branch 
received its final form during the early years of the new nation, see Charles Thach, The Creation of the Presidency, 
1775–1789: A Study in Constitutional History (Liberty Fund, 2007). 
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 But Hamilton is not, after this initial declaration, a particularly modest political theorist, by 
which I mean he is not interested is discussing the subtle, difficult tradeoffs inherent in constitutional 
design.
21
  After briefly reviewing the history of the Roman republic and highlighting the frequency with 
which it was “obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man” in order the thwart the 
emergence of domestic tyrants and combat the advances of external enemies, he leaps from this 
impressionistic, anecdotal history of executive power to a rather imperious conclusion (Paragraph 1).  A 
feeble executive is rejected – on the grounds that a feeble executive is synonymous with bad execution, 
and “a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government” – 
and an energetic government is declared victorious (Paragraph 2).  From this point on in the essay, it is 
assumed that all sensible men agree on the necessity of an energetic executive, and that all that is left 
for the author to clarify are the precise ingredients that constitute this energy.  The possibility of an 
energetic executive branch – as executive branch that is energetic and purposeful as a result of its 
relative independence from the other main departments of government, rather than its embrace of 
one-man rule – is never considered. 
 Energy is a secured though four key ingredients: unity, duration, adequate compensation and 
ample powers.
22
  Protection against an executive outfitted with these provisions – safety from a 
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 For an excellent compilation of anti-Federalist texts, see Ralph Ketcham, The Anti-Federalist Papers and the 
Constitutional Convention Debates (Signet Classic, 2003). 
21
 In Chapter 8 we will discuss Hamilton’s other essays on the constitution of the executive department in order to 
explore how to introduce a deliberative separation of power into the executive branch (how, to be more specific, 
to create a deliberative device that satisfies Hamilton’s requisites to energy and safety in a non-insulated state).  In 
these essays he is rigorous and practical and largely immune to the criticism of immodesty.  It is in The Federalist, 
No. 70 – the essay most frequently cited by advocates of the unitary executive – that his immodesty as a 
constitutional theorist is most pronounced. 
22
 In Chapter 5 I argue that Hamilton presents us with the ideal constitution of the executive branch for an 
insulated republic.  To figure out how he might have balanced the requisites to energy and safety in a non-
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powerful executive with tyrannical impulses – is secured by dependence on the people and clear lines of 
responsibility.  The juxtaposition of these two fundamental principles of republican government – 
energy and security – and the subsequent introduction of six key ingredients necessary to realize these 
principles, suggests that a delicate balancing act awaits us.  The argument for a unitary executive, 
however, turns out to rest almost entirely on a rejection of pluralism.    “Whenever two or more persons 
are engaged in any common enterprise or pursuit there is always the danger of difference of opinion.”  If 
a difference of opinion erupts between public servants “clothed with equal dignity and authority,” we 
should expect that the animosity generated by such disagreement is likely to impair the planning and 
operations for which these combatants are responsible.  And if “bitter dissensions” should 
“unfortunately assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of a plurality of persons, 
they might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government and in the most critical 
emergencies of the state” (Paragraph 11).  Whereas the inconveniences that result from differences of 
opinion and perspective are acceptable in a legislature – an institution in which such jostling and 
competition “may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and 
circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority” – this kind of obstructionism in the 
executive is deleterious.  “[N]o favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of 
dissension in the executive department.  Here they are pure and unmixed.  There is no point at which 
they cease to operate.  They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to 
which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it” (Paragraph 13).  The greatest threat to 
a republic with a plural executive would come not from internal and external enemies but from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
insulated republic – and to understand how a deliberative separation of powers inside the executive branch might 
be configured – we need to understand the role and implications of these ingredients, and why such a premium is 
placed on unity.  We will cover this material at length in Chapter 8.  It is in this chapter that I bring constitutional 
theory and defense reform into a creative conversation and propose a constitutional solution to the problem of 
aligning political ends and means alignment in a national security crisis. 
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obstinacy and caprice of the men who constitute the plurality.  Vanity and conceit would distract from 
the great interests of society and a fatal loss of energy would result.   
 Plurality in the executive is declared a profound and unmitigated threat to national security.  
Energy is the “bulwark of national security,” and decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch, the fruits of 
energy, are diminished in direct proportion to numerical enlargement of the executive (Paragraph 13).  
“An artful cabal in [the executive] would be able to distract and to enervate the whole system of 
administration.   If no such cabal should exist, the mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be 
sufficient to tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and 
dilatoriness” (Paragraph 14).  Multiple magistrates and councils of any kind are not only unnecessary but 
are corrupting influences that offer no compensatory benefits.  “A council to a magistrate, who is 
himself responsible for what he does, are generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, 
are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad, and are almost always a cloak to his faults” 
(Paragraph 22).  Pluralism conceals faults, destroys responsibility and invites disaster.   Unity is 
recommended not because it is our best option among imperfect alternatives but because safety against 
a unitary executive is easily secured and there are no arguments to recommend pluralism. The notion 
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 Let me quote from Steven Calabresi, an expert on the doctrine of the unitary executive, in defense of my 
interpretation of this essay (my claim that the arguments in the essay are overly simplistic).  “Thus, whereas a 
plural executive would both dilute executive energy and popular accountability and control, a unitary executive 
would lead to the opposite result.  Executive energy would be enhanced and so would the likelihood that it would 
be used in conformity with the interests of the nation” (Steven Calabresi, “Some Normative Arguments for the 
Unitary Executive,” Arkansas Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring 1995), p. 44.  But why should we assume that the 
energy of the executive would be used in conformity with the interests of the nation?  What happened to the great 
difficulty in a republic of determining precisely what these interests are?  Even the claim that unity always 
enhances energy is suspect: in a national security crisis, for example, collaboration, consensus and trust can be 
sources of energy, and they often flow from deliberative decision-making procedures.  
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 There are at least two ways to engage with these arguments.  Based on the evidence in The 
Federalist, No. 70, it is perfectly reasonable, I would suggest, to be baffled by Hamilton’s reputation as 
an astute constitutional theorist.  Is the choice between unity and plurality really as simple as the choice 
between competence and feebleness?  Does unity lead to responsibility, and responsibility to good 
governance, in such a smooth and linear manner?  Are there no benefits whatsoever to pluralism in the 
executive branch, given the incredibly wide range of activities that fall within the executive domain?
24
  
Does a diversity of views in the executive open the door to a spirit of feebleness as surely and as 
violently as a lack of constitutional checks and balances in the legislative branch opens the door to the 
spirit of faction?  Are the restraints of public opinion and the threat of impeachment sufficient checks on 
the personal and ideological ambitions on the president and his political appointees to negate the need 
for any additional safety measures?
25
    Hamilton may have been a financial and administrative genius, 
but he was not, at least in this essay, a serious constitutional theorist.  A serious constitutional theorist, I 
would argue, searches for points of friction, for paradoxes and conundrums, for excruciating tradeoffs, 
for delicate balancing acts, and Hamilton does not do this in his defense of unity. 
The alternative mode of engagement would be to look beyond the unpersuasive rhetoric and 
assume that Hamilton must have understood at least some of the responsibilities of the executive very 
differently than we do today.  In the realm of national security, for example, if a president only had to 
respond to unequivocal threats from external enemies – if decision-making in a national security crisis 
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 In Hamilton’s defense, he was writing at a time when no one could have imagined the future size and complexity 
of our administrative state. 
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 This is a subject we cover at length in Chapter 8.  How do we properly balance the requisites to energy and to 
safety in a non-insulated state?  In Chapter 6 we delve into the “constitutional convention” of 1945-1947 to 
familiarize ourselves with the principles and forms on which the national security state was founded.  In Chapter 7 
we explore the principles and forms that animated defense reformers during the Goldwater-Nichols debates in the 
1980s.  By the time we return to Hamilton and Madison in Chapter 8, I hope it is clear to the reader why I think 
defense reformers would benefit from a close study of the political theory of The Federalist and political theorists 
should apply their expertise to the structures of the national security state.  Let me just point out here that these 
two requisites to safety – elections and the threat of impeachment – are expected by most contemporary defense 
reformers do to a great deal of heavy lifting in our republic to compensate for the absence of any immediate 
checks and balances on the exercise of executive power. 
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were an either / or proposition rather than an brutally complex game of percentages and probabilities 
subject to human fallibility and ideological distortion – then we would indeed be unwise as 
constitutional theorists to recommend any measures that compromised activity, secrecy, dispatch and 
decision in the executive.  Why open the door to interests and passions that would only frustrate the 
measures of government in the most critical emergencies of the state?  Why risk making the executive 
less accountable to the people?  Hamilton’s understanding of the responsibilities of the executive in the 
late eighteenth century, I would argue, was indeed quite different than we understand them today, and 
gives contemporary scholars permission to reconsider his unqualified embrace of unity.  Who could have 
imagined in 1787, after all, the promise and peril of the kind of military power the United States would 
possess in the twentieth century?  This is the main argument I pursue in the next chapter, so I will not 
elaborate upon it here, except to mention that the transition from an insulated to a non-insulated state 
is marked by a great expansion not only in the scope of responsibility of the executive, but in the 
potential for the spirit of faction to undermine the quality of national security decision-making. 
Let us return to the subject at hand.  Even if we think Hamilton presents a context-specific 
understanding of executive power in this essay, we still might have to accept the basic premise of The 
Federalist, No. 70, which is its unequivocal rejection of pluralism.  Is there a viable alternative to one-
man rule?   
 
The Political Theory of The Federalist 
 
Let us return to the particulars of our institutional inheritance.  Mansfield argues that we have inherited 
the following: A government that is free, and yet strong enough both to deter its enemies and to 
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provide security to its citizens.  The extent to which freedom and strength are able to coexist, he argues, 
is the genius of our Constitution.  Precisely because freedom and strength are not natural collaborators 
and are, in fact, often in direct competition with each other, the invention of free government remains, 
and will always remain, in a precarious state.  Free government is inherently fragile because the very 
strength it must possess in order to vouchsafe the security of its citizens can also be used to deprive its 
citizens of their freedom.  Mansfield defers to Lincoln for clarity and great-leader heft: “Must a 
government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its 
own existence?”
26
  Mansfield believes that for free government to be strong enough to maintain its 
existence, it must be very strong indeed, and that this strength must be lodged not merely in the 
national government or the executive branch, but in the hands of a single executive.  This belief is what 
unites most contemporary advocates of executive power.   Energy in a republican regime is essential, 
and the requisite quantum of energy can only be generated through, and effectively harnessed by, a 
single executive. 
 Mansfield’s claim that the authors of The Federalist were equally committed to a republicanized 
version of one-man rule – equally committed to an anti-pluralist principle in the constitution of the 
executive branch – rests primarily on two claims that I will challenge in the sections below.  In the first 
section we will explore the following question: Is the concept of necessity as useful – as unambiguous 
and dictatorial – as he assumes?  In the second: Was the primary task of the political theory of The 
Federalist to create a powerful executive under the pretext of erecting a law-bound constitutional 
regime?  
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1. By finding a place for the necessities of government within the framework of government itself, the 
Constitution corrects the foolish optimism of republicanism which thinks, in essence, that men can live by 
the laws they choose and never have to bow to the necessities they do not choose, or learn from their 
experience of them.  Perhaps I am being unnecessarily confrontational here, but is there not a whiff of 
romantic obscurantism in Mansfield’s heavy reliance on the idea of necessity?  Contemporary political 
theorists rarely claim that history is a coherent narrative that offers us fixed and indisputable answers, 
and yet he clearly equates “necessity” with the “lessons of history,” as though such lessons were 
absolute and indisputable truths.
27
  History, as most of us realize, is sometimes based on facts to which 
we all have access and can interpret with ease, but often it is the story of the particular prejudices of a 
group of scholars who belong to a particular school of thought and mistakenly assume they have 
assembled an objective narrative of the past.  Mansfield surely appreciates the extent to which group 
and individual biases compete on surprisingly equal terms with reason and method in our study of 
historical phenomena.  He is, after all, a very sophisticated political thinker.  Why, then, does he lean so 
heavily on the concept of necessity (the necessities of international politics to which a republic must be 
able to respond; the necessity of certain design features in a republic) in his defense of a strong 
executive?  Why does he claim that the Founders shared an understanding of history and necessity 
when unanimity among a group of such diverse and opinionated scholar-politicians is close to a 
statistical impossibility? 
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 Leonard Sorenson, I would suggest, engages in a similar kind of romantic obscurantism when he invokes history 
and executive power.  He argues that the doctrine of proportionate means defended in The Federalist culminates 
not only in a government with unlimited powers but an executive with a great deal of discretion in foreign policy.  
“There are certain crucial political advantages of constitutional prerogative which outweigh its philosophical, 
moral, and political disadvantages. Proper acts of prerogative typically occur in the context of the greatest, history-
shaping, events in the life of a nation. They are among those awesome acts, those illustrious and memorable 
deeds, of the greatest political heroes,” (Leonard R. Sorenson, “The Federalist Papers on the Constitutionality of 
Executive Prerogative, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Spring 1989), p. 277).  Proper acts of 
prerogative?  Is history not also shaped by prerogative exercised improperly? 
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The history of self-government, Mansfield claims, taught the Founders that the “republican 
prejudice” against energetic government had to be abandoned.  The architectonic device and stabilizing 
mechanism that the history of republican rule imposed upon them – and imposes on us today – is a 
unitary executive with a degree of power and independence that evokes our monarchical past.  “In 
executive leadership, bygone partisans of monarchy do not quite have all they ever wanted, but they 
have enough to satisfy them that modern republicans have unwittingly admitted much truth in the 
monarchist cause.”
28
  We know we need an executive who can, in a national emergency, transgress the 
law on our behalf, and yet as citizens in a republic we want to believe that our executive is in fact 
executing our will in a constitutional manner.  We know we need a monarch to protect us but we are 
too enamored with the idea of self-government to call our executive by such a name.  The general 
nature of law – its abstract, imprecise, context-blind nature – teaches us that an executive cannot 
effectively fulfill her responsibilities if she is bound by the law.  Executives must make decisions in 
response to very unique, irreproducible pressures, threats and opportunities that no set of pre-existing 
laws, no matter how comprehensive, can adequately address.  The irresolvable disconnect between the 
generality of law and the idiosyncratic nature of political life necessitates a degree of flexibility and 
improvisation in the executive that is at odds with the idea of a government in which the people rule 
and the executive is fully subordinate to the law. 
  This argument – that an executive fully subordinate to the law is an executive ill-equipped to 
protect the nation in an emergency – draws heavily upon Locke’s defense of executive prerogative.
29
  It 
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 Mansfield, p. 294. 
29
 John Locke’s discussion of executive prerogative in his Second Treatise of Government has obviously received a 
great deal of attention over the years, and continues to do so today.  Should we understand Locke’s discussion of 
prerogative to mean that the president is authorized by the law to take extra-legal actions in extraordinary 
circumstances – or that such actions are best understood as extra-constitutional?  In this debate, there are 
“constitutionalists” and “extra-constitutionalists,” going all the way back to Hamilton and Jefferson, respectively.  
The former argue that executive prerogative exists only in the sense that the legislature can authorize the 
executive to circumvent the constitution in an emergency (see, for example, David Weaver, “Locke, Leadership, 
and the Federalist,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 2 (April 1997); Thomas Langston and Michael 
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is worth familiarizing ourselves with his arguments because he is widely cited by contemporary 
advocates of executive power.  In Locke’s constitutional theory, domestic politics is guided by two 
powers that need to be separated: legislative and executive.  In international politics, however, the lack 
of a viable exit strategy from the state of nature that defines this realm evokes what Locke calls the 
federative power, which is the “power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions, 
with all persons and communities without the common-wealth.”
30
  Despite the importance of separating 
legislative and executive power when it comes to national political life, the management of national 
security, Locke argues, and contemporary advocates of one-man rule second enthusiastically, should not 
be subject to the same division and oversight.
31
 
What happened to Locke’s discussion of the extent of human frailty and our gift for confusing 
private and public interest?  What happened to the human passions, which, he argues, if undisciplined 
by established law, lead to disorder and the ruin of a commonwealth?  Locke clearly appreciates these 
dangers – threats to a republic that Madison’s theory of faction teaches us how best to control – and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Lind, “John Locke and the Limits of Presidential Prerogative,” Polity, Vol. 24., No. 1 (Fall 1991).  The extra-
constitutionalists claim that Locke’s executive prerogative is a natural rather than constitutional power and 
therefore beyond constitutional control.  The “legalism” of the constitutionalists, these scholars argue, is 
dangerous in a national security emergency.  An executive acting on behalf of the public interest has the right to 
act without or even against the laws (see, for example, Clement Fatovic, “Congressional and Presidential 
Prerogative: Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian Perspectives,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 3 (July 
2004); and Ross J. Corbett, “The Extraconstitutionality of Lockean Prerogative,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 68, No. 
3 (Summer 2006).  
30
 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Hackett Publishing Company, 1980), XII. 146. 
31
 Among those scholars critical of the assumption that Lockean prerogative is consistent with the political science 
of The Federalist is Morton J. Frisch.  “The great originality of the American regime can be said to be its 
incorporation of monarchical or executive power within the framework of traditional republicanism, a blend now 
referred to as presidential government,” he writes, but “Lockean prerogative is clearly incompatible with the 
American Constitution” (Morton J. Frisch, “Executive Power and Republican Government – 1787,” Presidential 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Spring 1987), pp. 282 and 286).  Richard Pious is another noted scholar who 
argues that executive power is left “ambiguous and undefined” in the Constitution, and that interpreting the 
boundaries of executive power is an unambiguously political act.  “There is no question that the weight of 
scholarship favors doctrines that limit executive power and provide for both interbranch policy codetermination 
and checks and balances,” he writes, but history tells a different story: “The scholars have won the battle of 
constitutional analysis, but they have lost the war over executive powers” (Richard M. Pious, “Inherent War and 




yet, on the subject of federative power, he jettisons the principles that guided his earlier work on 
domestic politics and institutional design.  “And though this federative power in the well or ill 
management of it be of great moment to the common-wealth, yet it is much less capable to be directed 
by antecedent, standing, positive laws, than the executive; and so must necessarily be left to the 
prudence and wisdom of those, whose hands it is in, to be managed for the public good.”
32
  The 
unpredictability of the enemy, he argues, forces citizens in even a well-designed commonwealth to trust 
the wisdom, prudence and skill of those in whose hands federative power has been placed – to grant 
them, in other words, great leeway in the conduct of foreign affairs.
33
  If a republic is to survive and 
flourish, fidelity to the law cannot be its highest obligation. 
A student of national security might reasonably wonder why the greater unpredictability of 
international politics should be associated with an increase in the level of trust we are expected to place 
in a single civilian leader, rather than a call for more substantial checks and balances, but Locke insists 
that though executive and federative powers are “distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to be 
separated.”
34
  The legislative power must be the supreme power in every commonwealth, the power to 
which all other powers must be subordinate, and yet the federative power – the power of war and 
peace – must be placed solely in the hands of a single executive with a great deal of latitude to act not 
only beyond the law, but at times against it. 
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 Locke, XII.147. 
33
 Benjamin Kleinerman argues that Locke was “far more aware of the dangers of executive prerogative than the 
more optimistic accounts in the scholarship have appreciated,” and that, as a consequence, was “surprisingly 
pessimistic about the permanent sustenance of legislative constitutionalism.”  Although the people have 
“advanced beyond their simplistic trust in kingly ‘father-figures’ who would look out for their good,” they still 
remain “far too passive for the vigilance essential to ‘umpire’ well the necessity of executive action outside the 
laws,” (Benjamin A. Kleinerman, “Can the Prince Really Be Tamed?  Executive Prerogative Popular Apathy, and the 
Constitutional Frame In Locke’s Second Treatise,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 101, No. 2 (May 2007), p. 
210). 
34
 Locke, XII.148. 
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What happened to Locke’s great respect for the “variety of opinions, and contrariety of 
interests” that coexist in any community of men, and that would, he suggests, quickly fell Hobbes’ 
mighty Leviathan?
35
  Are decisions about the use of force so uncomplicated and impervious to 
ideological rigidity that we need not worry about the disruptive passions and interests of those charged 
with planning and executing a nation’s wars?  Are decisions about war and peace even more axiomatic 
than his natural law, which, though perfectly transparent and easily comprehensible, still needs an 
impartial judge to interpret and thereby protect us from our subjective and competing interpretations?  
Locke, despite his profound concern for the abuse of state power – despite his sensitivity to the many 
ways in which power and subjectivity can lead a constitutional regime to ruin – nevertheless appears to 
answer these questions in the affirmative.  The federative and executive powers are both “ministerial 
and subordinate to the legislative,” and yet “several things should be left to the discretion of him that 
has the executive power.”
36
  In a world in which threats are difficult to decipher and formulating 
effective responses to these ambiguous threats presents an enormous challenge for even the brightest 
and most experienced among us, is there no viable alternative to giving a single executive the power to 
act on matters of national security according to his judgment and discretion?  Must a grant of extra-legal 
or extra-constitutional power to the executive branch be synonymous with one-man rule?  Is the choice 
we must make as republican theorists between an executive who is subordinate to the law, and 
therefore too inflexible and programmatic to meet the necessities of international political life, and a 
unitary executive who is free to transcend the law, and respond to these necessities as she sees fit? 
Mansfield claims that extra-constitutional powers must be available to the executive – that 
constitutional boundaries must be permeable – if a republic is to prosper.
37
  Critics of executive power 
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 Locke, VIII.98. 
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 Locke, XIII.153, XIIII.159. 
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 Hamilton argues that the power to attend to the common defense “ought to exist without limitation: Because it 
is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent & 
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may grumble when presidents take actions that offend their morals or judgments, but these 
protestations, he argues, subside as soon as the policy preferences of these critics require a similarly 
forceful exercise of executive power.  Mansfield argues that we all agree on the necessity of a strong 
executive, even though some of us shy away from the implications of our position.  Either we are honest 
supporters of executive power or we are partisans and hypocrites.
38
  Ambivalence is logically 
permissible, but this ambivalence manifests itself in our attempt to conceal from ourselves the fact that 
executive power is indeed a necessity.  Despite our desire to nurture a belief in government by the 
people and for the people, we recognize the need a very powerful, solitary figure at the head of 
government.  This is why the Founders created a formal executive with vast, informal powers.
39
  Our 
executive may not possess outright tyrannical power, but it is nevertheless “far more powerful than the 
supposed, theoretical formal executive.”
40
  We may be enamored with legislative and judicial processes 
– processes which end in decisions that reflect a sequence of arguments and counterarguments – but 
we do not speak of executive process precisely because we realize that the nature of executive decision-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them.  The circumstances that endanger the safety of 
nations are infinite; and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which 
the care of it is committed” (The Federalist, No. 23, Paragraph 4). 
38
 Progressives favored executive power in the early and middle parts of the last century, while conservatives 
rejected it; since the 1970s, these positions have largely reversed.  Jack Goldsmith presents a nice summary of this 
politics-driven history of executive power.  As he thoughtfully speculates, “Yoo’s account of the constitutional 
founding would have set James Burnham’s hat on fire” (Jack Goldsmith, “The Accountability Presidency,” The New 
Republic (February 2010).  He could have written the same thing about the inflammatory relationship between 
mid-twentieth century and contemporary progressive scholars on the subject of executive power.  For the 
progressive and conservative positions during the early and middle part of the last century, see, respectively, 
Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Quid Pro, LCC, 2011); and James Burnham, Congress and the 
American Tradition (Henry Regnery Company, 1959).  
39
 Abraham Sofaer argues that both advocates and critics of executive power present exaggerated claims.  
Executive power is best understood in the context of our separation of powers system.  Concurrent authority 
creates what Justice Robert H. Jackson called a zone of twilight: “When the President acts in absence of either a 
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone 
of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. 
Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, 
if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to 
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law” 
(Abraham D. Sofaer, “Presidential Power and National Security,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1 
(March 2007), p. 119). 
40
 Mansfield, p. 4. 
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making is fundamentally different from the deliberative, compromise-seeking processes that define the 
other two branches of government. 
Perhaps there is not a viable alternative to one-man rule, but I would argue it is premature to 
reach such a conclusion.  Advocates of a strong, unitary executive, I would suggest, make a fundamental 
error in their defense of executive power: they focus strictly on the comparative power of the three 
branches of government.  This leads them to insist on executive supremacy in matter of national 
security policy – that certain powers of the common defense cannot be shared between multiple 
departments of government – and as a result never consider the practical nature of executive branch 
decision-making in a national security emergency.  Political theorists may not speak of an executive 
process, as Mansfield points out, but defense reformers most certainly do.  And as I argued in the 
previous two chapters, deliberation in a constitutional system is not encouraged merely to facilitate 
compromise-seeking: it can improve the quality of lawmaking and statecraft.   The choice between unity 
and plurality in the executive branch is not a simple, obvious choice between competence and 
feebleness. 
 
2. The task of political science in The Federalist was to show that an energetic executive could be 
republicanized.  Was the great theoretical innovation of the founding fathers the smuggling of 
monarchial power – singularity and strength – into a constitutional order?  Is this design innovation – 
this seemingly awkward synthesis of regime types – the feature of our constitutional order most 
deserving of our praise and allegiance? 
The genius of our republican form of government, one could argue, owes more to the friction 
and turbulence of the founding debates than of harmony and agreement among the founders.  With this 
possibility in mind, we could make a compelling case in support of the idea that our constitutional order 
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is a product of the compromises and tradeoffs that were forced upon its various architects, and that our 
republic benefited from this clash of principles and temperaments.
41
  Publius, in other words, 
understood republican constitutionalism better than either Madison or Hamilton.  Had we had a single 
founder, we would have inherited a less well-designed, less durable, less dynamic republic. 
This argument certainly has its merits.  I would suggest, however, that it does not always serve 
contemporary scholars well to conflate the political theories of the two primary authors of The 
Federalist.  If we want to examine key principles from the founding era in order to test their applicability 
to contemporary institutional dynamics, we must recognize that the various arguments made by 
Madison and Hamilton in The Federalist are not always compatible.  Do we gain in clarity and 
understanding by conflating their political theories?  Does a selective presentation of the political 
science upon which our republic was founded – aligning our arguments with either Madison or Hamilton 
– help us to grabble with contemporary problems?  Most advocates of one-man rule – of the 
“personalization of executive power,” and the “strict administrative subordination to the will of the 
President”
42
 – follow the convention of treating the political theory of The Federalist as a single, 
coherent theory.  A composite view certainly has much to teach us about constitutional theory and 
institutional design, but I would suggest that we do ourselves a disservice when we do not study The 
Federalist from both a composite and individual-thinker perspective.
43
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 Not all features of our Constitution, of course, emerged from a creative friction between first principles.  Two of 
the famous compromises at the convention – equal representation in the senate and the three-fifths clause – have 
less to do with principles of constitutional theory than the overriding concern with preserving the union. 
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 Skowronek, pp. 2099, 2097. 
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 Critics of the unitary executive are more likely to juxtapose the arguments of Madison and Hamilton, and the 
Pacificus-Helvidius debates of 1793-1794 (provoked by Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation) are often used to 
clarify their respective positions on executive power.  As stimulating as these debates are, I generally subscribe to 
the methodological view that argues it is better to ground our arguments about the meaning of Constitution in 
pre-enactment history rather than post-enactment history, in order to filter out political preferences and 
institutional loyalty.  In terms of this methodological preference, as we will see in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, students of 
the national security state have one clear disadvantage compared with students of the founding era: it is very 
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What was the main task of the political science of The Federalist?  It is understandable that an 
advocate of one-man rule would nominate the creation of a powerful executive for this honor.  But if we 
take Madison’s contributions to The Federalist seriously, rather than subordinating them to Hamilton’s, 
we would have to nominate the problem of faction – the need to design institutions capable of 
controlling factional impulses of both majorities and minorities – as the overarching task and central 
theoretical challenge of The Federalist.  This is not a superficial distinction.  If we approach The 
Federalist from Hamilton’s perspective
44
 – How do we republicanize an executive that by necessity must 
be strong and energetic? – rather than from Madison’s perspective – How do we mitigate the problem 
of majority and minority factions? – we will weigh very differently the various political principles that 
compete for our loyalty as constitutional theorists and do not always co-exist peacefully in our 
constitutional order.
45
  How scholars approach the two primary contributors to The Federalist – how 
they select and omit arguments from the various essays – makes an enormous difference.
46
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the political principles from the political preferences and institutional loyalties 
of the founders and reformers of the national security state.    
44
 I do not mean to imply that this is the only way to interpret Hamilton.  It is Mansfield’s Hamilton, and also the 
Hamilton of The Federalist, No. 70.  As Morton Frisch argues, Hamilton was not “unconcerned about the abuses 
that might result from executive power.  He knew well the untoward tendencies of a strong executive and to the 
extent that the government as a whole was limited by its ends, executive energy was limited too.  The presidency, 
as strong as it was, was intended to secure only limited ends” (Morton J. Frisch, “Executive Power and Republican 
Government – 1787,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17. No. 2 (Spring 1987), p. 283).  In the next chapter I will 
argue that these ends were once sharply limited by circumstance – by our status as an insulated state – and that, 
which our evolution into a powerful non-insulated state, executive energy is no longer as limited as Hamilton 
assumed it would be. 
45
 The basic difference between Madison and Hamilton, political scientist Charles F. Hobson argues, was that 
“Hamilton unblushingly preferred a monarchy on the British model while Madison sought to establish a national 
government on republican principles” (Charles F. Hobson, “The Negative on State Laws: James Madison, the 
Constitution, and the Crisis of Republican Government,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2 (April 
1979), p. 218.  In Philadelphia, he elaborates, Madison “offered a means of strengthening the central government 
without resorting to monarchy while showing that a strong union provided a setting in which republicanism would 
not only survive but flourish” (p. 225). 
46
 I do not mean to suggest that one of the great tasks of the political science in The Federalist was not to 
demonstrate how an energetic executive could be republicanized.  What I am suggesting is that a more 
fundamental task of the political science in The Federalist was to explain how factiousness, which had destroyed all 
previous experiments in popular government, could be controlled.  If we accept this premise, students of the 
national security state have a strong argument for turning to the political science in The Federalist to weigh the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of hierarchical and non-hierarchical structures inside the executive branch. 
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Let us briefly return to Madison’s theory of faction, which I covered in detail in the previous two 
chapters.  None of the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed republic, Madison argues, 
deserves our attention more than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.  “The friend 
of popular government never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he 
contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice.  He will not fail therefore to set a due value on any 
plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it.”
47
  
Madison’s great constitutional project was designing a set of institutions that would consistently 
frustrate the spirit of faction, whether this spirit resided inside or outside of government, and in 
whichever of the three main departments of government it managed to grab a foothold.  
Madison and Hamilton both argue that the greatest threat to their projected constitutional 
order would come from the legislature.  But on the subject of executive power, this agreement reflects a 
narrow overlapping consensus, rather than a substantive convergence of perspectives.  Hamilton 
wanted a strong executive so that a single national figure could exercise significant power independently 
of the people and their representatives.  Madison wanted a strong executive to rebuff legislative 
aggrandizement.
48
  The difference here must be respected if we are to reflect critically on the role of the 
executive today.  The difference can perhaps be best characterized as one-man rule and one-man 
oversight.  Madison encouraged his fellow citizens to give up their instinctive hostility to a large republic 
and a strong central government, but he was certainly not as convinced of the merits of one-man rule as 
Hamilton.
49
  Hamilton insisted that the executive had to be above the law in extraordinary 
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 Madison, The Federalist, No. 10, Paragraph 1. 
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 The contrast here is drawn a bit too starkly: Hamilton also had a great fear of legislative over-reach and argued 
that the executive needed to be energetic in part to act as an effective disciplinarian and counterweight. 
49
 As Charles Thach reports: “The truth is that Madison’s views on executive power were extremely vague when he 
came to Philadelphia in 1787 … Madison saw the defects of what existed, but he did not as clearly see the 
remedies” (The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789, p. 70-71).   In a letter written to Washington on April 16, 
1787, he states candidly: “I have scarcely ventured as yet to form my own opinion either of the manner in which 
[the executive] ought to be constituted or of the authorities with which it ought to be clothed” (Quoted in Thach, 
p. 72.  The executive department under the Articles of Convention was obviously too weak – too dependent on the 
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circumstances in order to respond to domestic insurrection and threats from foreign powers.  For 
Madison, these issues were secondary to his focus on legislative misrule.  An executive had to be strong, 
he argued, not primarily to respond to national security threats but to counter the threat to liberty 
posed by a potentially pernicious legislature.  A strong executive branch is required in Madison’s 
constitutional system because otherwise it would be impossible to maintain the constitution equilibrium 
that is so crucial for stability.
50
  Republican principles – primitive republican principles – are 
compromised not to sneak monarchical power into the executive but to preserve a delicate and 
essential separation of powers.  It is either an error in judgment or an act of partisanship to reproduce 
under the name Publius Hamilton’s arguments for a unitary executive when there is ample evidence to 
suggest that there is a disconnect between the principles Hamilton and Madison privilege in their 
respective approaches to institutional design.
51
 
 Advocates of one-man rule frequently refer to The Federalist, No. 37 to close this gap between 
Madison and Hamilton and portray the former as being as committed to a unitary executive as the 
latter.  But Madison’s affinity for an energetic government in this essay has much less in common with 
Hamilton’s preference for one-man rule than proponents of this maneuver seem to assume.
52
  The 
challenges encountered by the constitutional convention were many, Madison candidly informs us, and 
among the most elusive was trying to figure out how to combine “the requisite stability and energy in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
legislature – and hence a degree of independence was required.  But by the resolutions introduced by Madison on 
June 1 suggest, the executive Madison supported at the convention was “essentially subordinate to the 
legislature” (p. 73). 
50
 Madison, The Federalist, No. 39. 
51
 George Thomas argues that “taking Hamilton seriously” on the subject of extraordinary executive power “might 
suggest the practical difficulty – if not the theoretical impossibility – of limiting government by way of 
constitutional democracy” (George Thomas, “The Limits of Constitutional Government: Alexander Hamilton on 
Extraordinary Power and Executive Discretion,” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Seattle, WA, September 1-4, 2011). 
52
 Bailey argues that Madison’s executive is too modest to close the gap, and that it “would not have the latitude in 
foreign policy desired by those who make foreign policy arguments from the unitary executive” (Jeremy D. Bailey, 
“The New Unitary Executive and Democratic Theory: The Problem of Alexander Hamilton,” The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 102, No. 4 (Nov., 2008), p. 464. 
129 
 
government with the inviolable attention due to liberty and the republican form.”
53
  Were the 
participants at the convention able to mingle liberty, stability and energy in the right proportions?  
Advocates of one-man rule have little if any doubt about the proper ordering of these concepts: without 
a sufficiently energetic executive – without a unitary executive – instability and tyranny would be 
inevitable.  The great importance they place on energy – we had better hope a vigorous executive is not 
inconsistent with the genius of republican government – leads them to assume that Madison’s framing 
of the issue – the challenge of mingling liberty, stability and energy in the right proportions – is largely a 
rhetorical device.  But energy, Madison argues, is essential not only to secure a republic against internal 
and external threats, but to promote the “prompt and salutary execution of the laws which enter into 
the very definition of good government.”
54
  It is the “vicissitudes and uncertainties” of state 
administrations under the Articles of the Confederation that command Madison’s attention in these 
passages.  Energy is a necessary component of good government primarily because it serves as an 
antidote to the pathologies of the legislatures. 
Let me end this section by repeating my primary objection to Mansfield’s approach to The 
Federalist.  By subsuming Hamilton and Madison under the name Publius to buttress his argument in 
favor of one-man rule, he effaces a good deal of Madison’s political thought in the process and ends up 
with a composite constitutional theory that Madison (and perhaps even Hamilton, as I will argue in the 
next chapter) would reject.  For Madison, the primary purpose of executive power is to serve as an 
antidote to legislative power: strength in the executive is essential not because of the necessity of extra-
constitutional power, but because he believes the executive department must be protected against 
legislative encroachment if a republican system of government is to maintain its delicate equilibrium.  As 
political scientist Stephen Skowronek points out, the Founders assumed that the legislature, with its 
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“vast repository of expressed powers and its close proximity to the people, was the branch most likely to 
exploit public sentiments, and that a properly constituted executive” – a strong executive – “would help 
to stabilize the affairs of state.”
55
  For Madison, the primary threat to republican government comes 
from within – from legislative misrule – rather than from the kind of internal and external enemies who 
carry guns and would, if our defenses proved inadequate, tyrannize us against our will.
56




Must we conflate a strong executive branch and one-man rule?  Are there alternative ways of 
constituting the executive branch that respect the principles of the Founders – that perhaps even realize 
them to a greater degree?  Can energy, secrecy, dispatch and decision be preserved in a republican 
system of government without yielding, however grudgingly, to the necessity of one-man rule?  In The 
Federalist, No. 78, Hamilton describes the judiciary as “the least dangerous” department of government 
because it may “truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.”
57
  Can we create a 
“department” within the executive branch that fits this description – that can exercise judgment but is 
largely devoid of force and will?  Is it possible to control faction within the executive department 
without compromising its administrative punch and dexterity?  
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 Stephen Skowronek, “The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental Perspective on the 
Unitary Executive,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 122 (June 2009), p. 2072.  
56
 Part of the explanation for Madison’s apparent endorsement of the unitary executive in The Federalist comes 
from his desire to maximize the executive’s responsibility and accountability to the people.  If the Senate shared in 
more executive functions, executive responsibility would be lost, and without adequate compensation.  In this 
context, what I argue in this dissertation is that ensuring a close alignment of political ends and military means in a 
national security crisis is adequate compensation for the degree of responsibility that might be lost with the 
introduction of an element of pluralism. 
57
 Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 78, Paragraph 2. 
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 The problem with Mansfield’s approach to constitution theory, I would suggest, is that it 
remains at a level of abstraction that diminishes its practical relevance.  He is a historian of 
constitutional theory and executive power, not a defense reformer wrestling with specific problems.  
Advocates of one-man rule would argue that there are no outstanding constitutional problems that 
need to be solved – that a strong executive is the modern solution to an ancient problem, and that we 
need not worry about the issues raised in the previous paragraph – but this position only reveals a lack 
of familiarity with debates about defense organization that have exercised students of national security 
and defense reform since the founding of our national security state.
58
  The arguments of Mansfield and 
other advocates of one-man rule are compelling only if we ignore how executive power is actually 
exercised in our republic, and how decisions regarding the use of force are actually made.
59
 
 Liberal constitutions, Mansfield writes, “would not work without a branch whose function could 
be accurately described – though you might never hear it described that way – as getting around the 
constitution when necessary.”
60
  The politics of such theoretical arguments aside – they may encourage 
executives not only to ignore popular opinion and the will of the legislature but any informal 
deliberative processes designed to improve the quality of executive branch decision-making – extra-
constitutional power can obviously be exercised unwisely.  The wise exercise of national power, I am 
acutely aware, is not something any constitutional theorist can guarantee, no matter which set of 
principles she privileges.  The question we must therefore ask ourselves is whether one-man rule is in 
fact a necessity in the sense that it minimizes an ineradicable margin of error.  
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 These are subjects we will cover in the second part of this dissertation.  Familiarity with the defense reform 
debates that led to the National Security Act in 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 – the principles and 
forms upon which our national security state was founded – should make it clear to political theorists why this 
author is interested in provoking an inter-disciplinary conversation. 
59
 How are such decisions actually made?  The second part of this dissertation addresses this question at length.   
60
 Mansfield, pp. 5-6. 
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As an amateur student of history, and someone in awe of our inability as a species to grasp fully 
how much we do not know, and the consequences of our ignorance, I am not easily seduced by the 
image of a wise, prudent, deliberative-minded executive – a virtuous executive, we could say – who 
routinely harnesses the great energy at his disposal to repel unequivocal threats to the nation’s security 
and welfare.  Rulers, to put it mildly, do not always exhibit tactical and strategic genius under stress.  
Why, I wonder each time I encounter another theoretical defense of executive power, do advocates of 
one-man rule always seem to assume that statesmen entrusted with great energy and strength will 
possess the poise and humility necessary to exercise their power wisely?  Why is the assumption so 
widespread in the literature that the power of public opinion (elections) and a fear of impeachment will 
compensate for the normal human allotment of intellectual and emotional weaknesses?
61
  In The 
Federalist, No. 51, Madison gives us one of the great maxims in the history of political theory: “If all men 
were angels, no government would be necessary.”
62
  The great myth that animates executive-power 
realists is the idea that the abundant energy lodged in the executive branch will be exercised by 
preternaturally calm, knowledgeable and deliberative-minded executives who have cultivated a tactical 
and strategic genius.  Only fictional princes, I think it is safe to say, ever reach a level of intellectual and 
emotional maturity that would make such statecraft possible.
63
 
But even if readers agree that the men and women elected to our highest office are unlikely to 
be properly equipped to exercise great power according to their discretion, I have only succeeded in 
pointing out a fairly obvious weakness in our constitutional order.  I have not proposed a corrective, and 
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 This is another subject we will return to in the second part of this dissertation.  In an insulated state, these two 
requisites to safety might indeed be sufficient to ensure that a strong, unitary executive governed in the interests 
of the people.  In a non-insulated state, additional requisites to safety may be required.  Are ex post means of 
limiting extraordinary power in a national security crisis likely to improve the quality of decision-making?    
62
 Madison, The Federalist, No. 51, Paragraph 3. 
63
 There are of course many echoes of Niccolo Machiavelli in the literature.  Machiavelli was surely correct to argue 
that conventional morality can thwart the benevolent projects of a genius.  But this insight is no more helpful to a 
constitutional theorist than pointing out that conventional morality can thwart the benevolent projects of an 
angel.  If men were angels – or geniuses – no government would be necessary.  In this context, Machiavelli is an 
ideal theorist, rather than a problem-driven realist, and closer in spirit to John Rawls than to Carl von Clausewitz.  
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a better alternative may not exist.  It could very well be that one-man rule is a necessary weakness of 
our republican system and that any attempt to correct the problems that arise because of one-man rule 
would be counterproductive.  The comparative lens used by most constitutional theorists certainly leads 
us to draw this conclusion.  In a national security crisis, we want the executive branch to be strong and 
nimble, and the participation of members of the legislature or judiciary would be unlikely to improve the 
forcefulness or wisdom of our response.  But I would suggest that this lens has its limitations.  It leads 
us, with respect to the constitution of the executive branch, to privilege Hamilton’s constitutional 
preoccupations over Madison’s and endorse, however grudgingly, some version of one-man rule.  It also 
leads us to accept as useful if not wholly convincing the dichotomy between energy and deliberation 
(the former being a feature of the executive, the later of the legislature and judiciary).  And it leads us to 
reject the possibility that a deliberative separation of power inside the executive branch might control 
the influence of faction without compromising its energy, secrecy, dispatch or decision.   It prevents us 
from asking what I would suggest is the crucial question: In a national security crisis, are there decision-
making arenas in which factiousness presents a greater threat to the republic that a degree of pluralism?  
If our only choice were between a strong executive and an executive weakened by legislative oversight, 
constitutional theory would have little to offer a student of the national security state.  But if we are 
convinced that the genius of our constitution is the remarkable attention it pays to the problem of 
faction – and Hamilton, as I argue in the next chapter, was much more concerned with executive-branch 
faction than most advocates of one-man rule realize – then we will not have to ignore or reject certain 
components of the political theory of The Federalist when we defend the introduction of a deliberative 






5 The International Political Theory of The Federalist 
 
The president of the United States possesses almost royal prerogatives, which he has no occasion to 
make use of, and the rights which, up to now, he can use are very circumscribed: the laws permit him to 
be strong, circumstances keep him weak. 
- Tocqueville 
 
The dilemmas involved are pre-eminently American dilemmas, not because America has weaknesses that 
others do not have but because America is powerful as no nation has ever been before, and the 
discrepancy between her power and the power of others appears to be increasing.  One may hope that 
America, with her vast resources and democratic traditions, with her diverse and creative population, will 
find the wisdom to match her power; but one can hardly be confident because the wisdom required is 
greater wisdom than any great nation has ever shown before. 
- William Fulbright 
 
The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue which could make 
it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its 
intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as 
would be the President of the United States. 
- Alexander Hamilton 
 
What should a constitutional theorist know about international politics?  Let me be a bit more 
provocative: What must a constitutional theorist know about international politics in order to design 
national security institutions wisely?
1
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 I use the word “provocative” because political theorists have been critical of international relations theorists for 
excluding domestic political variables from their models of the behavior of states in the international system.  I am 
critical of this tendency as well, but I suspect that the desire of IR scholars to develop system level theories and 
create an independent niche within political science has a lot to do with the trajectory of the discipline. If IR is 
about studying variables that are unique to the international system, then it is perfectly logical to exclude domestic 




 In this chapter I am going to analyze the international political theory of The Federalist. 
International relations as an academic discipline obviously did not exist at the time The Federalist was 
written, but these essays nevertheless contain a coherent theory of international politics that not only 
had a profound influence on the design of our republic but have serious implications for how 
contemporary scholars should think about relationship between international politics and domestic 
institutional design.
2
  The international political theory presented by Alexander Hamilton and John Jay in 
The Federalist makes a key distinction between insulated and non-insulated states.  Although the logic 
of this distinction was not explored at length, the implication is clear: insulated and non-insulated 
republics are best served by different constitutional orders.  In his contributions to The Federalist, 
Hamilton characterizes the United States as an insulated state, and makes it clear that he expects it to 
remain so for the foreseeable future.  The fact that the United States is now a global superpower – is 
“immensely and unprecedentedly rich,” a “hyper-power,” a nation with a military capability that “dwarfs 
that of most other countries combined,” as Geoffrey Wheatcroft puts it – is an invitation – an urgent 
invitation, I would argue – to rethink the constitution of our executive branch.
3
 
                                                           
2
 Stephen Walt, a political scientist and student of national security policy, is critical of the larger IR community for 
widening the gap between theory and policy over the last few decades and not producing much policy-relevant 
theoretical work (Stephen Walt, “The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations." Annual 
Review of Political Science, Vol. 8 (2005).  I share this general criticism.  This does not mean, however, that defense 
reformers or political theorists interested in national security policy can ignore the relationship between 
constitutional theory and international relations theory.    
3
 Geoffrey Wheatcroft, “Boxed In: The Constraints of U.S Foreign Policy,” World Affairs Journal (January / February 
2010).  If we had to characterize our constitution as being based on a single overarching principle, a good 
candidate would be that hegemonic power is rarely exercised wisely.  This principle applies to states in the 
international system, I would suggest, as reliably as to individuals or individual institutions in a constitutional 
system.  As we will see in the second part of this dissertation, however, most participants at the “constitutional 
convention” of 1945-1947, advocates of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, and contemporary defense reformers 
approach the problem of national security as though American’s hegemonic power in international politics were 
unproblematic.  Few defense reformers or constitutional theorists are as consistently skeptical of the exercise of 
power as Bernard Brodie.  “A large nation will not only be more nearly certain to resist so direct an offense as 
invasion of its own borders, but, depending on its sense of power and importance, it will also commit itself to war 
or warlike acts over a broader spectrum of what it asserts to be provocations, which is to say simply that it 
interprets more expansively its ‘vital interests’” (War and Politics, p. 2).  I would only add here that it is particular 
administrations, rather than nations, that commit themselves to war or warlike acts in defense of a nation’s so-
called vital interests. 
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 Here are two questions I would like the reader to keep in mind as we interpret the international 
political theory of The Federalist.  First question: Did the Founders think systematically about the 
relationship between constitutional theory and international politics?  Phrased somewhat differently, do 
the Founders present a constitutional system that would possess the proper balance of executive energy 
and safety in any republic, irrespective of its relative international power?
4
  Second question: If they did 
not think systematically about this relationship, does the present constitution of the executive branch 
suffer as a consequence from unnecessary imperfections? The best constitutions – the best 
constitutional theories – create constitutional orders that are able to adapt to changing circumstances.  
If insulated and non-insulated states are not equally able to promote wisdom and stability in a national 
security crisis, would the later benefit from a different balance of the requisites to energy and safety in 
the constitution of its executive branch? 
 
Jay’s Theory of International Politics 
Union or Else! 
 
Jay’s first contribution to The Federalist addresses the most fundamental question of the ratification 
debates: whether the people of America should “be one nation, under one federal government,” or 
“divide themselves into separate confederacies” (No. 2, Paragraph 2).  His argument begins with an 
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 William Wohlforth notes that the United States is “freer than most states to disregard the international system 
and its incentives” (William Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 
(Summer, 1999), p. 8).   The international system clearly does not constrain the United States in the same manner 
it did in the late eighteenth century.  What I argue in this chapter is that the magnitude of these constraints should 
have an impact on the requisites to safety against the abuse of executive power we build into our constitutional 
system.  Constitutional theorists have much less reason to worry about the discretionary power of a strong unitary 




appeal to common sense: because government is an indispensible necessity, men must cede to it some 
of the natural rights they are understandably loathe to relinquish.  With this concession in mind, Jay asks 
his readers if the safety and happiness of the citizenry should be entrusted to union or division, to one 
federal government or multiple sovereignties.  Jay is clearly frustrated by the erosion of what had been a 
long-standing consensus in favor of union.
5
  The emergence of an alternative doctrine – one that 
assumes individual rights would be better protected by disunion – is almost incomprehensible to him, 
and his lack of sympathy with this position leads him to present his readers with a stark alternative: 
either union under a single federal government, which would promote happiness and prosperity, or 
division into a number of “unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties,” which would obviously be 
antithetical to the happiness and prosperity of all but a small minority (No. 2, Paragraph 6). 
Part of what animates Jay’s union-or-else position is a very favorable judgment of America’s 
history as a single political entity: “As a nation we have made peace and war; as a nation we have 
vanquished our common enemies; as a nation we have formed alliances, and made treaties, and 
entered into various compacts and conventions with foreign states” (No. 2, Paragraph 7).  Jay is well 
aware that the federal government, which was brought into existence under emergency circumstances, 
is seriously flawed.  “It is not to be wondered at, that a government instituted in times so inauspicious, 
should on experiment be found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it was intended to 
answer” (No. 2, Paragraph 8).  But the deficiencies and inadequacies of the central government, he 
argues, would be best addressed by a new and improved central government, rather than abandoning 
the principle of union altogether.  In none of his contributions to The Federalist does Jay directly refute 
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 “When the King of Great Britain,” Jay remarked in a 1788 address to the people of New York, “misguided by men 
who did not merit his confidence, asserted the unjust claim of binding us in all cases whatsoever, and prepared to 
obtain our submission by force … Union was then considered as the most essential of human means, and we 
almost worshipped it with as much fervor as pagans in distress implored the protection of their tutelar deities. 
That Union was the child of wisdom. Heaven blessed it and wrought out our political salvation” (John Jay, “An 
Address to the People of the State of New York,” in Henry P. Johnston, ed., The Correspondence and Public Papers 
of John Jay, Vol. 3, 1782-1793 (G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1891). 
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the logic of division – the positive arguments for multiple sovereignties or confederacies.  His defense of 
union is therefore rather minimalist.  He endorses the deliberative practices employed by the 
representatives at the constitutional convention; claims that all wise and experienced men identify 
union with greatness and prosperity and disunion with violence and tyranny; and concludes that we 
should put our trust in wise and experienced men. 
 After praising his collaborators, Jay enters into a discussion about the importance of personal 
safety, which he considers the preeminent object of consideration to which a wise and free people will 
gravitate.  Peace and tranquility are threatened by “dangers from foreign arms and influence,” as well as 
“dangers of the like kind arising from domestic causes” (No. 3, Paragraph 4).  How does he establish the 
primacy of union in terms of its ability to secure the people from foreign hostilities?  He takes the 
roundabout approach of an already-committed advocate of union.  There are just and unjust wars, he 
points out.  If a united America would provoke other nations into fewer just wars than a disunited 
America, then citizens must vote for union.  A single national government, he argues, would act more 
justly than several smaller governments, and would therefore be less likely to provoke foreign powers 
though unjust actions.  Here is the key passage that summarizes his basic argument: 
 
Because when once an efficient national government is established, the best men in the 
country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it; 
for, although town or country, or other contracted influence, may place men in State 
assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more general 
and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to 
recommend men to offices under the national government – especially as it will have 
the widest field for choice, and never experience that want of proper persons which is 
not uncommon to some of the States.  Hence, it will result that the administration, the 
political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national government will be more 
wise, systematical, and judicious than those of individual States, and consequently more 





Rather than sketch a theory of international politics that would support his pro-union position, Jay relies 
here entirely on what I call the talent-pool principle: the larger the talent pool for a political election, the 
more likely talented people will end up in government.  Members in a national government, whether 
elected or appointed, are less likely to be beholden to personal or local interests than members of a 
smaller state government in which a majority of citizens might vote unwisely or irresponsibly.  As a 
result, the proposed union will not, as smaller states with multiple borders inevitably will, succumb to 
the “impulse of sudden irritation,” nor will it be affected by the pride that inhibits honest reflection and 
self-criticism, as its character will be temperate and cool (No. 3, Paragraph 15).  Jay hints at a theory of 
international relations with his reference to the danger of crowded neighborhoods – a theory that, in 




 In his third contribution to the The Federalist, Jay focuses on the kinds of wars likely to be 
provoked by the inevitable rise in American economic influence.
7
  It is in this essay that he begins to 
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 Despite their many differences, Niccolo Machiavelli, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Blaise Pascal, Emmanuel Kant, E. L. 
Carr, Raymond Aron, Hans Morganthau and George Kennan all fit loosely under the general rubric of classical 
realism.  Certainly the other labels popular in contemporary international relations theory – neorealist, 
neoliberalist and constructivist – are less appropriate.  I use classical realism to capture the idea that these scholars 
were not advocates of a single level of analysis and took leadership, domestic politics and the basic structure of the 
international system into consideration in their attempts to understand patterns of war and peace.  Perhaps Jay 
would fit best with a “state-centric realist” in international political economy such as Robert Gilpin, who 
incorporates the influence of international trade and economic power into his understanding of international 
politics (Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton University Press, 1987).  Labels 
are always a bit misleading, but identifying which kind of theories of international politics the Founders would have 
rejected will contribute to our analysis. 
7
 It is worth pointing out that economic power is here kept distinct from military power.  States which might suffer 
from our rising economic power would naturally be tempted to interfere with our emergence as a global 
competitor.  In emphasizing the threat our rise as an economic power might pose to other nations, Jay appears to 
be convinced that our military power would not rise in conjunction with our economic power, and that whatever 
military power we possessed would only ever be used for unambiguously defensive purposes.  Jay expressed a 
strong desire to see the union gain the respect and recognition of established European powers, and he believed 
this required a strong economy based on fixed borders, a stable currency, a robust system of credit, and new 
trading partners.  The inability the Confederation to perform its national economic duties was an invitation to 
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sketch a slightly more systematic theory of international politics.  With a new economic competitor on 
the scene, “jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of other 
nations” (No. 4, Paragraph 9).  Under these circumstances, a strong union is essential: “Wisely, 
therefore, do they consider union and a good national government as necessary to put and keep them 
in such a situation as, instead of inviting war, will tend to repress and discourage it” (No. 4, Paragraph 
10).  This is a blunt form of economic materialism: the greater the economic resources of a nation – as 
long as a nation is governed reasonably well – the less tempted other nations will be to arrest her 
natural development in an attempt to preserve their relative superiority. 
 After this discussion of the dynamics of international economic competition – the inevitability 
with which powerful nations will try to compromise the economic independence of emerging 
competitors – Jay turns to the problem of unjust wars.  What defenses are embedded in the constitution 
to protect against manufactured wars, as opposed to just wars, which are “disgraceful” to human nature 
and yet characterize the rule of absolute monarchs (No. 4, Paragraph 2)?  The defense of a strong 
national executive, Jay argues, must begin with a detailed description of the institutions that will be in 
place to prevent such executives from making war for “purposes and objects merely personal, such as a 
thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or 
support their particular families or partisans” (No. 4, Paragraph 3).  This list of concerns is a bit 
antiquated, but if we swap ideological fixations for private compacts, we end up with a legitimate set of 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
foreign powers to meddle economically in our affairs.  The literature both by and on Jay is sparse compared with 
what has been written by and about James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, but his correspondence and public 
papers are still full of insights into his economic-driven vision of American greatness.  See, especially, Henry P. 
Johnston, ed., The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, Vol. 3, 1782-1793 (G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1891).   
8
 Antiquated in the sense that personal affronts and private compacts are less likely to be responsible for 
“disgraceful” wars today than the unwillingness or inability of civilian leaders to subject their assumptions and 
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What safeguards does Jay argue are built into our constitution in order to prevent our executive 
from engaging in wars “not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of the people” (No. 4, 
Paragraph 3)?   Jay mentions only one such mechanism: a single government “can collect and avail itself 
of the talents and experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be found” (No. 
4, Paragraph 12).  The talent-pool principle makes yet another appearance.  Jay mentions other 
advantages, such as uniform policy-making and a tendency to suppress particular interests, but these 
are arguments against disunion, not safeguards against the unwise exercise of national power in matters 
pertaining to war and peace. 
Jay, I think most readers would agree, makes a strong case for union: 
 
Leave America divided into thirteen or, if you please, into three or four independent 
governments – what armies could they raise and pay – what fleets could they ever hope 
to have?  If one was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend their blood 
and money in its defense?  Would there be no danger of their being flattered in 
neutrality by its specious promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for peace to 
decline hazarding their tranquility and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of whom 
perhaps they have been jealous, and whose importance they are content to see 
diminished?  (No. 4, Paragraph 15). 
 
But Jay, I would suggest, fails to distinguish between the defensive strength of union and the danger, in 
terms of the executive engaging in a war not sanctified by justice or the interests of the people, of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
beliefs to close scrutiny.  The focus in this passage on personal motives also suggests that Jay has in mind a weak 
theory of faction, rather than a strong theory of faction.  A weak theory of faction, as I explained in Chapter 2 and 
3, discourages theorists from thinking about how to control ideologically-driven factions.  If constitutional theory 
only had to worry about the dangerous interjection of private interests into the international affairs of the state, 
this constitutional theorist would be largely content with the present constitution of the executive department. 
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union with the strength to project military power abroad.
9
  Jay is most concerned with presenting to the 
world a model of strength and efficiency: “If [foreign nations] see that our national government is 
efficient and well administered, our trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and 
disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our credit re-established, our people free, 
contented, and united, they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our 
resentment” (No. 4, Paragraph 17).  Divided, we would soon be objects of contempt and outrage, and 
suffer accordingly.
10
  Jay may be right about the wisdom of union, but his passion for union and 
antipathy for disunion, I would suggests, blinds him to the diversity of challenges and dangers of 
international politics.  The absence of a clearly articulated theory of international politics – the dangers 
not only to an emerging nation but an established power – is an impediment to the articulation of a 
constitutional theory that would fit a republic irrespective of its economic and military stature. 
 
More Heavy Lifting: The Talent-Pool Principle Revisited 
 
By granting the President and the Senate jointly the power of making treaties, Jay argues in another 
contribution to The Federalist, the proposed constitution “affords the highest security that it will be 
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 As we will see in the second part of this dissertation, this distinction – between defensive strength and the 
strength to project military power abroad – also has implications for civil-military relations.  As David Hendrickson 
explains, “Every system of civil-military relations must contend with disputes over the level and scope of military 
authority, and finding the proper distribution of authority in the realms of strategy, operations, and administration 
in no easy thing”( David C. Hendrickson, Reforming Defense: The State of American Civil-Military Relations (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 29).  Part of what I argue in this dissertation is that we have reached an impasse 
in terms of the applicability of conventional ideals for civil-military relations, and that this is why we need to 
reengage with the constitutional theory on which our republic was founded. 
10
 At the time Jay was writing, the Spanish, French and English – not to mention Native Americans – were all 
embedded inside, or hovering around the periphery of, the nation, and either actively or passively searching for 
frailties and weaknesses.  This may not be an accurate representation of the motives and actions of these groups 
and nations, but Jay certainly believed that the nation had to be unified in order to deal with direct threats to the 
territorial boundaries of the United States.  For an overview of Jay’s concerns during the convention and 
ratification debates, see Walter Stahr, John Jay: Founding Father (Continuum, 2006). 
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exercised by men the best qualified for the purpose, and in the matter most conducive to the public 
good” (No. 64, Paragraph 3).  The now-familiar assumption here is that “able and honest men … 
perfectly acquainted with our national concerns,” will in practice exercise treaty-making power (No. 64, 
Paragraph 5).  Jay believes that the electoral processes outlined in the constitution are sufficient to 
achieve this result.  Presidents will be by law over thirty-five, and senators over thirty.  These safety 
measures “confines the electors to men of whom the people have had time to form a judgment, and 
with respect to whom they will not be liable to be deceived by those brilliant appearances of genius and 
patriotism which, like transient meteors, sometimes mislead as well as dazzle” (No. 64, Paragraph 4).  
Jay’s faith in age restrictions and the electoral college can be explained in part by the context in which 
he makes his arguments.  Opponents of the treaty-making provision as presented in the proposed 
constitution fell roughly into two camps: those who argued that only men invested with legislative 
authority should possess treaty-making power, and those who believed that treaties, rather than being 
the supreme law of the land, should resemble legislative acts, and be similarly amenable to repeal.  If 
contemporary constitutional theorists had to choose between giving treaty-making power to the 
president, with the approval of two-thirds of the senate, and giving it solely to a popular assembly, few 
would choose the former arrangement.
11
  Similarly, if constitutional theorists had to choose between 
equating treaties with the supreme law of the land, and making them amenable to repeal, few would 
defend the latter option.  But the ease with which these decisions are made, I would suggest, distracts 
us – as it distracted Jay – from engaging in a more thorough constitutional analysis. 
 What if presidents are not particularly attuned to the complexities of war, peace and commerce, 
as Jay assumes they will be?  What if they are imperfectly acquainted with our national concerns and do 
not choose their advisors wisely?  What if they lack the knowledge and intuition to improve our 
                                                           
11
 In terms of their decision-making aptitude in foreign policy, their knowledge and expertise on matters pertaining 
to international politics, popular assemblies have never inspired much confidence in republican theorists. 
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international position at decisive moments in our history?  Jay is explicit about the objective of 
constitutional theory: on the subject of the power of treaty making, for example, he argues that a well-
designed republic guarantees that “our negotiations for treaties shall have every advantage which can 
be derived from talents, information, integrity, and deliberate investigations on the one hand, and from 
secrecy and dispatch on the other” (No. 64, Paragraph 8).  This is surely the ideal: talent, integrity and 
deliberation, coupled with secrecy and dispatch, and not only in our negotiations for treaties but the 
domain of national security in general.  But should contemporary constitutional theorists be as 
confident as Jay was in 1787 that we have in place the kind of institutional structures that will secure 
every advantage that can be derived from these inputs in a national security crisis?
12
 
 What I would argue – with Madison as my inspiration – is that ableness, honesty, talent and 
integrity do not preclude factional affiliations.  Jay’s faith in electoral procedures – supplemented by the 
power of impeachment, which, he believed, conspires through fear of punishment and disgrace to 
encourage good behavior – is unwarranted.  As students of international politics and national security 
know well, factions are formed not only by people who pursue selfish interests but patriots who 
mistakenly believe they are pursuing the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.  Part of 
the genius of Madison’s political theory is its commitment to controlling faction.  Unlike most political 
theorists before him, he abandoned the utopian goal of eliminating factions.  Jay, in contrast, neglects 
the importance of controlling faction and takes refuge in the overly idealistic notion of eliminating 
faction through electoral procedures.  Jay, I would suggest, fails to appreciate the need for additional 
                                                           
12
 Our democracy, let me remind the reader, was founded on the principle that great ambition is commonplace, 
while great leadership is rare.  Good intentions may or may not be the norm, but great leadership is too rare a 
phenomenon upon which to base a theory of republican government.  We need constitutional checks and balances 
precisely because we cannot assume great leadership in times of peace or war.  As Hayek puts it, because “all men 
in the pursuit of immediate aims are apt – or, because of the limitation of their intellect, in fact bound – to violate 
rules of conduct which they would nevertheless which to see generally observed” (F. A. Hayek, The Road to 
Serfdom (G. Routledge & Sons, 1944), p. 179). 
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auxiliary mechanisms to control the factional impulses of presidents in a powerful state.
13
  And he does 
so despite the fact he is convinced that the universal laws of international politics would destroy the 
happiness of prosperity of citizens if they chose disunion, which would expose them not only to the 
jealousies and uneasiness of the leaders of other nations, but their own. 
 
Hamilton’s Theory of International Politics 
The Gambler 
 
Do citizens possess the capacity to choose their form of government wisely?  This question may have 
tormented all of the Founders on some occasions, and inspired them on others, but Hamilton’s 
ambivalence is particularly pronounced.  “Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious 
estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the 
public good,” he writes in his opening contribution to The Federalist.  The American people have been 
given a rare and precious opportunity – the opportunity to deliberate on a new constitution – and it 
would be ideal if they took full advantage of this unique and fortuitous situation and focused their 
deliberative energies on the identification and realization of the public good.  “But this is a thing more 
                                                           
13
 I do not mean to come across as overly critical.  Did any theorist, statesman or science fiction writer, for that 
matter, anticipate in the late-eighteenth century the discretionary power the twentieth and twenty-first century 
executive would exercise in national security?  Did any founding-era scholar have an understanding of what it 
would mean to be a contemporary global superpower?  In a letter to George Washington early in 1787, Jay 
presented a vision of the executive that suggests a fairly constrained understanding of the powers he would 
exercise.  “Shall we have a king?” He answers this question with a rhetorical one: “Might we not have a governor-
general limited in his prerogatives and duration?” (“John Jay to General Washington, January, 7, 1787,” in Henry P. 
Johnston, ed., The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, Vol. 3, 1782-1793 (G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1891). 
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ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected.”
14
 Distinguishing between our true interests, and 
fraudulent versions of our true interests, is an exercise fraught with difficulty.
15
 
How will citizens be able to differentiate between sincere and valid criticisms of the proposed 
constitution and mere dissembling and demagoguery?  “The plan offered to our deliberations affects 
too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion 
a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the 
discovery of truth.”
16
  Hamilton appeals to his readers to keep in mind the many reasons why some 
participants in the ratification debates might consciously choose to misrepresent the benefits and 
dangers of the new constitution.  Those who will lose power, wealth or prestige as a result of the 
adoption of the new constitution will understandably attempt to steer citizens away from the truth.  
Although Hamilton believes the nation as a whole would benefit enormously from adopting the 
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 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 1, Paragraph 2. 
15
 The public good, in this context, is the most advantageous form of government.  Hamilton is announcing to his 
readers that he will attempt to distinguish between their “true” and “fraudulent” interests, in terms of union / 
disunion and other features of a constitutional order.  Too often in national security and defense reform scholars 
try to distinguish between true and fraudulent interests not in term of forms and institutions but policy 
preferences.  In response to this or that particular national security threat – or, more generally, given this or that 
reality about the international political system – we should do, or refrain from doing, x, y, or z.  From an 
institutional perspective, our “true” interest in a national security crisis, as I argue at length in Chapter 3, is to have 
in place institutional devices that ensure that the views of the president and his closest civilian advisors are 
subjected to the only kind of decision-making process that can reliably bring political ends and military means into 
relatively close alignment.  Charles Stevenson, a noted military historian and defense reformer with whom we will 
engage in Chapter 8, believes that we presently have an informal deliberative process in place that accomplishes 
what I argue can only be secured on a regular basis through a formal deliberative process.  
16
 Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 1, Paragraph 2. 
17
 As we will see in Chapters 6 and 7, the strongest defenders of the unification of the armed services and a 
streamlined chain of command have been presidents and their closest civilian advisors.  In the “constitutional 
convention” of 1945-1947, for example, President Truman and Harold Brown, his budget director, energetically 
fought back the attempt of one group of reformers to dilute executive power.  Immediately after the passage of 
this legislation, they also worked hard to define how the National Security Council would function.  We will address 
the merits of these arguments in latter chapters.  What I want to point out is that both Hamilton and Madison 
recognized that it was an enormous advantage to be able to form a government largely from scratch, and that 
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The objections of this minority, however, represent only one of the many serious challenges 
facing honest and concerned citizens.  Along with the conscious dissemination of untruths – along with 
crude attempts to misrepresent the merits of the constitution – the ratification debates will be buffeted 
by ignorance, illogic, incomprehension, and the various and sometimes mysterious machinations of the 
unconscious mind.  Hamilton demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of human psychology when 
he writes that “it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or 
may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable – the 
honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears.”
18
  Between conscious 
dissemblers and unconscious saboteurs, Hamilton provides us with an impressive catalogue of the 
challenges honest citizens must overcome. 
 The ideas I have sketched so far may not appear to bear directly on international politics.  It may 
also be somewhat unclear why I have chosen to highlight passages from The Federalist, No. 1, written as 
a broad introduction to the arguments that follow.  But in this particular essay Hamilton expresses a 
fundamental point about political decision-making with a clarity and forcefulness that warrants our 
attention.  Despite his sensitivity to the obstacles to truth-seeking, he does not appear to doubt his own 
ability to filter out these same pressures and temptations and calmly discern the true and precise 
character of the public good.  Although deeply skeptical of the ability of most citizens and opinion-
makers to identify the right solution to any particular problem, Hamilton is not the least bit skeptical of 
his own aptitude for pure and rigorous inquiry.  This preferential treatment, I would suggest, leads to a 
dubious assumption that influenced his constitutional thought and has had adverse consequences for 
our nation’s ability to navigate the turbulent waters of international politics.  Although exquisitely 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
reforming an established regime, a system of government in which power, wealth and prestige were already 
dispersed, meant that individuals and institutions would be very much on the defensive, and obstacles to judicious 
reform would increase exponentially.  
18
 Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 1, Paragraph 4. 
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sensitive to the fallibility of the average human mind, he believes that a gifted minority of citizens is 
immune to the perplexities and biases that cloud the judgment of the vast majority.  This is a familiar 
kind of elitism.  Hamilton assumed that men of high natural intelligence, if properly educated, could 
reason their way to the truth.  As a broad generalization, this assumption may indeed be true.  But as we 
know in our more introspective age, merely because a person is aware of the extent to which prejudices 
are at play in the minds of others does not mean he is equally aware of the extent to which his own 
thoughts are subject to similar distortions.
19
 
Does Hamilton’s embrace of the idea of exceptional leaders create a dilemma for students of his 
political thought?
20
  The authors of The Federalist largely share a basic theory of human motivation.  
They may at times exempt themselves from the general implications of this theory – each may have 
thought himself and a few of his political allies as being largely immune to the passions and prejudices 
that taint the thoughts and actions of most men – but they shared a general understanding of human 
nature and the profound challenge it posed to republican government.
21
  The motives of most human 
beings are at best mixed, and mixed motives generally steer men toward self-interestedness and away 
from the pursuit of the public interest.  These beliefs contribute mightily to the reason why we live in a 
                                                           
19
 If I had to make a very bold claim here, with Chapter 4 still fresh in our minds, I would argue that if we translate 
the thoughts of any notably self-critical philosopher into the language of constitutional theory, we would end up 
with a strong theory of faction.  We would end up with a mildly postmodern conception of the truth and 
constitutional constraints to ensure that people who insist on a single truth or vision are unable to dominate the 
state’s levers of power, and not romantic notions of statesmen possessing exceptional judgment and virtue.  We 
would end up with lots of powers creatively intermixed, rather than one-man rule.  
20
 The major biographers of Hamilton all present a man who was extremely bright and principled, and who held 
himself in extremely high regard, at least after he had proven to himself that he was a successful soldier and 
statesman.  See, for example, Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton (Penguin Books, 2005); and Forrest McDonald, 
Alexander Hamilton: A Biography (W. W. Norton and Company, 1982).  Another common way of explaining the 
great faith Hamilton appears to place in the judgment and temperament of future presidents – aside from 
conflating his judgment and temperament with those of future executives – is the prominence in his mind of the 
man who would almost certainly be the first president under the new constitution.  “Hamilton's treatment of the 
powers of the desirable chief executive in ten numbers of the Federalist is the description of a living man; his 
readers and hearers, unless singularly lacking, must have seen the trusted hero in the chief of the nation as 
defined,” (Broadus Mitchell, “Alexander Hamilton, Executive Power, and the New Nation,” Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Spring 1987), p. 335). 
21
 For a stimulating discussion of the intersection of psychology and institutional design in The Federalist, see 
Morton White, Philosophy, The Federalist and the Constitution (Oxford University Press, 1989). 
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republic with a system of representation, a bicameral legislature, and shared powers.  And yet in his 
contributions to The Federalist that address national security, Hamilton argues that obstacles to truth-
seeking are modest and that the policy-making process therefore only requires rudimentary safeguards 
against the errors of statesmen, be they honest or otherwise.     
Why would a sophisticated student of human psychology adopt such a seemingly uncritical 
position in the domain of national security, where robust safeguards against the passions and prejudices 
of statesmen would seem to be required?  It could be that the pragmatism in these early passages is a 
rhetorical device rather than a statement of conviction.  What happened, after all, to the idea that wise 
and good men frequently oppose each other on opposite sides of great national discussions?  It is as 
though he were wed to two incompatible models of politics: one for domestic politics and one for 
international politics.
22
  Michael Federici, a student of Hamilton, is equally perplexed: “In his political 
thinking, he consistently believed in the imperfectability of human nature and the permanent presence 
of evil in political life, yet his statesmanship was at times animated by a self-confidence that was at odds 
with his view of human nature.”
23
  Why would the errors that lead men astray in the domestic political 
arena not apply to the international political arena?  
 Hamilton argues that “a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal 
for the rights of the people than under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency 
of government.”  History teaches us that “the former has been found a much more certain road to the 
introduction of despotism,” and that of the men “who have overturned the liberties of republics, the 
greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing 
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 I do not mean to invoke Aaron Wildavsky’s two presidency thesis here.  My argument is that Hamilton’s two 
models are based on a logical inconsistency – on two different understandings of human nature.   
23




demagogues, and ending tyrants.”
24
  Let us leave the precise details and percentages alluded to here to 
historians and statisticians.  What I want to point out is that the problem with our constitutional order – 
the problem, to be more specific, with the constitution of our executive branch – is not that it poses a 
serious, direct threat to the liberty of the people.  Ever since our emergence as a global power, a 
relatively firm and efficient government led by a single executive has been reasonably compatible with 
the preservation of liberty.  But this relatively impressive track record does not mean that our powerful 
executives have always acted in the “national interest,” or that there are not other forms of tyranny that 
should concern us.
25
   
 Why does Hamilton, whose skepticism about decision-makers in this essay is profound, never 
seriously consider the possibility that presidents might lack the knowledge or temperament to govern 
wisely on matters of war and peace?  If citizens and their representatives would struggle to identify the 
truth in the ratification debates, why not in matters related to war and peace?  Hamilton appears to 
hold a view of international politics in which great men produce great results because great men – at 
least the great men that will, though electoral processes, consistently rise to power in a united America 
– will be immune to pressures from inside and outside of our republic; will accurately discern balance of 
power configurations; demonstrate near infallible judgment in their choices of alliances; and rarely if 
ever fail to distinguish between wars of necessity and wars of choice.  The following appears to be 
Hamilton’s foundational proposition: Great men are reasonable and, fortunately, the international 
political environment rewards reasonableness.  Hamilton’s executive belongs in certain respects to the 
same fanciful world as Plato’s Philosopher-King and Machiavelli’s Prince.  In this alternative world, 
leaders possess genuinely superhuman powers: they can see through the pre-war fog of conflicting 
perspectives and points of view as easily as superman can see through walls.  Hamilton knew he was 
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 Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 1, Paragraph 5. 
25
 By relatively impressive I do not mean to suggest an absence of serious blemishes. 
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gambling on the people’s ability to choose their form of government wisely.  What he did not apparently 
realize was how much blood and treasure he was gambling on the exceptional knowledge and 




The Classical Realist 
 
Hamilton sketches a theory of international politics in The Federalist, Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9.  Whereas Jay 
discusses at some length the dangers we would face from foreign nations as a disunited plurality of 
states, Hamilton addresses in these thematically interrelated essays the threats posed by inter-state 
rivalries, domestic factions and internal convulsions.  The simple fact that men are “ambitious, 
vindictive, and rapacious” effectively guarantees that the motives for violent conflict between individual 
states will be ever-present.  Only a utopian would fail to see the great danger that would result from 
disunion.  “To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected 
sovereignties in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, 
and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages” (No. 6, Paragraph 2).  Hamilton’s vision of 
international politics is rather grim:  
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 Let me draw a link between the questions I raise here and a subject broached in the previous chapter.  Hamilton 
and other advocates of executive power claim that the executive needs to possess ample discretionary power to 
deal with a future that is too mysterious and unpredictable to lend itself to anticipatory legislation.  “Though it is 
easy to assert, in general terms, the possibility of forming a rational judgment of a due provision against probable 
dangers, yet we may safely challenge those who make the assertion to bring forward their data, and may affirm 
that they would be found as vague and uncertain as any that could be produced to establish the probable duration 
of the world” (Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 34, Paragraph 4).  This argument certainly supports granting the 
executive a significant degree of independence from the legislature.  But this sensitivity to the unlegislatable future 
should also be associated with an appreciation of our equally pronounced inability to predict the future 
circumstances in which a strong, unitary executive might exercise his power.  The unpredictable future should 
argue not only for a cautious approach to the idea of subordinating the executive to the rule of law, but placing 




The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable.  There are some which have a 
general and almost constant operation upon the collective bodies of society.  Of this 
description are the love of power or the desire of pre-eminence and dominion – the 
jealousy of power, or the desire of equality and safety.  There are others which have a 
more circumscribed though an equally operative influence within their spheres.  Such 
are the rivalships and competitions of commerce between commercial nations.  And 
there are others, not less numerous than either of the former, which take their origin 
entirely in private passions; in the attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of 
leading individuals in the communities of which they are members (No. 6, Paragraph 6).  
  
The history of war between nations testifies to the fact that both monarchies and republics are prone to 
aggression.  The logic behind this observation is simple and straightforward: “Are not the former 
administered by men as well as the latter?” (No. 6, Paragraph 9).  Men may on occasion be motivated by 
virtue, but ambition, vindictiveness, and greed are far more common motives for action.  Leaders are 
prone to self-justifying rationalizations, and popular assemblies are “frequently subject to the impulses 
of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities,” and this 
combination works against whatever peaceful tendencies we might be tempted to assign to commercial 
republics (No. 6, Paragraph 9). 
Hamilton argues that republics do not have any built-in constitutional mechanisms to thwart 
their war-making proclivities.  This is a very pessimistic view of republican government: Hamilton does 
not believe that constitutional theory can protect states from their own aggressive impulses, much less 
their neighbors’ inhospitable intentions, if they live in a crowded neighborhood.  Contrary to much 
contemporary scholarship, international trade and interdependence, he argues, does not mitigate the 
problem: “Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the object of war?  Is not the love 
of wealth as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power and glory?” (No. 6, Paragraph 9).  
Hamilton would be startled to learn that quite a few modern scholars believe that globalization and the 
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spread of democracy promote peace.
27
  Experience – that least fallible of guides, as Hamilton puts it – 
must be the final arbiter in these kinds of debates.  “[W]hat reason can we have to confide in those 
reveries which would seduce us into an expectation of peace and cordiality between members of the 
present confederacy, in a state of separation?” (No. 6, Paragraph 17).  Hamilton can barely contain his 
contempt for those who believe that thirteen independent states would peacefully coexist.  Why would 
these states make war on each other?  “It would be a full answer to this question to say – precisely the 
same inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the nations of the world” (No. 7, 
Paragraph 1).  
 Hamilton has no doubts about the disaster that would befall the individual states of the 
confederacy if they choose disunion.  War and destruction would be the natural consequence of any 
political arrangement other than complete union.
28
  But how, exactly, would union protect citizens from 
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 We would not align Hamilton with contemporary supporters of the democratic peace thesis.  Democratic peace 
theorists have put forward strong empirical evidence to support the generalization that democracies rarely go to 
war with each other.  Scholars working within this program now focus most of their research on trying to establish 
the causal logic behind this regularity.  Supporters of the democratic peace thesis tend to fall into two camps: 
those who attribute this peace dividend to shared common norms (see, for example, Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, 
Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller, Debating the 
Democratic Peace (MIT Press, 1983) and those who explain this phenomenon by highlighting the role of 
democratic institutions, primarily democratic elections (see, for example, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. 
Morrow, and Randolph M. Silverson and Alastair Smith, “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace,” 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 4 (December 1999).  Sebastian Rosato offers a very thorough – and 
what I consider very persuasive – critique of the institutional and normative logics that underpins the democratic 
peace.  Since the Founders placed a great deal of faith in the power of elections to rationalize national security 
policy, let me quote from his basic criticism of the institutionalists: “There is no a priori reason to believe that a 
leader who is likely to lose office for fighting a losing or costly war, but unlikely to be exiled, imprisoned, or killed in 
the process, should feel more accountable for his policy choices than a leader who is unlikely to lose office but can 
expect to be punished severely in the unlikely event that he is in fact removed” (Sabastian Rosato, “The Flawed 
Logic of the Democratic Peace Thesis,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 4 (November 2003), pp. 593-
594).  I mention this body of literature because it largely ignores how the constitution of the executive department 
might influence national security policy.  It also points to an inconsistency in Hamilton’s reflections on international 
politics: democracy would not save the disunited states, he argues, and yet he places a great deal of faith in 
democratic institutions – elections and the threat of impeachment – to protect the nation from the abuse of 
executive power. 
28
 Geography plays a critical role in Hamilton’s understanding of international politics.  Disunion would produce a 
very crowded neighborhood.  Borrowing this geographical lens, we could argue that, contra the democratic peace 
thesis, which is widely accepted by national security experts, that we cannot learn much about the behavior of 
democratic states by lumping together the war-proneness of countries as structurally “chaste” as Belgium – a weak 
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the tumultuous nature of international politics?  Hamilton begins his security-based defense of the 
proposed constitution by glancing back in horror at the “petty republics” of Greece and Italy.  Brief 
“intervals of felicity” there may have been, but these peaceful interludes were inevitably overwhelmed 
by “tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage.”  The talents and endowments that were periodically 
able to emerge from the gloom were simply no match for the “vices of government” (No. 9, Paragraph 
1).  But this history need not be repeated, he argues.  There is still reason for republican optimism.  The 
new and vastly improved science of politics can save us from rage, sedition, greed, ambition and the 
many vices of government.  The failed republics of the past were not structured properly, he argues, and 
it is in a new set of architectonic principles that the hope of free government rests.     
 
The efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which were either not known 
at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients.  The regular distribution of power into 
distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution 
of courts composed of judges holding their offices; the representation of the people in 
the legislature by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new discoveries, or 
have made their principle progress towards perfection in modern times.  They are 
means, and powerful means, by which the excellencies of republican government may 
be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided (No. 9, Paragraph 3). 
 
Hamilton is convinced that the imperfection of republican government can be minimized by the new 
science of politics.  Separation of powers, checks and balances within the legislature, an independent 
judiciary and representative democracy rather than direct democracy are the discoveries he justifiably 
celebrates.  But does the therapeutic role of these innovations address the dangers inherent in 
international politics that he outlines in his spirited rejection of disunion?  Hamilton believes that 
“momentary passions, and immediate interests, have a more active and imperious control over human 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
state in a crowded neighborhood – and as structurally “promiscuous” as the United States – a state so powerful 
that old understandings of geographical opportunities and constraints no longer apply. 
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conduct than general and remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice,” and this is what leads him 
to reject arguments about the pacific nature of republics (No. 6, Paragraph 9).  Neither leaders, popular 
assemblies, nor the citizenry are reliable political actors when their passions and self-interest are 
aroused, as they are with alarming frequency.  The dangers of disunion are clear at this point.  But how 
will the innovative design features of the new political science protect the union from unjust, misguided 




Let us now turn our attention to The Federalist, No. 8, which I consider the most important essay in The 
Federalist on the relationship between domestic institutional design and international politics.
29
  
Hamilton begins this crucial but largely neglected essay by reminding his readers that the political units 
that would emerge from disunion would be “subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of 
friendship and enmity with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not united 
under one government” (No. 8, Paragraph 1).  This essay elaborates upon the causes and consequences 
of these predicted vicissitudes. 
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 In the previous chapter I was critical of scholars who choose selectively from The Federalist to support their 
arguments.  In this context, let me point out that I have not encountered a single discussion of this essay in the 
executive power literature.  David Grey Adler is also critical of the way Hamilton has been appropriated by 
contemporary advocates of executive power.  “The Bush administration’s conscription of Hamilton to justify its 
soaring claims of executive power invites fresh consideration of his views. Does Hamilton bear responsibility for 
the absolutist pretensions of the Bush presidency?”  The answers to these questions, he argues, depend on which 
of Hamilton’s writings we prioritize.  “Who is the subject of inquiry: Hamilton as delegate to the Philadelphia 
Convention, as “Publius” in The Federalist Papers, or as “Pacificus” during the 1793 dispute over the Neutrality 
Proclamation?” (David Grey Adler, “Hamilton and the Bush Theory of Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs,” 
Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 3 (September 2010), p. 532.  I would add to this remark that our 
understanding of Hamilton changes if we exclude certain essays in The Federalist from our analyses, whether it is 
Nos. 69 and 75, on the constitutional allocation of foreign affairs powers, or No. 8, which suggests that insulated 
and non-insulated states present a republican theorist with a different set of constitutional challenges. 
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 In the immediate aftermath of disunion, the absence of established armies and fortifications 
would be an invitation to war and plunder.   The populous and therefore relatively more powerful states 
would naturally respond to the weakness of their less populous neighbors with aggression.  No 
impediments would exist to check the covetousness of potential invaders.  Predatory violence and 
profound insecurity would be the defining characteristics of interstate relations at this juncture.  
Although this volatile and highly unstable situation would not last for long, its replacement would give 
citizens little cause for optimism.  “The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the 
continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most 
attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy 
their civil and political rights” (No. 8, Paragraph4).  The creation of standing armies would be the 
inevitable response to the profound insecurity of living in independent states.
30
  In exchange for 
personal security from violent and predatory neighbors, citizens would embrace a form of government 
that presented grave risks to their personal freedom.   
 Hamilton argues that standing armies and military establishments pose two direct challenges to 
individual liberty.  First, military establishments are a great source of power and influence, and this 
                                                           
30
 The IR theorist with whom I would argue Hamilton has the strongest affinities is Kenneth Waltz (Kenneth Waltz, 
Theory of International Politics (Random House, 1979).  Waltz’s structural realism is based on three core 
assumptions that Hamilton adopts in his own reflections: anarchy, self-help, and power balancing.  The 
international system is characterized as anarchic since there is no supranational body that possesses a monopoly 
on the legitimate use of force.  Unlike the hierarchical systems that exist within states, the international system 
lacks an established “chain of command.”  States in an anarchic system must therefore help themselves, since 
there is no institution capable of punishing aggressors and no guarantees that an ally today might not be an 
adversary at some time in the future.  The practice of self-help, forced upon states by the anarchic nature of the 
system, leads states to engage in strategic balancing, an activity in which states form alliances and coalitions in an 
attempt to provide its citizens with a semblance of security in an inherently insecure world.  I mention the 
similarities here because I will soon argue that Hamilton’s distinction between insulated and non-insulated states 
suggests the bare outlines of a kind of systemic theory of international politics.  In order to preempt a certain kind 
of criticism of Waltz, let me add that in his theory of international relations there is room for the personalities – 
the institutions and institutional relationships – of individual regimes.  As he argues, his theory was intended to 
add an additional causal layer to pre-existing conceptions of international relations, not to supplant the variables 
his predecessors, mostly diplomatic historians and political theorists, had already identified as central to 
understanding state behavior.  In reality, “everything is related to everything else, and one domain cannot be 
separated from others” (Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000). 
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means that there is always a strong risk that this power and influence will not be exercised in a manner 
friendly to individual rights.  Second, because it is “of the nature of war to increase the executive at the 
expense of the legislative authority,” republican constitutions otherwise able to preserve the delicate 
balance of power between the branches of government would “acquire a progressive direction towards 
monarchy” (No. 8, Paragraph 5).  Although Hamilton had a greater appreciation for monarchial 
government than most of his fellow founders, he is explicit in this essay about the need to avoid a drift 
toward monarchy.  Dissolve the Confederacy and standing armies are inevitable.  Standing armies 
necessitate powerful executives.  The existence of powerful executives set in motion the “engines of 
despotism,” the scourge of continental Europe (No. 8, Paragraph 6).   
 Hamilton’s rejection of disunion appears to put him in a theoretical pinch.  On the one hand he 
argues that disunion would engender an inevitable drift toward monarchy and despotism in the newly 
independent states.  On the other hand, he does not believe that this general law of international 
politics – that there is no such thing as a safe neighborhood – poses a significant threat to his proposed 
union.  Hamilton escapes this apparent contradiction by making a distinction between the kind of 
standing armies that would be required in the case of disunion, and the nature of the army that would 
be needed to defend and protect the union.  He makes a pivotal assumption at this point in his 
argument.  Here is the key passage: 
 
There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a country seldom 
exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in one which is often subject to them, 
and always apprehensive of them.  The rulers of the former can have no good pretext, if 
they are even so inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous as must of necessity be 
maintained in the latter.  These armies being, in the first case, rarely, if at all, called into 
activity for interior defense, the people are in no danger of being broken to military 
subordination … The smallness of the army renders the natural strength of the 
community an over-match for it; and the citizens, not habituated to look up to the 
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military power for protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love nor fear the 
soldiery; they view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a necessary evil, and 
stand ready to resist a power which they suppose may be exerted to the prejudice of 
their rights.  The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate to 
suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection; but it will be unable to 
enforce encroachments against the united efforts of the people (No. 8, Paragraph 9). 
 
Hamilton’s understanding of international politics differentiates between two types of states: insulated 
and non-insulated.  A state that is non-insulated – that lives in a crowded neighborhood – is at an 
enormous disadvantage.  “The perpetual menacing of danger,” he writes, “oblige the government to be 
always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for instant defense.  The continual 
necessity for their services enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the 
condition of the citizen” (No. 8, Paragraph 10).  A state that is insulated – that does not have potential 
aggressors on its borders – has primarily to worry about defending itself against small domestic 
disturbances.
31
  In the case of disunion, the independent states would suffer from profound 
overexposure.  In the case of union, the citizens would benefit from a condition that approximated 
insulation.  The historical models for the security of union and insecurity of disunion are Britain and 
continental Europe.  Britain’s geographical position is extremely fortuitous, and without it, “she, like 
them, would in all probability be, at this day, a victim to the absolute power of a single man” (No. 8, 
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 Lamberton Harper, in his thoughtful study of Hamilton’s approach to foreign policy, interprets an insulated state 
to mean a nation possessing the characteristics of an island.  This does not imply, however, a self-sufficient or 
isolated state.  “The creation of a strong union obviated internecine conflict, but not foreign wars” (Harper 
Lamberton, American Machiavelli: Alexander Hamilton and the Origins of U.S. Foreign Policy (Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), p. 5.  Hamilton’s concern with spill-over effects is expressed strongly in The Federalist, No. 34, where 
he writes about the ambition and enmity of other nations: “A cloud has been for some time hanging over the 
European world. If it should break forth into a storm, who can insure us that in its progress a part of its fury would 
not be spent upon us?” The lesson of European affairs is blunt: “Let us recollect that peace or war will not always 
be left to our option; that however moderate or unambitious we may be, we cannot count upon the moderation, 
or hope to extinguish the ambition of others” (Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 34, Paragraph 5).  These arguments 
present a less tranquil state of affairs than in the essay under discussion here – a state does indeed have to worry 
about potential aggressors – but this does not render the volatility associated with being a non-insulated state any 
less pronounced.  
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Paragraph 11).  What must be avoided at all costs is the kind of fragmentation that characterizes 
continental Europe and has fueled centuries of violence and tyranny. 
The logic that cautions against disunion is the same logic that endorses insulation.   Disunion or 
the loss of isolation would introduce threats to liberty and security that are “real, certain, and 
formidable” (No. 8, Paragraph 13).  Hamilton’s constitutional theory – particularly his embrace of a 
strong executive – rests significantly on his understanding of the relationship between geography and 
international politics.  “If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an 
advantage similar to that of an insulated situation” (No. 8, Paragraph 12).  And when a nation that 
profits from relative insulation – not only in terms of outside threats but the range of options available 
to national security decision-makers – develops into a global hegemon?  Hamilton never imagined the 
power the new nation would one day wield on the international stage.  Although he believed in 
American greatness, it was simply inconceivable in 1787 that the unified republic he defended with such 
passion and insight would one day have military bases in hundreds of countries around the world and 
the financial resources, technical sophistication and manpower to fight major wars on multiple 
continents simultaneously, and that these conflicts would not be unambiguously defensive in nature.
32
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 Let us return briefly to Waltz’s structural realism.  Even if democracies generally incline toward moderation and 
peacefulness, a democratic state could still be a danger both to itself and to other states in the international 
system if it acquires a preponderance of power.  This argument aligns with Hamilton’s emphasis on the danger of 
crowded neighborhoods: the kind of neighborhood in which a state resides is a stronger indicator of how it will 
behave on the international stage than regime type.  In a crowded neighborhood, unbalanced power is a hazard no 
matter who wields it, and this is not the case, I should add, because power necessarily corrupts or because 
powerful states are always aggressive and expansionist.  The problem is that calculating a state’s national interest, 
as I argued in Chapter 3, is a deeply subjective endeavor.  Another way to capture this high degree of subjectivity – 
of factiousness, we could say – is that the minds of decision-makers in every administration are impregnated with 
an idiosyncratic subset of a society’s pool of norms.  This does not mean that decision-makers ignore the 
distribution of material capabilities in the international system or that material considerations might not, as a 
general rule, dictate the behavior of states.  What it does mean is that the “self-interested” behavior of a state, 
under one administration, is not a reliable indicator of the “self-interested” behavior we should expect to observe 
in the future, under a different administration.  In powerful democracies, in other words, the norms that influence 
national security decision-making act most consistently and measurably at the level of individual administrations, 
and this dynamic, I would suggest, speaks directly to the problem of unchecked national security factions. 
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This lack of imagination and foresight, however understandable, has serious consequences for 
his constitutional theory.  When the armies of a state must be “numerous enough for instant defense,” 
the separation of powers system in a republic will tilt inexorably toward the executive.
33
  The continual 
necessity for the services of the soldier not only “degrades the condition of the citizen” but forces the 
state to elevate the military over the civil (No. 8, Paragraph 10).  This elevation puts too much power in 
the hands of the executive and is antithetical to liberty.  Republican theory at the time of our founding 
was “primitive” in the sense that it did not have to contend with the problem of a large and permanent 
military establishment.  Hamilton’s great fear was the loss of personal liberties that non-insulation more 
or less guaranteed.  But even if our personal liberties are not be seriously threatened by this dynamic, 
the degradation of the citizen, and the elevation of the military over the civil, are not the only two 
dangers to which an institutional designer must be extremely sensitive.   
 Why do states go to war with each another?  This was not a question that agitated too many 
political scientists prior to 1914 (much less back in the late-eighteenth century), since the general causes 
of war struck most students of history as rather obvious.  States went to war either because they 
thought they could gain wealth, territory or status by doing so, or because they were attacked by an 
aggressive state and forced to defend themselves.  Going to war, in many respects, was what sovereign 
states did.  States went to war, to borrow a formulation from economics, when the benefits of conquest 
significantly outweighed the costs.  With industrialization, changes in state-society relations, and 
increasing economic interdependence, political scientists were put on the defensive.  The disastrous 
consequences of World War I – the death of millions, the collapse of numerous regimes, the 
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 Grant Hammond argues that the framers never envisioned that two of the principles to which they “were firmly 
committed—relative isolationism in world politics and the absence of a large standing military force—would be so 
thoroughly displaced by what they sought to avoid.”  Not that we should be surprised: “the world in which they 
lived and the principles that guided their thinking have been changed virtually beyond recognition” (Grant 
Hammond, “Time for a Revolution: The Transformation from National Defense to International Security,” in 




extraordinary material destruction – was an affront to common sense and presented scholars with an 
acute challenge.  Once the costs of international conflict in both lives and treasure had risen 
dramatically, why would states continue to go to war and put their security and prosperity at risk?
34
 
These kinds of questions and themes – and the theories and arguments that have arisen over 
the last century in response to them – simply did not haunt the intellectual firmament in the late 
eighteenth century.  The authors of The Federalist never imagined a world in which the nature of 
national security threats would be profoundly ambiguous and wars not obviously and directly a matter 
of self-defense.  They shared with Walt Whitman, writing a century later, a limited understanding of 
international politics: confident that no foreign conqueror could subdue a unified American, it was a 
“fear of conflicting and irreconcilable interiors, and the lack of a common skeleton, knitting all close,” 
that troubled them.
35
  As a result of this worldview – as a result of the theory of international politics 
that implicitly informs the constitutional theory of the Founders – they never imagined that the violence 
of faction could dominate the national security decision-making process.   
 That men who lived at the time of the constitutional convention and ratification debates did not 
imagine the United States evolving into a hegemonic world power that possessed fighter jets, smart 
bombs, nuclear weapons, unmanned drones, and a million-man standing army is hardly a surprise.  They 
probably did not anticipate the impact railroads and the electric telegraph would have on international 
relations in the early nineteenth century.
36
  Important constitutional questions, however, arise from this 
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 Norman Angell famously predicted an end to major wars.  The elaborate economic relationships between great 
powers in the early years of the last century, he thought, made the prospect of a world war practically 
unfathomable (Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1910).  Liberal peace theory would lay 
largely dormant through two hot wars and most of a cold war before its late-twentieth century revival. 
35
 Walt Whitman, “Democratic Vistas,” in Walt Whitman’s America: selections from Leaves of grass, Democratic 
vistas, Specimen days, and Portraits of Lincoln (World Publishing Company, 1964). 
36
 Military historian Michael Howard writes, in a remarkably informative and stimulating short book, that in the 
eighteenth century it was “generally accepted that there was a strict limit to the size of armies that could usefully 
be deployed in the field,” and that, with the introduction of railways, “these limits disappeared.”  Other 
technological advances were equally unanticipated, including the extent to which war would be “a matter of 
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understandable short-sightedness.  Does the inability of the Founders to anticipate the power dynamics 
of our contemporary world mean that their constitutional theory is ill-equipped to manage them?  The 
theory of international politics embedded in The Federalist is clearly outdated.  Does this necessarily 
mean that our constitutional order is vulnerable as a consequence?  My research into the structures of 
the national security state, which I will present in the second half of this dissertation, suggests that that 







Let us return to the two questions with which I opened this chapter.  First question: Did Hamilton or Jay 
think systematically about the relationship between constitutional theory and international politics?  I 
hope the reader is convinced at this point that not enough systematic thinking about the relationship 
between international politics and institutional design takes place in The Federalist.  The creative force 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
scientific calculation, administrative planning, and professional expertise” by the late nineteenth century.  By the 
time America transitioned from an insulated to non-insulated state sometime in the late ninetieth-early twentieth 
century, the invention of high explosives had increased “the range of all weapons to a hitherto inconceivable 
extent,” the “problem of supplying and deploying large forces” had evaporated, and “belt-fed, water-cooled 
machine-guns” were firing several hundred rounds a minute (Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford 
University Press, Updated Edition, 2009), pp. 94-115). 
37
 From systems theories we can “draw some inferences about the expected behavior and fate of the units: 
namely, how they will have to compete with and adjust to one another if they are to survive and flourish.  To the 
extent that the dynamics of a system limit the freedom of its units, their behavior and the outcomes of their 
behavior become predictable” (Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1988), p. 618).  What logically follows from this argument is that we 
should expect fewer constraints on the freedom of states to lead to less predictable state behavior, and this is 
another way of saying that the spirit of faction will have a strong and potentially violent influence on national 
security policy in powerful non-insulated states.  Structural realism – as opposed to classical realism - teaches us 
that there are indirect threats to the security of a republic that the Founders failed to anticipate and that 
contemporary constitutional theorists generally ignore.  A non-insulated state can harm its citizens not only 




behind Hamilton’s and Jay’s reflections on international politics was a comparison between the 
advantages of union and the disadvantages of disunion, not a comprehensive theory of international 
relations.
38
  As a consequence, there are many inconsistencies in their arguments.  Jay, for example, may 
be right about the wisdom of union, but his passion for union and antipathy for disunion blinds him to 
many of the challenges and dangers of international politics.  Hamilton offers us a more comprehensive 
theory of international politics, but it is still insufficiently universal.  He recognizes the subjective nature 
of the public interest, for example, but defends a constitutional theory that assumes an objective 
national interest.  He forcefully argues that “attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of a 
community or cabinet” would destroy any peaceful interludes between the disunited states, but he does 
not seem to realize that future presidents and national security advisors would be as vulnerable to these 
corrupting influences as the leaders of individual states in a disunited federation.  In sum, there is plenty 
of evidence, I believe, to support my claim that the Founders did not think systematically about the 
relationship between constitutional and international political theory. 
The second question presents us with a much greater challenge.  Even if we acknowledge that 
the Founders did not think systematically about this relationship, does our constitutional system suffer 
as a consequence?  This is the question that animates the second part of my dissertation, on the political 
theory of the national security state.  But let me mention here that the absence of an internally 
consistent structural theory of international politics is responsible for a weakness in the political theory 
of The Federalist.  Hamilton, as I mentioned, is a skeptic of the idea of a “democratic peace” between 
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 Viktor Vanberg and James Buchanan argue that the “fundamental problem of constitutional choice can be 
stated in the following question: “How can we maintain a desirable constitutional order among ourselves, given 
that – at any and every point in the continuing process – we cannot know what will be known, invented, and 
created tomorrow, what potential solutions may be available to us, what problems we will face, or even what we 
will perceive as problems tomorrow?” (Viktor J. Vanberg and James M. Buchanan, “Constitutional Choice, Rational 
Ignorance, and the Limits of Reason,” in Karol Soltan and Stephen Elkin, The Constitution of Good Societies 
(Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), p. 55.  A consistent theory of international politics, I would suggest, 
helps us to anticipate future challenges and therefore to maintain a desirable constitutional order even though the 
particular problems we will face in the future may have little in common with the problems we face at the moment 
of constitutional choice. 
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disunited states and yet he does not apply his arguments in support of this position to the future 
behavior of the federal entity he hopes to chaperone into existence.  Hamilton is an inconsistent realist: 
he is an exceptionalist in the sense that he assumes the republic he champions will not succumb to 
universal temptations and proclivities.  In the absence of an internally consistent theory of international 
politics, I would suggest, it is very difficult to fully appreciate the threat that the possession of relative 
international power presents to a republican regime.  Hamilton conceived of America as an insulated 
nation and did not anticipate the steady erosion of this inestimable blessing.  He presents us with a 
truncated theory of international politics: the international political theory of an insulated state.  The 
theory of international politics that informs the constitution of our executive branch, in other words, 
does not recommend the same constitutional order for the state we once were, and the state we have 
since become. 
“At the head of the American forces,” William Emerson writes, “the Constitution places an 
amateur strategist of high and unrivalled rank. As Commander-in-Chief, the President may select, 
discharge, hearken to or ignore his military advisers without check or even the necessity of explanation.  
He can, if he chooses, assert his will quite independently of any subordinate military agency, for, in his 
relations with the military, the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief is clear and 
unchallenged.”  In the second part of this dissertation I will argue that although this constitutional 
arrangement may have once had much to recommend it, it no longer serves our nation well.
39
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 William Emerson, “Franklin Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief in World War II,” Military Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 4 






6 The Creation of the National Security State 
 
 
Unfortunately, in our preoccupation with what governments should do to address contemporary 
problems, we give little critical attention to the intellectual tools that are appropriate to the 
constitutional level of analysis. 
- Vincent Ostrom 
 
Far from fulfilling the hopes of an earlier generation that modern principles of organization would 
strengthen the quest for more rational policies, the structural features of hierarchy, specialization, and 
centralization that characterize all complex organizations have produced chronic pathologies of 
information processing and appraisal. 
- Alexander George 
 
The critical policy question is what effect will occur if we change the allocation of decision-making rights. 
Centralization from this perspective can be defined as the monopolization of decision-making rights in 
one organization while federal solutions would indicate that decision-making rights are dispersed to a 
number of semi-autonomous organizations.  At its core, government reorganization is nothing more than 
assessing the effect that different allocations of decision-making rights will have on the realization of 
public purposes within the political context of a democratic society. 
- Robert Hawkins 
 
 
This chapter is essential to this dissertation not because of the strength or boldness of the claims I will 
make here – my claims will in fact be quite modest – but because we cannot understand the defense 
reform debates of the 1980s, which culminated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, or the 
assumptions and preoccupations of contemporary defense reformers, without being familiar with the 
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debates that led to passage of the National Security Act of 1947.
1
  We also need to be familiar with the 
constitutional theory to which the creators of the national security state claimed allegiance – the 
constitutional theory that recommended the institutional structures we have inherited – to appreciate 
which constitutional principles and forms defended in The Federalist did not receive the attention they 
may have deserved.  A familiarity with these debates is also essential if we hope to make a practical – 
rather than merely theoretical – contribution to contemporary defense reform. 
A basic story can be told about the creation of the national security state.
2
  In the aftermath of 
World War II, Congress passed legislation to formalize institutional arrangements that had arisen out of 
the need to prosecute the military conflict more effectively and efficiently, especially in the European 
theater, where the United States had to collaborate intimately with her allies.
3
  The intent of the 
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 The National Security Act of 1947 was also an experiment in constitutional choice.  In this respect it has 
something noteworthy in common with the Articles of Confederation.  Both were revolutionary in the sense that 
they were largely without precedent.  I do not mean to overstretch this analogy, but the authors of both of these 
experiments in constitutional choice lacked the kind of practical experience with forms and principles that latter 
reformers would advantageously possess.  If Madison, Hamilton and other key participants at the Constitutional 
Convention had not learned a great deal about republican government from a decade under the Articles of 
Confederation, we would very likely not be celebrating their accomplishments today.  Just as the revolutionaries in 
1776 did not have much experience with popular self-government, the authors of the National Security Act of 1947 
had little experience with the operations of a national military establishment.  The relationship between law and 
behavior in the domain of national security, we could say, was largely unknown (it might have been less unknown 
if The Federalist had a wider readership at the time, but that is another story).  What I would suggest is that sixty-
five years after the passage of this landmark piece of legislation, we now know enough about the institutional 
dynamics of the national security state to explore constitutional solutions to the problem of misaligned political 
ends and military means.  Why defense reformers in the 1980s did not explore the possibility of introducing a 
formal deliberative process into the executive department is a subject we will cover in the next chapter.   
2
 There are three comprehensive histories of the debates that led to the passage of the National Security Act of 
1947.  All three are impressive scholarly studies.  What authors Michael Hogan, Douglas Stuart and Demetrios 
Caraley do not attempt to do in their work, however, is tease apart the political goals of key figures in these 
debates from the constitutional principles and forms they advocate.  Hogan and Stuart do an excellent job of 
identifying the national security ideologies that inspired key reformers, but they leave largely unaddressed the 
relationship between these ideologies, the specific proposals advocated, and the constitutional theory on which 
our republic was founded.  Caraley asks a poignant question – “Why should such an intense political conflict have 
developed over proposals to unify the military services?” – but opts to “neither explicitly judge the merits of the 
issues concerning unification nor offer organizational blueprints of its own” (Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of 
Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process (Columbia University Press, 1966), p. x.  See Michael 
Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1947 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1998); and Douglas Stuart, Creating the National Security State (Princeton University Press, 2008).   
3
 Numerous interdepartmental committees formed during the war to address specific organizational challenges.   
Richard Best, among other scholars, argues that while these committees facilitated cooperation and coordination, 
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National Security Act of 1947 – certainly one of the most important pieces of legislation in the twentieth 
century, despite the lack of attention it has received by the scholarly community – was to preserve “the 
generally successful balance of judgment and power between Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS), between the individual members of the JCS, between the JCS and the theater commanders, and 
between the theater commanders and the service component commanders.”
4
  The ideal behind this 
legislation was to ensure that actors who had previously been relatively independent agents – the 
President, the Secretary of War, The Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of State, the military services, 
the JCS, the intelligence agencies and Congress – would work as a cohesive unit in the future.  A 
Secretary of Defense was established and put in charge of coordinating the different services, and the 
JCS (in its corporate, pre-chairman days) was given the responsibility of harmonizing inter-service 
relations.  The effectiveness of President Roosevelt’s highly personalized leadership style, it was widely 
recognized, was not something the nation could rely on in the future.
5
  A goal of the legislation was 
therefore to put institutions in place that would compensate for whichever leadership styles and 
personal idiosyncrasies future civilian leaders might possess.  The National Security Act of 1947 was the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
they were nevertheless inadequate as long-term solutions because they represented a piecemeal approach to the 
larger challenge of coordinating national security policymaking.  See Richard A. Best Jr., “The National Security 
Council: An Organization Assessment,” Congressional Research Service (January 2011). 
4
 Allan R. Millett, “The Organizational Impact of Military Success and Failure: An Historical Perspective,” in Millet 
et. al., The Reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: A Critical Analysis (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1986), 
p. 12. 
5
 Historian William Emerson is critical of scholars who focus their attention on the late stages of the war and 
conclude that Roosevelt was too deferential to his military advisors.  He may have afforded his military chiefs great 
freedom and authority in operational matters, but even late in the war his “ascendancy over his chiefs was no less 
real and his control, indirect but persuasive, over the major decisions of the war no less marked” (William 
Emerson, “Franklin Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief in World War II,” Military Affairs, Vol. 22. No. 4, p. 205).  I 
mention this distinction between control over the major decisions of the war and control over operational matters 
to highlight the following point: the creators of the national security state appear to have assumed that while 
presidents would direct future wars (with or without much consultation with the legislature), military leaders 
would retain control over operational matters.  Such a clear division of responsibilities promotes a degree of ends-
means harmonization even in the absence a formal deliberative body (only a degree: military leaders may be able 
to choose the means they consider best suited to the stated political objectives, which often narrows the potential 
gap between ends and means, but this exercise of military judgment does not equate with a process of mutual 
adjustment and adaptation).  And as long as a clear division of responsibility between civilian and military leaders 
exists, the absence of formal mechanisms for ensuring a relatively seamless fit between political ends and military 
means is unlikely to attract much attention. 
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“statutory expression of the collective hope that some balance of horizontal bureaucratic proliferation 
and decision-making centralization would improve the quality of national security policy.”
6
 Ensuring a 
high degree of collaboration between different institutions of government, despite turnover in 
leadership and changes in the international environment, was the fundamental intent of the legislation.
7
 
As I mentioned, this is an overly simplistic version of the story of how and why reformers 
attempted to improve the quality of America’s national security decision-making in the aftermath of 
World War II.  It is overly simplistic because it is a narrative largely stripped of its political, ideological 
and constitutional undercurrents.  Politically, there were power struggles between the armed services; 
between various executive agencies and departments; between reformers inside and outside of 
government; and between the legislative and executive departments for control over the military 
establishment.
8
  Ideologically, reformers disagreed about the role America should play in the post-war 
world; the size and purpose of the defense establishment; the importance of peacetime planning and 
preparation for future military operations; the necessity of industrial mobilization to enhance national 
security preparedness; whether horizontal or vertical principles of organization should guide the 
consolidation of the armed services; and how best to distribute national resources between the military 
and non-military sectors of the economy (some scholars feared a lapse into prewar unpreparedness, 
others a monopolization of economic resources by the military).
9
  With respect to the constitutional 
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 As we will see later in this chapter, the legislation merged the Departments of War, the Navy and the Air Force 
(newly created) into the National Military Establishment; created the position of the Secretary of Defense to head 
the National Military Establishment; and established the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Research Board. 
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 As a new institutionalist working with a principle-agent framework, Amy Zegart focuses her attention on the 
bargains struck between key political actors in the final formulation of the legislation and  discounts the influence 
of principled arguments (Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JSC, and NSC (Stanford University 
Press, 1999). 
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 Two influential books in the 1930s argued that our separation of powers system was an obstacle to the 
president’s ability to carry out his responsibilities.  Our nation could only compete with our less open and 
democratic international competitors if significant changes were made to our constitutional system.  Decision-
makers, they argued, had to be further insulated from fractious, interest-group-driven democratic practices.  See 
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component of these debates, which is what interests us here, Douglas Stuart argues that the National 
Security Act of 1947 is best understood as “a dialogue about how best to adjust American values and 
interests to the non-negotiable demands of national security.”
10
  This is a fairly apt description.  But 
what is difficult to ascertain from primary and secondary sources is the extent to which this requisite 
adjustment of values to the non-negotiable demands of national security was understood to involve a 
recommitment to – or partial renunciation of – the political forms and principles on which our republic 
was founded. 
Let me suggest two plausible explanations for this ambiguity.  First, most of the participants in 
these debates – whether they supported the unification of the armed services or pushed for a set of 
new agencies and departments to address the enormous challenges of national security in the early Cold 
War era – claimed fidelity to the Constitution.  An unequivocal (and at times strident) allegiance to the 
Constitution, however, does not imply a familiarity with the nuanced arguments that went into its 
construction.  Many impressive thinkers, soldiers and politicians participated in these debates.  Despite 
an abundance and diversity of talent, however, there is no theoretical defense of the National Security 
Act of 1947 on par with The Federalist.  I do not mean to suggest this is surprising: there are few texts in 
the history of political theory that compare favorably with The Federalist.  What I want to point out is 
that participants in these debates generally articulated strong political preferences but did not couch 
their arguments for institutional reform in terms of devising republican remedies for distinctly 
republican diseases or balancing the requisites to energy and safety in the constitution of the executive 
department.  The basic question on the mind of most reformers was how to compete with the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
William Y. Elliot, The Need for Constitutional Reform: A Program for National Security (McGraw-Hill, 1935); and 
Arthur N. Holcombe, Government in a Planned Democracy (McGraw-Hill, 1935).  The extent to which such 
ideological arguments influenced reformers is difficult to determine, not least because World War II, as Melvyn 
Leffler points out, “resurrected faith in the capacity of the capitalist system to serve the welfare of the American 
people” (Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold 
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 Douglas Stuart, Creating the National Security State (Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 3. 
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organizational advantages of authoritarian regimes around the world without bankrupting the nation or 
turning it into a “garrison state.”
11
  The concerns of the Founders – the importance of connecting the 
interests of men with the constitutional rights of the place, for example, or the understanding that a 
power to advance the public interest always involves a discretion that can be abused
12
 – may have been 
in the back of the minds of some reformers, but these principles of institutional design are largely 
absent from the unification debates. 
 For the second plausible explanation, let me turn to an argument made by Douglas Stuart: 
    
Two clusters of related issues came to dominate wartime and postwar discussions about 
the new national security bureaucracy.  The first cluster of issues involved proposals for 
the unification of the armed services.  This was by far the most important topic for US 
defense planners, as well as the topic that was accorded the greatest attention by 
Congress, the president, and the media.  The second cluster of issues dealt with 
proposals for reform of the executive branch to improve political-military consultation, 
institutionalize intelligence gathering and analysis, enhance presidential management of 
resources affecting national security, and establish a more efficient system for 




The first cluster of issues, which focuses primarily on the structural relationships between the armed 
services, does not lend itself to a constitutional level of analysis.  The structure of the armed forces, to 
return to a distinction I introduced in an earlier chapter, is primarily a sub-constitutional issue.  But civil-
                                                           
11
 Aaron Friedberg convincingly explains why such a state never developed in the U.S.  See In the Shadow of the 
Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton University Press, 2000).  But it is 
understandable why many were concerned.  Michael Hogan and Douglas Stuart both argue that many defense 
reformers were motivated by the belief that the nation had to be prepared for a more or less permanent national 
security crisis.  See Michael Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 
1945-1947 (Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Douglas Stuart, Creating the National Security State (Princeton 
University Press, 2008). 
12
 For a list of “operational” rules for government reorganization distilled from the political theory of The 
Federalist, see Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of the Compound Republic (Institute for Contemporary Studies 
Press, 1987.  
13
 Stuart, p. 74. 
173 
 
military relations and national security decision-making – the central issues under investigation in this 
dissertation – invoke founding-era debates about the constitution of the executive branch and warrant a 
constitutional level of analysis.   What I want to emphasize here is not that organizational, 
administrative or management theory is inadequate to the tasks defense reformers set themselves, but 
that the intellectual tools that individual reformers choose to work with often reflects the nature of the 
problems they hope to mitigate.
14
  
 This chapter has five main sections: The Unification Debate, The Eberstadt Report, The 
“Constitutional Convention” of 1945-1947, The National Security Act of 1947, and Constitutional Theory 
and the National Security State.  Each of the first three sections corresponds with a distinct period in the 
debates that would eventually lead to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.  What began as 
a fairly narrow debate about the organization of the military would eventually encompass a much 
greater range of subjects and ambitions.  In these first three sections we will identify the particular 
problems that animated reformers and summarize the basic arguments they made in support of their 
proposals.  In the final section we will return to the relationship between the forms and principles 
advocated by defense reformers and the forms and principles defended by Madison and Hamilton in 
The Federalist.  
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The Unification Debate 
 
The Army was strongly in favor of unification.  Army Chief of Staff George Marshall took the early lead in 
promoting the unification plan and trying to usher it through the legislative process.
15
  A lack of unified 
command was the primary issue that vexed supporters of consolidation.  Unification of the armed 
services, it was argued, was the obvious, practical solution to the problems of inefficiency and 
duplication that resulted from the JSC committee system.  The organizational structures improvised 
during World War II may have enabled the Army, Navy and Air Force to cooperate reasonably well in the 
execution of their respective duties during the war, it was argued, but they would prove painfully 
inadequate during peacetime, especially with the impending contraction in the defense budget.  
Frustration with the functionality of committee systems was particularly pronounced among pro-
unification reformers.  Alias Huzar, an historian and political scientist who studied these debates as they 
unfolded, captures this sentiment well: 
 
If the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other committees could supply only slow and incomplete 
integration even under the pressure of war, the pattern of organization on which they 
were based cannot be expected to provide the integration that is desirable in 
administration, services, and supply – possibly even in operations – in time of peace 
when the cohesive force of a threat to the nation’s existence is absent and when the 
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 General Marshall formally recommended unification of the War and Navy Departments to the JCS in October, 
1943.  An early iteration of the Army’s unification plan was presented to Congress on April 24, 1944.  The 
Woodrum Committee held hearings on postwar military policy in mid-1944 and approved the principle of postwar 
unification of the armed services along the lines Marshall and other Army spokesmen had proposed (Proposal to 
establish a single department of armed forces: Hearings before the Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy, 




 session (Government Printing Office, 1944). 
16




To address this concern, reformers proposed merging the Army and Navy departments into a single 
department of the armed forces; replacing the secretaries of the two departments with a single civilian 
secretary, and replacing the JCS committee system with a general staff headed by an officer who would 
report directly to the president.  Separate land, sea and air components would exist within this unified 
structure, but they would not be assigned departmental status, which would have muddied the chain of 
command. 
At this early stage of the unification debates, General Marshall and his supporters appear to 
have been guided by a set of pragmatic concerns.  They believed that consolidation would improve the 
internal cohesion of the military and thus bolster the nation’s overall defense posture.  Pearl Harbor and 
World War II had convinced them that the existence of the separate services had led to unnecessary 
duplications, inefficiencies and waste.  President Truman, who was an ally of Marshall’s in the Senate 
and, as president, would play a prominent role in the later stages of these debates, wrote an article in 
Collier’s Magazine in 1944 in which he called attention to the fact that the United States had adjacent 
air installations in various locations because the Army did not have landing rights on Navy runways and 
the Navy did not have permission to land its planes on Army runways.
17
  In the absence of unification, 
the United States would end up with two separate, uncoordinated departments of defense (and 
ultimately a third, with the inevitable elevation of the Air Force to department status), and these kinds 
of inefficiencies would proliferate.  The commander in chief, he argued, should be supported by a new 
defense organization in which every element of the nation’s defense would be unified in one 
department under one authoritative head who reported directly to the president.  Committees like the 
JCS may be useful for generating ideas and providing a platform for different opinions, but they flounder 
when the participants cannot reconcile their differences.   
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Unity of command was the fundamental, organizing principle of the unification plan: it was 
assumed by supporters of unification that consolidation would work best both in the theater of 
operations and in the policy-making arena.  Unification in Washington would allow for increased 
centralization, and this, in turn, would enable a single civilian administrator, to whom the service chiefs 
would be subordinate, to make significant inroads against the problems of economic inefficiencies and 
service parochialism.
18
  The primary target of reformers was the unanimous-consent, JCS committee 
system.  The goal of reformers was to replace this coordinate system with a single secretary of the 
armed services who would be advised by the JCS and assisted by a group of staff officers.  Future wars 
were unlikely to conform to the simple, elemental partitions of past conflicts, and this meant that 
ground, sea and air forces would have to be employed simultaneously and with great coordination for 
operations to be effective.  President Truman would emphasize this point in a special speech before 
Congress in late 1945 that was designed to generate legislative momentum for the Army unification 
plan: “Even in the field our unity of operations was greatly impaired by the differences in training, in 
doctrine, in communication systems, and in supply and distribution systems, that stemmed from the 
division of leadership in Washington.”
19
  Only unification in a single department of the armed forces, 
under a single chief of staff, would allow for the kind of system-wide integration required. 
 The Navy resisted the push for unification.  In part this was because the Navy assumed that 
unification of the armed services posed a direct threat: the Army and Air Force were perceived as 
natural allies, and this alliance, if allowed to take root within a single department, would not only skew 
the competition for limited resources away from the Navy but lead to a streamlining of the armed 
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Unification, p. 70). 
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services in which the Navy would lose its aviation capacity to the Air Force and its ground forces (the 
Marine Corps) to the Army.
20
  The central goal of the Navy coalition was “preserving the Navy and all its 
constituent parts as they had developing during World War II, that is, a sizeable fleet based primarily on 
the naval air power of fast-carrier task forces and including a ‘Fleet Marine Force’ as the country’s 
combat-ready landing force and as the trustee and refiner of amphibious warfare expertise.”
21
  The Navy 
feared not only a diminishment in resources but also a strategic move away from sea-power, which, it 
believed, would both erode its status and prestige and put the nation at risk.  As Naval historian James 
Hewes explains, the Navy preferred “to continue the common direction of military and naval forces 
through cooperation under the JCS committee system.”
22
 
 Instead of unification and consolidation, the Navy and its supporters in the legislature wanted to 
preserve the system of coordination and consultation that emerged during the war.
23
  Paul Hammond 
argues that the Navy’s initial resistance was understandable: “The Army’s unification plan of 1944 was 
practically identical with the existing structure of the War Department, with three administrative 
commands under the Chief of Staff.”
24
  Army organization, in other words, was based on a vertical chain 
of command, while the Navy’s management structure was more decentralized.  The Army was also 
accustomed to relying on executive branch leadership to promote its interests, while the Navy had 
cultivated strong relationships with members of the legislature for the same purposes.  Unification, as a 
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result of this dynamic, would strongly favor the Army.  The fact that the Army and Navy had different 
surrogates in the government is why Stuart argues that “the postwar unification debate was part of a 




Navy spokesmen argued that the principle of coequal military services had served the nation 
well during World War II and should therefore be preserved.  Each civilian secretary and service chief of 
staff had been able to offer his opinion directly to the president and his peers during the war, and this 
had greatly improved the quality of military decision-making.
26
  Deliberative structures and horizontal 
decision-making had proven their merits.  To abolish the JCS committee system simply to put an end to 
differences of opinion struck Navy supporters as foolish.  Debate within the military, the Navy argued, 
should be encouraged.  Differences of opinion, rather than being frowned upon, should be debated, at 
length if need be, and this is precisely what the current system ensured.
27
  Admiral King defended 
separate service departments and the principle of cooperative decision-making when he argued before 
Congress that, as a nation, “we must, in the future, develop to the fullest extent the capacity of each 
branch of our military services because we must be adequately prepared to fight a war of whatever 
character the future may bring.”
28
  Granting one man the power to compel agreement was problematic.  
What protection would there be against this power being exercised arbitrarily?  Would not final 
decisions reflect partisan considerations rather than the collective wisdom of the armed services?  Unity 
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 As we will see in the next chapter, supporters of military reform in the 1980s placed little value in deliberative 
structures and horizontal decision-making.  The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 put a premium on the 
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  Quoted in Huzar, p. 301. 
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in the field may be necessary and desirable, but unity in Washington would be dangerous.  In the words 
of Charles Eliot, a scholar and journalist who participated in these debates, “It is submitted that the 
consultative system will be more flexible and adaptable than a system of centralized control, because it 
will be less dependent on individual prejudices and preconceptions and less vulnerable to the fixed idea 
of a single individual.”
29
 
The Army and Navy, of course, were not merely concerned with promoting their vision of the 
common good.  They were also concerned about the fierce competition that was likely to characterize 
the postwar era, and understandably wanted to be well positioned within the executive branch to 
promote their interests.  We should hardly be surprised by “the natural repugnance of the parties to a 
relinquishment of power,” as Madison put it in his notes, or by “a natural jealousy of its abuse in other 
hands than their own,” two of the principle difficulties incident to the formation of all power-sharing 
arrangements.
30
  But the parochial aspect of these debates, I would argue, has been over-emphasized in 
the literature.  To what extent did supporters and critics of unification disguise their real interests in the 
matter?  Here is a typical remark on the influence of service parochialism: 
 
Army spokesmen, who wanted unification because they thought it would provide them 
with a greater share of the defense budget, said they supported it because it promised 
greater efficiency and a stronger national defense. Navy spokesmen, fearful of being 
submerged by the larger army, held up the spector of a military takeover. They claimed 
that the job of directing the armed forces was too big for any one man; therefore, the 
civilian secretary would be forced to rely more and more on the military until eventually 
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Service parochialism certainly influenced these debates: attitudes toward unification must have been 
partly formed by estimates of how its provisions would impact the individual services.  But the existence 
of mixed motives does not diminish the extent to which these were also principled debates.
32
  Eliot 
offers what I would suggest is a more accurate assessment of the range of concerns that motivated 
reformers: 
 
We should not misunderstand this diversity of service opinion and we should not 
attribute it to mere jealousy.  Every officer of every service is anxious that the United 
States should remain strong and secure, and is firmly convinced that the contribution to 
be made to that strength and security by his particular service must not be weakened.  
And every one of them who has had any experience in budgetary matters knows that 
there is going to be a good deal of paring, and wants to be in a position to defend the 




There was certainly a principled side to this early round of defense reform debates.  The Navy disagreed 
with the Army assessment of the military’s performance in the recent war and was concerned that a 
single secretary would not be able to present the president with a balanced military point of view.  Each 
service had to be able to defend itself against encroachment, the Navy argued, and each service 
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(rather than informal) deliberative body might be able to improve the quality of decision-making.   More 
specifically, improve the process of adjustment and adaptation that is necessary to ensure that political ends and 
military means are closely aligned. 
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secretary needed to have direct, unrestricted access to the president.
34
  The proposed national military 
establishment would simply be too large and complex to be administered well by a single individual.  
The Navy position at this point in the unification debates was clear: unified action in the field, 
coordination in Washington.  
 
The Eberstadt Report 
 
The Navy’s initial response to the Army’s unification plan may have been primarily defensive – an 
attempt to refute the underlying logic for unification – but when Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal 
recruited Ferdinand Eberstadt, a management and administrative expert with wartime experience in 
mobilization and production,
35
 to study the unification matter within the broader context of national 
security, its range of concerns expanded well beyond a mere rejection of a military reorganization plan 
put forth by a competing service.
36
  Here are the three questions Eberstadt and his team set out to 
answer: 
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1. Would unification of the War and Navy departments under a single head 
improve our national security? 
2. If not, what changes in the present relationships of the military services and 
departments has our war experience indicated as desirable to improve our 
national security? 
3. What form of postwar organization should be established and maintained to 
enable the military services and other Government departments and agencies 





The Eberstadt Report was submitted to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs on May 15, 1945.  It not 
only rejected the logic that informed the Army’s unification plan but, as I mentioned, presented an 
alternative organizational plan for the postwar national security establishment.  Given the legacy of 
World War II and the immense national security challenges that lay ahead, Eberstadt and his colleagues 
argued that lawmakers needed to think not only about the wisdom of merging the service departments 
but about the importance of integrating all of the political, military and economic agencies that 
contributed directly and indirectly to national security into a formal system of coordination.
38
  A single 
department of national defense might help improve coordination between the services, eliminate 
duplication of efforts, and reduce overall appropriations for national defense, but it would not 
coordinate the efforts and plans of the military with other departments of government also concerned 
with national defense. 
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 What the unification plan ignored – and what national security most demanded – was the need 
for a broader, more encompassing organizational structure.  Instead of consolidation, the Army and 
Navy departments (along with a newly established Air Force Department), the report argued, should be 
tied together through formal links with military and non-military organizations.  This was an extremely 
ambitious proposal that did not merely flirt with state-building, as the unification plan did.  “Our present 
situation calls for action far more drastic and far-reaching than unification of the military services.  It 
calls for a complete realignment of our governmental organization to serve our national security in the 




The organizational form for our military services was only one – and not the most important – of 
the many questions that had to be urgently addressed.  National security preparedness depends more 
on establishing productive collaborate relationships between military and civilian agencies and between 
the public and private sectors than strictly between the military departments.  The following agencies 
would be at the center of this new integrated network: the National Security Council (NSC), the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the National Security Resource Board (NSRB), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
the Research and Development Board, and a Military Education and Training Board.  The NSC was the 
centerpiece of the proposal.  The council would include the Secretary of State and the secretaries of the 
three armed services, and be presided over by the President.  This is where overall political and military 
policy would be formulated and the execution of these policies properly coordinated. 
Political scientist Jeffrey Dorwart characterizes the underlying logic of the Eberstadt Report as 
follows: “The Eberstadt Plan advanced collaboration, coordination, and consultation among government 
agencies, between government and business, and between the military and industry through clusters of 
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formal and informal coordinating structures.”
40
  These formal and informal structures are what 
Eberstadt called “ligaments of coordination.”  The metaphor is apt: what troubled Eberstadt and his 
team most about the pre-1947 national security system were the perilous gaps between vital agencies 
and actors.
41
  Among the worrisome gaps were those between foreign and military policy; between the 
State Department and the military establishments; between strategic planning and its logistic 
implementation; between the JCS and the military and civilian agencies responsible for industrial 
mobilization; between and within the military services, principally in the field of procurement and 
logistics; between the executive and legislative branches of our government; and between the 
government and the people.
42
  The NSC was expected to do a great deal of heavy lifting in this context.
43
  
It was to serve as “a permanent vehicle for maintaining active, close and continuous contact between 
the departments and agencies of government responsible for our foreign and military policies, including 
formulation and coordination of such policies, the assessing and appraising of our foreign objectives, 
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The “Constitutional Convention” of 1945-1947 
 
Although two competing plans were now on the table, the overarching logic that should inform the new 
national security system was not in dispute: structural problems revealed during the war, the 
emergence of an increasingly large and unwieldy bureaucracy, and the magnitude of the national 
security challenges the nation would face in the aftermath of the war suggested to both sides of the 
reform debate that the various elements of the proto national security state had to be better 
coordinated.  Most participants in these debates agreed that the United States in the postwar period 
“would have to assume major peacekeeping functions, rebuild the world economy, and ensure 
international stability in the face of revolutionary unrest.”
45
  This substantial overlap contributed to a 
strong consensus on a number of key issues.  Whatever specific structural reforms were ultimately 
decided upon, both sides agreed that they needed to accomplish four things: facilitate the integration of 
foreign and military policy; improve military planning and preparedness; ensure greater unity of 
command in the field; and reduce waste in the overall budget of the armed services.
46
   
 Common ground proved much more elusive when it came to the particular kind of structures 
that would best achieve these goals.  President Truman and his supporters believed that replacing the 
JCS committee system with a general staff that worked directly under the president was the key 
innovation that would best prepare the United States to fulfill its political-military duties and 
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responsibilities in the postwar era.
47
  Eberstadt and his colleagues, in contrast, argued that unification 
would not only fail to work as advertised, but that there were serious gaps in the nation’s security 
structure that required a collection of new civilian and military agencies and departments to formulate 
and execute national security policy.   
 At this juncture in the unification debate, Truman attempted to draw upon his authority as 
president to accelerate the legislative process.  He tasked Secretary of War Patterson and Secretary of 
the Navy Forrestal with working out a compromise.  Certain organizational features of the new national 
security state were easily resolved: the final legislation would include a national security council, a 
national security resource board, and a central intelligence agency.  Huzar argues that a wide consensus 
had emerged with respect to the importance of these three agencies, though their final form remained 
in doubt.  Most reformers agreed that these agencies would “fill serious gaps in the nation’s security 
structure” and improve the “quality and the correlation of estimates of technological trends in weapons, 
political prospects of hostilities, and industrial mobilization required to wage war.”
48
  The issue that 
Patterson and Forrestal could not resolve was the original question of whether the armed services 
should be unified in a single department.
49
  This makes perfect sense: the two parties could not agree 
either to endorse or scrap unification because the principles at stake were central to their respective 
understandings of how organizations and democratic politics work.  Advocates and critics of unification 
believed that the strength and security of the nation would be enhanced by a reorganization of the 
executive branch included some degree of increased centralization.  Where the two sides of the 
unification debate parted ways was on the point at which increased consolidation and a streamlined 
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chain of command would begin to have an adverse impact on national security preparedness and 
policymaking.  
Why did Navy spokesmen invoke a man on horseback in their critique of the Army unification 
plan, claiming that a single military department presented a dangerous challenge to the Constitution?  
Why did they argue that a department of defense strong enough to unify the armed services would be 
so strong that it would pose a severe threat to civilian control of the military?  On the other side of the 
ledger, members of the Army coalition claimed that key features of the Eberstadt Report posed a 
dangerous threat to presidential authority and democratic institutions.  They argued that a defense 
establishment founded on collaborative principles would sharply erode democratic accountability.  How 
should we interpret and understand these remarks?  How are we to weigh the merits of these 
contradictory claims? 
 
1. Independence and Autonomy.  In hearings before the Senate Committee of Naval Affairs in 1945, 
Senator Robert Byrd wanted to know what “independent authority, if any, the Secretary for the Army, 
the Secretary for the Navy, and the Secretary for the Air Force have, independent of the control of the 
Secretary of Common Defense.”  Senator John Thomas, who was testifying before the committee as a 
proponent of unification, responded that they would be very independent actors in the new system.  
Senator Byrd pushed for specifics: “I am not speaking about what may be done, I am asking about the 
law.  We are going to pass a bill here.  I would like to know in the law, if possible, exactly the authority 
that the Secretary of the Navy has as an independent officer from the Secretary of Common Defense?”  
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Senator Thomas had to his emend his remarks: the secretaries for the individual services would in fact 
have to “carry out the will of the President and the Secretary at all times.”
50
 
If the Secretary of the Navy had no clear, formal authority, his informal powers would be 
vulnerable to usurpation.  Senator Byrd may have been partly concerned with the power and prestige of 
the Navy, but his inquiry also reflects a principled position.  Secretary Forrestal would carry on this line 
of questioning later in the hearings.  He was equally uncomfortable with the ramifications of a stream-
lined chain of command.  “I have deep misgivings about the danger of the concentration of such huge 
authority in the hands of one military man as this bill entrusts to the Chief of Staff.  Whether it be in 
business, government, or military operations, I mistrust the principle of relying on a single genius to 
make all basic decisions.”
51
  Whereas Byrd expressed a fear of a powerful civilian secretary, Forrestal 
here focuses on the danger of a single military chief.  An ambitious supreme Chief of Staff, he cautioned, 
could dominate his civilian counterparts and mold not only military policy to suit his ends, but national 
policy.
52
  Eliot was also suspicious of one-man rule under the president.  “No one man can have enough 
experience, specialized knowledge and wisdom to warrant building our military establishment on the 
basis of his single judgment.”
53
 
Eberstadt is perhaps the most persuasive opponent of the underlying logic of unification.  The 
JCS committee system under Roosevelt’s command, he believed, had proven its effectiveness.  “I am not 
                                                           
50





session, on S. 2044, a bill to promote the common defense by unifying the departments and agencies of the 
government relating to the common defense (Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 17-19. 
51
 Ibid., p. 38. 
52
 Ibid., p. 44.  Forrestal preferred a Director of the Common Defense with “supervisory jurisdiction.”  His models 
were Justice Byrnes, Mr. Vinson and Mr. Nelson, who had served President Roosevelt so honorably and effectively 
during the war.  “They did make decisions, but those decisions were not on a dictatorial or unilateral basis, they 
were made after listening to everybody whose interests were involved” (50).  He argued for a “coordinator” rather 
than an “overlord.” (p. 50). 
53
 Eliot, p. 271.  He follows this strong declaration against one-man rule, however, with a major qualification: “This 
is not to say, of course, that no one man can be qualified to be President of the United States.”  Statesmen of 
exceptional quality may also be rare, but the myriad imperfections of our presidents, he seems to want to believe, 
are largely muted and / or buttressed by our constitutional system of checks and balances.  “We do not extend the 
one-man idea any farther than we have to, and where we must use it we guard it carefully” (p. 271). 
189 
 
a student of military history, but I will say this, that I have never heard of strategic plans as brilliant as 
those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff both in conception and in execution.”
54
  He defended the strength of 
the JCS system on the grounds that it combined three essential organizational elements.  “First, each 
member, without domination or restraint, was able to present and to contend for his own views and to 
check over and criticize those of the others.  Second, when a final decision had to be reached, each had 
the duty and the power to join with the others in carrying it out.  And, finally, they had the authority to 
appoint theater commands to executive their plans and the responsibility of supervising their 
executive.”
55
  They were not, in other words, merely members of an advisory body with whom civilian 
leaders could choose not to engage. 
The Navy Department coalition insisted that the unification plan was based on a false premise:  
It did not differentiate between what was required in combat areas, which is unified command, and 
what was required in the planning and policy-making centers in government, which is deliberation and 
conference.  As Forrestal commented, an early draft of the final legislation still failed to respect the 




2. Presidential power and authority.  Truman was criticized by his opponents for his unflinching faith in 
the benefits of service unification and his inability to conceptualize the broader national security 
challenges that would face the United States in the aftermath of the war.  With these criticisms in mind, 
it interesting to note how Truman characterized the Eberstadt Report in his memoirs: 
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The principle thesis of the Navy’s proposal was that military policy must be tied in with 
national policy though the establishment of high-level agencies.  I endorsed fully the 
Navy’s emphasis on the need for some means of more effective meshing of military 
planning with our foreign policy, and agreed also that we needed to provide long-range 
plans for industrial mobilization consistent with the civilian economy.  In other words, it 
was clear to me that a national defense program involved not just reorganization of the 
armed forces, but actual coordination of the entire military, economic and political 




Given this strong endorsement of key principles in the Eberstadt Report – his support for a 
“comprehensive and continuous program of national security,” as he put it in his special message to 
Congress in 1945 – why was there still so much friction between the two reform camps?
58
 
 Truman and his supporters had two strong objections to the Eberstadt Report: they considered 
the arguments against unification as being partisan and suspect rather than innovative and constructive, 
and they were hostile to the idea of creating any kind of high-level executive agencies, committees or 
boards that might lead to the dilution of presidential power.   
Anyone with firsthand experience with how the separatist system functioned before and during 
the war, Truman argued, understood perfectly well that inter-service rivalry and conflict were 
impediments to forming a coherent and effective national security policy.  “We cannot have the sea, 
land, and air members of our defense team working at what may turn out to be cross purposes, 
planning their programs on different assumptions as to the nature of the military establishment we 
need, and engaging in an open competition for funds.”
59
  The problems with the current system were 
many.  The JSC committee system may have contributed to the successful prosecution of the war, but 
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committees that operate on the principle of voluntary cooperation are simply not good substitutes for a 
unified system of command.  Duplication and overlap within the services were unambiguous drains on 
limited national resources.  The President and the Congress should not have to reconcile the separate 
programmatic and budgetary claims submitted by the individual services.  The Eberstadt Report, which 
emphasized voluntary cooperation between the services, simply did not offer solutions to any of these 
pressing problems.  Truman was convinced that there was “enough evidence now at hand to 
demonstrate beyond question the need for a unified department.”
60
 
 Truman also believed that the proposed NSC and NSRB ran counter to the American elective 
system and borrowed too heavily from the European model of cabinet government.  He was adamant 
that the NSC not be granted (or be able to claim, after the passage of the legislation) any independent 
executive authority.  The idea of an associative state – a state in which “corporate elements and 
government cooperated to build interorganizational structures, design policy, create a public consensus, 
and guide legislative action” – was dangerous.  “Under our system the responsibility rests on one man – 
the President,” Truman wrote in his memoir.  “To change it, we would have to change the Constitution, 
and I think we have been doing very well under our Constitution.”
61
 
 Caraley suggests that the Army commitment to the principle of one-man decision-making played 
a significant role in these debates. “So strongly was this decision-making dogma adhered to by some of 
the Army generals that they were ready to criticize the effectiveness of the JCS during World War II 
almost as a matter of principle, even though they did not throughout the hearings take issue with the 
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content of a single one of the Chiefs’ strategic decisions.”
62
  But Truman seems less attached to Army 
tradition in this case than committed to protecting executive power.  As Senator Thomas replied to 
Senator Tydings when asked who would ultimately decide policies in the new national military 
establishment, “At no time do you get rid of the fundamental fact of our Constitution, because 




The National Security Act of 1947 
 
Here is the declaration of policy included in the final draft of the legislation: 
 
In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive 
program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of 
integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the 
Government relating to the national security; to provide a Department of Defense, 
including the three military Departments of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation 
and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force under the direction, authority, 
and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide that each military department shall 
be separately organized under its own Secretary and shall function under the direction, 
authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide for their unified direction 
under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense but not to merge these departments 
or services; to provide for the establishment of unified or specified combatant 
commands, and a clear and direct line of command to such commands; to eliminate 
unnecessary duplication in the Department of Defense, and particularly in the field of 
research and engineering by vesting its overall direction and control in the Secretary of 
Defense; to provide more effective, efficient, and economical administration in the 
Department of Defense; to provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant 
forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an 
efficient team of land, naval, and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of Staff 
over the armed forces nor an overall armed forces general staff.
64
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After two years of debates, which reorganization plan – which set of forms and principles – had the 
greater influence on the final architecture of the national security state?  Douglas Stuart argues that the 
legislation was “a major defeat for Harry Truman, George Marshall, and the other proponents of 
comprehensive military unification.”
65
  Richard Best concurs: “Eberstadt’s recommendations clearly 
presaged the eventual national security apparatus.”
66
  These scholars base this assessment on the fact 
that the legislation created a national defense establishment composed of three military departments, 
each represented by a service chief and civilian service secretary, and administered by the secretary of 
defense.
67
  The military was not unified; hence Truman suffered a major defeat.  Amy Zegart shares this 
opinion, arguing that Truman failed “in the face of intense interservice military conflict.”
68
 
As a constitutional theorist, I find these conclusions a bit puzzling.  Truman and his supporters 
may have lost the debate over military unification, but they were clearly victorious in the broader and 
much more significant debate over defense reform.  Hogan argues that we cannot characterize these 
debates as merely a power struggle between different individuals, agencies and institutions.  He 
emphasizes the “interplay of competing ideas and ways of thinking.” There were bureaucratic struggles 
and inter-department competition, but the two main camps presented “different designs for an 
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organizational framework that would meet political as well as military requirements,” and adopted 
“different strategies of state making.”
69
 
Charles Stevenson, who studied the National Security Act of 1947 closely and whose analysis I 
find persuasive, describes the legislation as a compromise between “advocates and opponents of a 
highly centralized military establishment, between supporters of a regularized process for interagency 
policymaking and defenders of Presidential prerogatives, and between an executive branch needing new 
legal authorities to deal with a postwar world and a Congress determined to maintain its special powers 
over the Armed Forces.” As a compromise, he concludes, the new law “disappointed most of the 
contending factions by falling short of what many advocates wished while going beyond what others 
considered acceptable.”
70
  This strikes me as an accurate description of the how the law was received 
and understood by participants in these debates.  But the fact that the bill reflects a compromise 
between two sets of preferences does not tell us much about how the constitutional issues at stake 
were resolved. 
The Eberstadt Report envisioned the NSC as a kind of war cabinet.  Had the NSC been granted 
such status – had it been assigned more than merely an advisory role in national security decision-
making – this would have violated Truman’s insistence on preserving presidential power and authority.  
On the question of whether lateral clearance or line command should inform the organization of the 
national security state, Truman and his supporters did not cede any ground to their opponents.  The 
Eberstadt Report recommended a national security council that would not merely serve the president:  
its authors pushed for a deliberative body that would discharge duties that, in a presidential system of 
government, would logically be assigned to a single department head working directly under the 
president.  The Eberstadt Report, as Paul Hammond points out, was inspired by a different theory of 
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government.  “Cabinet solidarity may be the cement of the British government, and interdepartmental 
committees may have certain uses, but the American Executive Branch is held together, if at all, by the 
authority of the President.”
71
  In the final legislation, the NSC was granted none of the independent 
power its advocates recommended.  The NSC, as a result of Truman’s understanding of the Constitution, 
was denied any policymaking or supervisory functions.
72
  Even the recommendation that the council be 
granted responsibility to bring matters to the attention of the president, rather than merely follow 
presidential direction, was rejected.
73
  The structures created by the National Security Act of 1947 may 
resemble those outlined in the Eberstadt Report, but the way power was ultimately distributed within 
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Constitutional Theory and the Creation of the National Security State 
 
Had attendees of the “constitutional convention” of 1945-1947 possessed a thorough understanding of 
the theory behind the Constitution, might they have thought differently about how best to constituted 
the executive branch?
75
  A constitutional theorist, I would suggest, would have unhesitatingly supported 
Truman’s defense of executive power.  Eberstadt and his supporters may have had a greater 
appreciation for the national security challenges the nation would face in the postwar era, and hence 
the need for a sharp increase in inter-governmental collaboration, but they did not justify the 
introduction of pluralistic elements into the constitutional of the executive branch with convincing 
constitutional arguments.  They were right to worry about the capacity of any single individual – be it 
the president, the civilian secretary of a unified military department or a supreme military chief of staff – 
to manage an extremely complex organization.  They were also right to doubt the ability of any single 
individual to correctly judge the threats the nation would face and choose wisely among the options 
available to meet these threats.  But Madison and Hamilton also worried about these same issues, as we 
know, and were nevertheless convinced that, as far as the balance between energy and safety in the 
executive was concerned, there was nothing more an enlightened and reasonable people could desire.
76
  
Supporters of the Eberstadt plan did not explain why additional safety measures might be required to 
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protect against the abuse of executive power or why the introduction of pluralistic arrangements in the 
executive department would not result in a loss of energy, secrecy, dispatch or decision. 
 Let me return to the question at the center of this dissertation.  Is there a constitutional solution 
to the problem of ensuring a relatively seamless fit between political goals and military means in a 
national security crisis?  This question directs our attention to the civil-military decision-making nexus, 
the top echelon of civilian and military leaders who plan and execute military actions. 
 Military historian Russell Weigley argues that the tradition of professional military subordination 
to civil authority was firmly established during the Civil War, and that it “reached a special flowering in 
World War II, only to erode as the post-1945 era carried the United States into military problems for 
which the historic American way of war had little prepared either soldiers or statesmen.”
77
  Not all 
military historians think the pre-1945 era was defined by civil-military harmony, but most agree that 
when military professionals had doubts about the quality of civilian leadership, they refrained from acts 
of direct insubordination.  But this tradition of military deference to civilian authority was partly a 
reflection of a parallel tradition of civilian deference to the military on operational matters.  What I want 
to suggest here is that civil-military relations before the creation of the national security state were 
characterized by a relatively clear division of labor between civilians and soldiers: civilians were 
responsible for identifying the goals of national security policy, and military professionals were 
responsible for choosing the appropriate means to achieve these goals.  The authors of the National 
Security Act of 1947 assumed that this clear division of labor would persist.
78
 
 What both sides in the unification debates failed to anticipate was the extent to which the 
internal power dynamics in a republic – not only the relationship between the legislature and the 
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executive but between civilians and soldiers inside the executive department – would evolve as its 
relationship to the outside world changed.  They were certainly sensitive to the degree to which our 
relative power in the international system had changed, but this did not lead them to reflect of the fact 
that our constitutional system was designed specifically for an insulated state.  To draw attention to this 
omission is not to criticize the participants in these debates.
79
  The founders of the national security 
state understandably did not ask themselves if it would be possible to increase a non-insulated state’s 
protection against the abuse of executive power without sacrificing executive energy.  They 
understandably did not debate the wisdom of introducing additional auxiliary mechanisms into the 
executive branch to protect against the violence of faction.  They understandably did not think about 
the merits of a formal process of adjustment and adaptation to ensure that political ends and military 
means would be adequately aligned in a national security crisis.   
 Ernst May, an expert on political-military consultation in the United States, argues that because 
the world is “as sensitive as a can of nitroglycerin,” it is essential that, “before executors of national 
security policy can decide what the nation ought to do, they must learn from political and military 
experts what the nation is able to do.”
80
  On the surface, this demand appears to be unexceptional.  Of 
course our statesmen need to consult with their political and military advisors before making important 
policy decisions.  Of course there needs to be a process of adjustment and adaptation between political 
ends and military means.  But what constitutional theory teaches us is that we should not expect 
statesmen to engage in deliberative processes on a strictly voluntary basis.  Voluntary associations may 
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199 
 
play a vital role in a democratic society, but volunteerism is not a principle in which constitutional theory 




The basic logic behind the Army’s original consolidation plan was compelling.  The improvised 
organizational structures that shaped the military’s response in World War II may have performed 
admirably at times, but they had obvious weaknesses, and reforms were necessary.  The competition 
between the individual services was responsible for unnecessary duplication and waste, and unification 
would eliminate these inefficiencies.  It would also ensure that a high level of coordination and 
cooperation would characterize the defense department whether the nation was at war or not.  The 
central principle at work here – unity of command – reminds us of Hamilton’s defense of the doctrine of 
the unitary executive.  As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, Truman believed that only unification in a 
single department of the armed forces, under a single chief of staff, would facilitate the kind of system-
wide integration necessary for the military to perform its duties admirably in times of peace and war.   
 The basic logic behind the Navy’s rejection of unification also has much to recommend it.  
Coordination and consultation – the principle of coequal military services – had an admirable track 
record: The JCS committee system, which proponents of unification wanted to abolish, had served the 
nation well.   Consolidating the services would grant one man the power to compel agreement and 
prevent civilian decision-makers from being exposed to disserting points of view.  Under a system of 
centralized control, proponents of unification feared that the individual prejudices and preconceptions 
at the center of the system would not be filtered through any kind of deliberative process.   
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 With the submission of the Eberstadt Report, the unification debate expanded to encompass 
the defense reform broadly speaking, rather than merely military reform, and appeals to the 
Constitution – if not the more nuanced constitutional theory on which our republic was founded – 
became frequent and impassioned.  If we want to improve our national security posture, its authors 
argued, all of the political, military and economic agencies and organizations that contribute to national 
security preparedness would have to be integrated into a single system.  Our new status as a world 
power meant that establishing formal relationships between civilian and military agencies, and between 
governmental and private institutions, were even more crucial than establishing formal relationships 
between the individual services.   
 How should a constitutional theorist evaluate the final form of the legislation that created our 
national security state?  What role, we could ask, did Madison’s theory of faction and Hamilton’s 
defense of executive energy play in the unification debates?  The executive branch needs to be strong 
enough to exercise its constitutional power in a national emergency.  This much everyone agrees upon.  
But even if we accept this premise, where are we to draw the line between what constitutes too much 
and too little power in the hands of the president?  The founders of the national security state, I would 
suggest, tiptoed around this boundary question.  They did not ask themselves when the risk of 
significant power being abused is greater than the danger of power insufficiently concentrated.
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7 The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 
 
 
Reorganization … decrees a change in organizational structure or jurisdiction as a beginning, and counts 
on this (and the shadow its prospect casts ahead) to alter the function in the desired direction or manner 
– whether correctly or not, we need not stop here to inquire: risks and uncertainties attend all courses of 
action. 
- Harvey Mansfield 
 
In retrospect, the Second World War still glows in the institutional minds of the armed forces not just 
because of the military victory, but because of the generally successful balance of judgment and power 
between Roosevelt and the JCS, between the individual members of the JCS and the theater 
commanders, and between the theater commanders and the Service component commanders. 
- Allen Millett 
 
The basic objective of any proposals for modifying the existing military organization of the country is to 
improve the caliber of military advice that the nation’s leaders receive.  What is good, sound, military 
advice?  To some officials it, unfortunately, means hearing the advice that the advised wants to hear. 




What I want to emphasize at the beginning of this chapter is that military reform is merely a component 
of defense reform.  Too many reformers conflate the two and end up arguing that military reform alone 
will solve problems that are at least partly the product of poor decision-making at a higher level of 
organization.  Most defense reformers – and almost all civilian defense reformers – are in fact military 





  But no matter how well organized the military may be – no matter how congenially the 
individual services work together; no matter how fine-tuned its joint operations; no matter how fiscally 
responsible its proposed budgets; no matter how adaptable its force structure; no matter how thorough 
and sophisticated its contingency planning; no matter how inspired its strategic vision – the 
performance of the military ultimately hinges on the wisdom of the tasks it is assigned to perform by the 
president and secretary of defense.
2
   
Soldiers who have served at the highest level of command are often quite sensitive to the 
distinction between defense and military reform.  They have operated through and within both military 
and defense structures, and experience has taught them that, as desirable as military reform may be, it 
is easy to overestimate what its positive impact will be on military performance.  Out of respect for their 
position in the chain of command, however, soldiers typically limit their engagement with defense 
reform to matters that pertain strictly to military reform.  In a system where soldiers are unequivocally 
subordinate to their civilian counterparts, and the norm of deference to civilian authority has been 
thoroughly internalized, we should hardly be surprised to learn that soldiers shy away from directly 
criticizing the president and secretary of defense or commenting on the broader constitution of the 
executive branch.  But this semi-voluntary abstention, though understandable, is nevertheless 
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 As I discussed in the previous chapter, in the debates leading up to the passage of the National Security Act of 
1947, military reform and defense reform were both subjects of discussion after the dissemination of the 
Eberstadt Report. 
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 Two edited volumes on defense reform capture the diversity of interests within the defense reform movement: 
Asa A. Clark IV, Peter W. Chiarelli, Jeffrey S. McKitrick and James W. Reed, eds., The Defense Reform Debate: Issues 
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 session (Government Printing Office, 1987). 
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unfortunate, since the relationship between the quality of civilian decision-making and the caliber of 
military performance should be at the center of defense reform debates.
3
    
 Is there an underlying assumption that unites most defense reformers?  Despite the many facets 
and complexities of the subject, the underlying assumption shared by most defense reformers is rather 
straightforward: reformers are united by the belief that the ability of military personnel to effectively 
advise, plan and conduct operations is impacted by US military organization, and that reorganizing the 
military in the proper manner will therefore improve how our nation prepares for and fights its wars.
4
  
We can understand why shifts in the international balance of power (real or imagined), as well as poorly 
executed military interventions, have won new generations of adherents to defense reform.  In theory, 
we should be able to identify problems with the system, adjust the organizational structure accordingly, 
and then sit back and enjoy the fruits of our intellectual labors (observe, in other words, a statistically 
significant rise in military performance over time). 
 This shared assumption about the causal relationship between military organization and military 
performance is why the focal point of most defense reorganization proposals between 1947 and 1986 
was the military chain of command.
5
  The military chain of command, one reformer commented, should 
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 I characterize the abstention of soldiers as being semi-voluntary because, in addition to the cultural and 
institutional pressures they face, soldiers may also refrain from engaging with defense reform in its broader 
context due to a lack of familiarity with constitutional theory, which, as I have been arguing in this dissertation, 
provides a unique set of conceptual footholds for a defense reformer. 
4
 Gordon Lederman identifies a slightly different assumption, and I include it here because it echoes arguments 
made about the performance of the national security system World War II which I touched upon in the last 
chapter.  “Implicit in the pro-reorganization position lay the assumption that DOD’s supposed weaknesses resulted 
from inadequate organization rather than incompetent personnel, meaning that these putative weaknesses could 
not be remedied by recruiting superior individuals for leadership positions.  According to this view, although 
superior individuals could devise ad hoc arrangements to compensate for the system’s structural problems, such 
arrangements were inherently unstable and depended on the meshing of personalities.  Establishing these ad hoc 
arrangements during a political-military crisis would delay decisionmaking, could cost lives, and ultimately 
undermine the national interest” (Gordon Lederman, Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater Nichols 
Act of 1986 (Greenwood Press, 1999), p. 34).  
5
 We will see later in this chapter that most reformers focus their attention on the relationship between military 
organization and military performance and ignore the relationship between the quality of civilian decision-making 
and the quality of military performance. 
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do two things very well: “provide truly objective military advice to the president and secretary of advice, 
particularly in the allocation of scarce resources, and plan operations in peace and execute them in 
war.”
6
  These are not particularly revolutionary demands or expectations, and as core principles in a 
debate on organizational reform they are abstract enough for even the most reticent reformers to 
embrace.  Even critics of the defense reform movement recognized that lines of command were not as 
transparent as they could be; that theater commanders did not occupy a sufficiently firm position in the 
chain of command; that the individual services played too dominant a role in the current system; that 
the service chiefs faced an insuperable conflict of interest as both representatives of services and 
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and that the joint staff was insufficiently joint and inadequately 
staffed.  But determining precisely which kind of reforms will improve the performance of our military – 
and do so without creating an acute and vexing set of new problems – is of course a far more 
contentious subject. 
 
Defense Reform 1947-1986 
 
James Forrestal was selected by President Truman to be our first secretary of defense.  His views on 
defense organization, as I mentioned in the last chapter, influenced the final design of the National 
Security Act of 1947.  Despite his original advocacy of a loose federation of the services, however, he 
was quickly frustrated by his lack of authority.  He had previously worried that a single strategic doctrine 
would come to dominate defense policy if the services were united under a strong secretary of defense.  
He had also been convinced that the future secretary “must be free to concentrate his efforts on the 
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establishment of broad policy” and, in doing so, “must look to the secretaries of the military 
departments for the information and data upon which his policy is to be based and then look again to 
them for the execution of these policies.”
7
  After a year in office, however, he was forced to revise his 
position and campaign for additional reforms.  Amendments to the National Security Act passed in 1949 
addressed the issues that had most frustrated Secretary Forrestal.  The critical problem he had faced as 
secretary had been the military’s inability to provide him with a consensus upon which to develop 
coherent strategic programs.  An additional source of grief was the rivalry between the services over 
roles, missions, and resource allocations.  Based on his personal experience, he became convinced that 
the secretary of defense needed more power in order to resolve these contentious issues.
8
 
 The Department of Defense was created in 1949, though an amendment to the 1947 National 
Security Act, and the department was placed at the center of defense policy planning so that the 
secretary of defense would have greater oversight over the services.  A chairman was also added to the 
JCS, based on the assumption that a chairman would be able to speak for the military as a whole if he 
were not beholden to a particular service.  The chairman, untainted by service loyalties and empowered 
to speak on behalf of the entire military, the reasoning went, would be in a better position to provide 
the president and the secretary of defense with quality advice.  Two amendments to the National 
Security Act passed in the 1950s, and they focused on the same two interrelated issues that had 
dominated the previous round of reorganization debates: first, decentralized decision-making processes 
were deemed major impediments to effective policy making; and, second, the president and secretary 
of defense needed more control over the military if the United States was to deal effectively with 
external threats.  Despite these amendments to the National Security Act of 1947, each of which was 
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 James Forrestal, Letter to Chairman Chan Gurney, quoted in Gene M. Lyons, “The New Civil-Military Relations,” 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 1 (1996), p. 54. 
8
 Forrestal’s diaries are rich in observation, intelligence and personality.  He was certainly a very complicated man 
who wrote privately about a very complicated period in American history.  James Forrestal, Walter Mills, ed., The 
Forrestal Diaries (Viking Press, 1951). 
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intended to increase the power of the secretary of defense relative to the JCS, civilians leaders in the 
Eisenhower administration were still convinced at the end of the 1950s that inter-service rivalry was the 
greatest obstacle to successful strategic and tactical planning.
9
 
 What was the cumulative effect of these acts and amendments?  The major implication of these 
reforms, Gene Lyons argued in the early 1960s, was to “shove the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military 
departments to the periphery of operational decision-making in Washington.”
10
  Richard Betts, writing 
fifteen years later, largely concurred: with the unification of the services under a civilian secretariat in 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which came as a result of the 1958 reorganization of the 
Department of Defense, “The Chiefs undeniably still had a large amount of influence, but in relative 
terms they had much less than they had previously.  Although they were still influential in budget and 
procurement decisions, in decisions on the use of force there were usually more powerful advisers, of 
the stature of the secretary of state or senior members of Congress, to counteract their prestige.”
11
  As 
military historian Allan Millett explains, over the course of the Cold War, the United States government 
“embedded military operations in an organizational structure that progressively reduced the autonomy 
of commanders and increased the likelihood of civilian intervention into the preparation and execution 
of military plans.”
12
  The relative influence of civilian and military leaders in national security 
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policymaking clearly shifted toward civilians, and by design.
13
  Did this recalibration have a positive 
effect on military preparedness and performance?  Centralization may have been necessary to reconcile 
the tension between our growing international responsibilities and limited financial resources during the 
early years of the Cold War.  Moderating the influence of service parochialism and rivalry may also have 
been necessarily to accelerate the move toward unified military commands.
14
  But supporters of these 
amendments did not think they went far enough to correct these problems, and critics worried about 
the unintended consequences of another round of military reorganization.  
 
The Case for Defense Reform 
 
As I already mentioned, there were many critics of the national security system, and many causes to 
which reformers were drawn.  The literature is impressively large and diverse.
15
  But in this dissertation 
we are interested in arguments made by reformers that have a direct impact on crisis decision-making.  
Despite earlier amendments to the National Security Act of 1947, most reformers in the early 1980s 
were critical of two trends: the negative impact of service parochialism on military performance, and the 
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poor quality of advice that moved up the chain of command, from military leaders to civilian leaders.  
On these subjects, the most reformers who presented the most compelling arguments, I would suggest, 
were two soldier-scholars, General David Jones and General Edward Meyer. 
 
1. The need for a military counterbalance to the individual services.  Since the passage of the 1947 
National Security Act, the United States has never been without critics of its defense establishment.  The 
number of major government investigations and reports is indeed impressive.  In this respect it is a bit 
misleading to credit any particular reformer (or any particular national security event, for that matter) 
with being the catalyst for this round of defense reform debates.  But prior to General David Jones’s call 
for reform in early 1982, the defense reform community was dominated by civilians outside of 
government and was very much a fringe movement.
16
  General Jones’s proposals lent the reform 
movement an urgency and legitimacy it had not previously not possessed.
17
 
General Jones begins his critique of the defense establishment with a few striking examples of 
how the services have resisted new ideas and technological innovations over the years because they did 
not fit neatly into existing service concepts.
18
  These examples – among them the Navy’s determination 
to build new sailing ships after the superiority of steam power had been clearly established and the 
requirement of the Army Air Corps that its officers wear spurs well into the 1930s – point to the absurd 
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and potentially deleterious impact of custom and tradition on decision-making within the individual 
armed services.
19
  Once we combine the adverse impacts of custom and tradition with the pathological 
nature of all large bureaucracies – the Department of Defense being as large and unwieldy as they come 
– we can easily imagine why a former chairman of the JCS might be an advocate of reform.  “We do not 
think through our defense problems adequately, and we are getting less capability than we should from 
our increased defense budgets,” he argued. As a result, there is reason to believe that “faced with a 
contingency requiring a major joint operation, our performance would be below the level we should 
expect or need.”
20
   
General Jones draws three clear lessons from our military history.  We have been generally 
“unprepared at the onset of each new crisis or war;” have suffered a series of “initial failures” in these 
conflicts; and have been forced to “reorganize our military while at war.”
21
  We have prevailed in wars 
past not because we have a particular gift for strategy and tactics, he suggests, but because we have had 
the luxury of time and resources on our side and have been able to wear down our opponents.  
To which specific structural flaws does he attribute this level of unpreparedness?  His basic 
argument is that the “balance of influence within the defense establishment is oriented too much 
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toward the individual services.”
22
  It is a delicate balance, he acknowledges, but the right set of reforms 
would promote a national perspective within the military without diminishing service autonomy to a 
detrimental degree.
23
  The excessive influence of service parochialism: this is the point on which 
moderate and radical reformers could agree, and it is because of this consensus that the organization of 
the JCS was the center of attention in this round of defense reform debates.
24
  If the high command 




General Jones had more modest goals.  He wanted to shift the delicate balance of power within 
the military system away from the individual services.  The centerpiece of his reform proposal was 
therefore a stronger chairman of the JCS.   The consequences of a weak chairman of the JCS, he argued, 
were felt throughout the entire national security system.  In the annual competition within the military 
for financial resources, for example, individual service needs too often take precedent over joint 




 Many scholars are not as nuanced in their criticism of the military.  As John Oseth explains, some of these critics 
argue that the military suffers from an “insidious disability” – “a reflexive instinct for institutional self-protection 
and concern for self-advancement … at all levels from service staffs in the Pentagon to fire-teams and gun crews in 
line units” (John Oseth, “An Overview of the Reform Debate,” in Robert J. Art, eds., Reorganizing America’s 
Defense (Pergamon and Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1985), p. 51).  
24
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25
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operations and inter-service issues.
26
  As a consequence, the gap between stated military requirements 
and resources allocated to the military – the “strategy force mismatch” – is indefensibly wide.  No one 
inside the military high command other than the chairman is in a position to honestly broker a fiscally-
responsible military budget – the other members of the JCS are the heads of their services and members 
of the JCS, which raises the problem of “dual hatting” – and yet the chairman has only a small staff to 
help him differentiate between service essentials and service luxuries.
27
  “The result of this tedious 
process is a defense budget that is derived primarily from the disparate desires of the individual services 
rather than from a well-integrated plan based on a serious examination of alternatives by the civilian 
and military leadership working together.”
28
  A stronger chairman would be able to discipline the budget 
system and be in a position to make very tough choices about which programs to prioritize given limited 
resources.  
General Jones wanted a “military counterbalance to the separate services.”  This does not mean 
he recommended an entrenched general staff of military elites.
29
  He wanted to strengthen the 
chairman of the JCS in order to create greater incentives than presently existed for officers to escape the 
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confines of service-oriented thinking.  He wanted to alter the structure and power dynamics of the 
present system in order to promote a national perspective within the military.  Budgetary advice, he 
argued, should cut across the services and transcend individual service loyalties and biases.  Incentives 
for military decision-makers should be structured so that the military produces officers with broader 
inter-service experience (part of the process of creating better strategic thinkers).  Decision-making 
spaces should be opened up with the current JCS structure so that the chairman does is not quite so 
beholden to the present committee system and can act with genuine independence in particular 
circumstances.   
 
2. The need to improve the quality of military advice.  General Meyer, a former Army chief of staff, was 
another early and influential advocate of reform to come from the military ranks.
30
  Although he was a 
strong supporter of the Joint Staff system, he was convinced that “grave new dimensions to the 
problems of national security have occurred since the creation of the Joint system,” and that these new 
developments, all of which revolved around the “dramatic” gains of the Soviet Union, “cast serious 
doubts on whether the system as presently constituted can ever be made to work.”
31
   
The logic that animated General Edward C. Meyer’s call for reform of the JCS system was a 
mainstay in the defense reform literature.  The Soviet Union’s “radically improved” military capabilities – 
its ability to “mount and sustain a rapid offensive, be it nuclear or conventional” in several theaters 
simultaneously – has dramatically changed the correlation of forces between the Soviet Union and the 
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  We are simply no longer in a position militarily to counter Soviet aggression.  We do not 
have weeks and months to respond to an attack, as our nation once did.  Changes in military technology 
have condensed this deliberative period to days and hours.  The JCS system is therefore under much 
greater pressure than in the past.  It is no longer feasible for each individual Chief to work with his peers 
to develop a coherent defense posture and to provide adequate leadership and direction to the 
particular branch of the armed services he represents.
33
  In addition to the problem of limited response 
time (and therefore a greater need for Chiefs to spend a greater percentage of their time on national, 
rather than service related issues), the JCS system has been burdened by what he calls an explosion of 
lawmaking, regulation and queries from congressional staffs.  The time available to Chiefs for strategic 
reflection and planning has been severely curtailed.  “It is therefore necessary,” he argues, “that we 
review and repair the way we organize for war.”
34
  The JCS method of military organization, he argued, 
was no longer adequate.  A chief simply no longer has the time and energy to simultaneously lead his 
service and direct joint activities.
35
  Major reforms, he insisted – and not merely evolutionary 
adjustments to the current system – were needed to meet this challenge. 
 What most troubled Meyer was the poor quality of professional military advice that went into 
national security decision-making.  “Today’s system fails to provide the quality of professional military 
advice necessary to ensure that elected and appointed civilian leadership have an adequate 
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understanding of the military impact of their decisions,” he argued.
36
  The military’s central role in arms 
negotiations, strategy and operations puts extreme demands on the time of the JCS, and Meyer thought 
this range of responsibilities should be narrowed so that military officers could “focus their attention on 
the critical issues which face our nation and our forces.”
37
  Two structural changes, he believed, were 
essential: strengthening the position of the chairman and the combatant commands (CINCs).  General 
Meyer was passionate about reform in part because he had a great deal of faith both in the ability of 
military leaders to identify the right course of action in an emergency and to persuade civilian leaders to 
follow their advice.  He thought, for example, that if senior military leaders had been free to devote all 
of their time and energy to the Lebanon crisis in 1982, instead of being bogged down in managerial 
responsibilities, they would have been able to present the Reagan with a stronger case against 
intervention and may well have convinced the president to act differently. 
 General Meyer was frustrated with the flagrant disconnect between the responsibilities placed 
on members of the JCS system and the time available to them to meet these demands.  But he was also 
sensitive to the perspective of his civilian counterparts: an overtaxed JCS system resulted in a lack of 
integrated military advice on defense planning in Washington and insufficiently joint military operations 
in the field.  This leads to a very clear and unambiguous statement of why he believes reform of the JCS 
system is essential: “Today’s system fails to provide the quality of professional military advice necessary 
to ensure that elected and appointed civilian leadership have an adequate understanding of the military 
impact of their decisions.”
38
   
 Before we turn to critics of the defense reform agenda, let me juxtapose the arguments of 
General Jones and General Meyers and highlight an important point of divergence.  General Meyer 
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believed that if better advice moved up the chain of command, the president and secretary of defense 
would recognize the quality of this advice; be naturally persuaded by the knowledge and experience 
that informed it; and act accordingly.  General Jones also believed that the military could provide the 
president and secretary of defense with better advice and recommendations on a host of issues if the 
military was modestly restructured.  But unlike General Meyer, he was skeptical about the extent to 
which his reform proposals would improve military performance or, more broadly, national security 
decision-making.  If a military counterbalance to the individual services can be established through 
institutional reform, this would certainly pay dividends.  But General Jones did not assume, as General 
Meyer’s did, that a military purged of its service-biases would inevitably have a greater influence on 
civilian decision-makers.   
 
Critics of the Defense Reform Agenda 
 
The military chain of command that flows down from our commander-in-chief to our newest military 
recruits has three primary functions.
39
  First, it must allocate resources wisely and efficiently.  This 
function of the chain of command has been severely criticized by almost all students of defense reform.  
Second, it must serve as a smooth conduit of orders and guidance: at each node in the chain of 
command, orders and guidance from above must be properly executed and a new set of orders and 
guidance, consistent with what was received, must be passed on to subordinates.  This performance of 
the chain of command in this capacity was also widely criticized.  The third primary function of the chain 
of command is no less vital than the two already mentioned, and yet it tends to draw the least 
attention.  No matter how well the chain of command allocates resources, and no matter how well it 
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facilitates the dissemination of orders and guidance, the ultimate success of the system hinges on the 
quality of decision-making at the top of the chain of command.  All military reformers recognize the 
importance of high-quality advice and recommendations moving up the chain of command. Few of 
these reformers, however, concern themselves with what happens to this information once it reaches 
its final destination.  Here, then, is the seemingly intractable problem: a nation cannot choose its wars 
wisely or fight them competently if good advice does not move up the chain of command, and yet it is 
equally important from the perspective of wisdom and competence that this advice is thoroughly 
absorbed and digested by the civilian decision-makers who sit authoritatively at the top of the chain of 
command. 
 Despite the ideal of a two-directional chain of command, the absorb-and-digest part of the 
equation is almost entirely neglected by advocates of defense reform.  How do we explain this apparent 
bracketing off of such an influential variable by defense reformers and national security experts?  Part of 
the explanation for this omission, I would suggest, can be attributed to the widely held assumption that 
all of the constitutional issues related to executive power and national security had already been settled 
– that constitutional theory, in other words, has nothing to contribute to defense reform.
40
  But this 
understanding about the limited utility of constitutional theory is mostly implicit in the literature.  The 
pervasiveness of two interrelated assumptions, I would suggest, explains why reformers focus on 
military reform rather than broader subject of defense reform.  Most defense reformers assume that a 
causal link between structural military organization and combat performance can be established.  They 
also believe that the primary problem with how the defense system functions is that the military high 
command does not produce the kind of good and timely advice that the president and secretary of 
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defense require.  The logic appears compelling: if we can improve the quality of advice that moves up 
the chain of command, we will see a system-wide improvement in the performance of our defense 
establishment.  
 
1. Can a causal link between structural military organization and combat performance be established?  
Military reform movements would not generate much support if there were not a fair number of 
observers who believed that the system was on the brink of failure.  To be more specific, they would 
need to believe that the system had failed repeatedly (and therefore predictably) in the past and that 
future challenges would strain the system even further.  The perception of failure is certainly a powerful 
agent of change in the political world, and it is often a necessary agent for overcoming political and 
bureaucratic inertia.  But defense reformers face a challenge much greater than they seem to realize: it 
is not enough to merely identify examples of flawed military actions or to convince us that security 
threats exist that our military as presently constituted is unprepared to meet.
41
  Reformers would only 
be justified in arguing for a particular set of military reforms if they can demonstrate a clear causal link 
between structural military organization and combat performance.
42
 
 If the military chain of command does not work particularly well, as many critics have argued, 
then improvements would naturally be in order.  It is the responsibility of military professionals, after all, 
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to advise, plan, and conduct military operations, and the military chain of command is what enables 
them to meet these diverse responsibilities.  If the quality of advice, planning or execution is deemed 
inferior by soldiers or civilians, the constitution of the chain of command would be a logical magnet for 
criticism.  But how easy is it to assess the performance of the military chain of command?  How 
confidently can we assign responsibility to this or that node in the chain of command for a particular 
military failure?   
 Most reformers – and almost all civilian reformers, interestingly – are convinced that such a link 
between military organization and performance exists.  They are not quite as suspicious of this causal 
relationship as Allan Millett, who humbly writes that assessing the “organizational impact of military 
success and failure is a task that should make any military historian quake.”
43
  Merely to begin such an 
assessment, he argues, a scholar must disentangle numerous explanatory variables from the equation – 
among them enemy plans and initiatives; a host of environmental factors; the capabilities and 
limitations of our forces from a personnel perspective; levels of technology; and the unique character of 
our field commanders – and proceed to give each variable its appropriate weight.
44
  Another student of 
defense reform echoes this sentiment.  “Proposals for reform and the resulting counterarguments,” 
Timothy T. Lupfer writes, “are essentially judgments about what major factors affect military 
performance.”  He argues that we must attempt to “identify the dominant cause-and-effect 
relationships that are suggested by the evidence,” but of course it is highly unlikely that scholars with 
different ideological or doctrinal orientations are going to agree on what the evidence suggests.
45
  How 
can we conclude from the Vietnam War, the Iranian hostage crisis, the bombing of the Marine barracks 
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in Lebanon and the invasion of Granada, as most reformers do, that the fundamental problem brought 
to light by these flawed operations is the organization of the military?
46
   
 Most reformers do not share Millett’s respect for the tremor-inducing nature of historical 
interpretation.  They also seem largely immune to Bernard Brodie’s warning about the relationship 
between history and politics: “One of the few unequivocally sound lessons of history is that the lessons 
we should learn are usually learned imperfectly if at all.”
47
  As a consequence, increased centralization of 
civilian and military authority in defense department – in effect, placing greater decision-making power 
in the hands of a small group of civilians in the executive branch, based on the assumption that the 
military is fundamentally incapable of presenting an objective and insightful point of view on crucial 
matters of national security – becomes the antidote to a problem – the excessive influence of the 
individual services – that may only be tangentially related to military performance.
48
  Past consolidation 
efforts did not meet the expectations of reformers: in the aftermath of reforms, most pro-reform 
advocates were still been disappointed with the performance of the military.  The most common 
explanation for these unmet expectations is that petty politics weakened reform proposals that would 
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 session, (Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 182).  Brent Scowcroft also de-
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have eliminated organizational deficiencies and produced better results on the battlefield.  I would like 
to suggest that the most salient problem with our military is not that insufficient power and authority is 
concentrated at the top of the chain of command.   Centralization has been confused with the kind of 
anti-parochial “nationalization” reforms that Madison, Hamilton and their fellow founders adopted to 
diminish the influence of state legislatures and create a national government that could promote the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community with some consistency.  
“The most obvious product of Cold War defense organization,” Millett writes, “is the number of 
political appointees and civil servants who deal with routine business that would have been defined as 
service matters before World War II.”  He recognizes that the growth of civilian activism may be 
perfectly compatible with democratic principles and may even be essential component of a well-
functioning democratic regime, but he is also sensitive to its dangers.
49
  The organizational complexity 
we now see is “a façade created in part to give a false sense of rationality and legitimacy to official 
actions, and accepted in part because it tends to diffuse responsibility for decisions gone wrong.”
50
  The 
crux of the problem, in Millett’s opinion, is not military organization, though he believes that modest 
reforms could prove useful.  What troubles him about the “reform lobby” is that it does not appreciate 
the extent to which the performance of the military is always to some extent a reflection of the quality 
of decisions made by civilians.
51
  Cold War military operations, “ranging from active combat to 
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‘presence’ and ‘show of force’ activities smacking of diplomatic metaphysics, have not yet shown any 
real susceptibility to organizational solution.”
52
  As a student of American military history, Millet is far 
from convinced that the military is always deployed intelligently.  Intra-service relations, inter-service 
relations and civilian-military relations are three organizational variables that clearly have some 
influence on military performance, but precisely because the causal relationships are ambiguous we 
cannot afford to leave key variables out of our analyses.    
 Another skeptic of the causal relationship between military organization and military 
performance is Robert Murray.  “Defense reform,” he writes in a tone that is far from reverential, “is 
one of the nation’s hardy perennials among debaters.”
53
  Murray draws our attention to a paradox that 
eludes the radar of most reformers: how can the quality of our armed forces be very high, as many 
defense experts have observed, while at the same time we continue to suffer operational failures?  In 
their enthusiasm for military reorganization, reformers tend to forget that wars are lost by statesmen 
and civilian decision-makers at least as often as soldiers.  The fact that so many reformers ignore the 
contribution of civilians to military failures helps explain why the JCS ends up bearing the brunt of the 
criticism for uninspiring military performances.
54
  Even though the Congress historically believed that “a 
diversity of military opinion was better than a single military voice, and that the cost of this (in terms of 
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efficiency) was preferable for our democracy,”
55
 reformers seem convinced that a single military voice – 
one of the fundamental goals of structural reform – would transform our civilian leaders into 
sophisticated strategists and free our military leaders to win the wars they are asked to fight.   
 Reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff system may indeed be desirable.  “Modest reform,” Murray 
wrote, and most critics of reform would concur, “can be accomplished without threat to democratic 
values.”  But the major deficiencies of the system, he cautions, “lie mainly outside the organizational 
chart.”
56
  The dangerous aspect of many reform proposals, I would submit, is that they conflate the 
issues of military and political leadership and, as a result, display excessive faith in the benefits of 
military reform.  Not only would some of the more radical reform proposals not fix the “problems” they 
are designed to remedy, they might very well exacerbate them.  What constitutional theory teaches us – 
and why I believe it can make a valuable contribution to contemporary defense reform debates – is that 
it is very difficult if not impossible to draw impermeable boundaries between subcomponents of a 
political system – the national security system in this case – as most defense reformers tend to do.  An 
analysis of the decision-making processes that transpire outside the organizational chart must be 
conducted in conjunction with an analysis of the processes conducted inside. 
 
2.  Is the primary problem with the defense system that good and timely advice fails to make it up the 
chain of command?  In my opinion, the most compelling arguments during this round of defense reform 
debates were made by General William Y. Smith.  General Smith was a defense reformer with strong 
reservations about the purported benefits of most military reform proposals.  The system can be 
improved, he argued, but those who claim that it is completely dysfunctional do not understand its 
purpose or design.  Smith was an advocate of incremental evolution rather than revolutionary change, in 
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part because he was unusually sensitive to the politics of national security and wanted to encourage 
modest, evolutionary reform without generating “opposition of a determined nature that may frustrate 
more modest, very worthwhile and consequential advances.”
57
  A pragmatic approach to reform led him 
to offer recommendations that respected two basic reform criteria.  First, the chain of command should 
be fine-tuned in order to reduce confusion and uncertainty.  Second, the type of advice rendered to the 
president, NSC and secretary of defense by senior military advisors should address the most difficult, 
contentious issues within the military, rather than merely what is most amenable to consensus, and it 
should be guided by fidelity to the principle of unified military thought and action, rather than catering 
to the particular concerns and perspectives of the individual services. 
These two goals would be accomplished, he suggests, by ensuring that unified and specified 
commanders are active participants in the decision-making processes that directly impact the 
performance of the forces under their command; changing the incentive structure for officers that serve 
with the joint staff so that joint duty is highly coveted and rewarded within the individual services; 
increasing the authority of the chairman of the JCS relative to the service chiefs; and lightening the 
administrative load of the chiefs so they can focus on strategic thinking and other more substantive 
issues.  If authority were concentrated in the chairman of the JCS and unified and specified 
commanders, we would see a marked improvement in the “issuance of guidance and orders,” as well as 
“military decisionmaking in peace and war.”
58
  Field commanders with greater authority and influence 
would improve the quality of information and advice moving up the chain of command, while abolishing 
the principle of unanimity in the JCS by strengthening the chairman would make JCS advice to the 
president and secretary of defense sharper and more persuasive. 
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Based on the arguments I have presented so far, General Smith’s recommendations appear to 
be compatible with the Jones and Meyer proposals mentioned above.  All three soldier-scholars agree 
that service parochialism has had a negative influence on the performance of the system and that good 
and timely advice on military matters does not always make it up to the top of the chain of command.  
But General Smith addresses an equally pressing problem with the overall structure of the defense 
system that most reformers neglect to address and that, he believes, ultimately has a greater impact on 
military performance.  Military reform, he argues, must be considered in the larger context of defense 
reform.  “Any change in the chain of command,” General Smith argues, “must not be so focused on 
streamlining that it ignores the need for broadly based input and for as broad a consensus as possible in 
the decisionmaking process.”
59
  General Smith understands that the function of the joint chiefs and the 
chairman is to “render impartial, objective military advice to their civilian superiors.”
60
  At the same 
time, he knows from personal experience that we cannot assume that when the military renders high-
quality advice up the chain of command it is received by civilians who are willing and able to incorporate 
this advice into their various calculations and assessments.  General Smith is too familiar with the 
politics of national security to assume that the only “parochialisms” that threaten the rationality of the 
defense system lie on the military side of the civilian-military partnership. 
An admirable sensitivity to the power dynamics within the executive branch – and not merely 
within the military – is what led him to argue that the chairman of the JCS should be an advisor to the 
NSC, rather than a statutory member of the body.  He wanted to protect against the chairman being 
perceived as a member of the administration’s political team, which is undoubtedly what would happen 
if he served with the vice president and secretaries of state and defense on the NSC.  “It is not 
inconceivable” – this is the kind of observation that suggests that he thought constitutionally about 
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defense reform even if constitutional theory was not a part of his formal education – “that the selection 
of a chairman under such conditions could become politicized, as each administration would want to 
make certain that it had a chairman fully compatible with and supportive of its outlook and objective.”
61
  
These are the words of a soldier who does not want the military to be portrayed as hostile to the 
principle of civilian control of the military.  “The temptation to dismiss the existing chairman and appoint 
its own man,” he elaborates, “would be great for an incoming administration, and the time-honored 
system of impartial, objective military advice would be threatened.”  He knows the problem – that the 
military is completely subservient to the executive and that ambition is not made to counteract 
ambition in the case of civilian-military relations – but does not propose a solution.  “What precise role 
do the civilian authorities want to retain to themselves, and give to the military?  How much freedom 
and independence in both formulating and implementing the strategy do they want the military to be 
allowed?  To my knowledge, there is not yet wide agreement on these points.”
62
 
Millett, Murray and General Smith all agree that the major flaws with the national security 
system will not be eliminated by military reform alone.  The JCS could be reorganized so that the 
chairman and chiefs were more effective – so that a national military perspective achieves dominance 
within the military high command – but this in no way ensures that non-parochial military advice will be 
properly integrated into national security decision-making.  If we are concerned with the quality of 
national security decision-making, “Realignment of the joint chiefs and the military chain of command 
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would be but a small beginning.”
63
  Here is a soldier-scholar who confidently identifies a problem with 
the national security system as a whole – who knows that “good, sound, military advice” is hard to 
define and that to a great many civilian leaders it means merely “hearing the advice that the advised 
wants to hear”
64
 – but accepts this situation as largely inevitable because he cannot conceive of a 
practical alternative.   
 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act 
 
To briefly review the material I have covered in this chapter so far, there was a general consensus 
among reformers and critics of the defense reform agenda that the influence of the four services on 
national security decision-making processes was excessive.  As long as members of the JCS were forced 
to compete with each other for resources and prestige, it was assumed, civilian leaders would lack the 
independent military advice they need to fulfill their job responsibilities.  There was also general 
agreement that the structure of the military chain of command was an impediment to sound national 
security policy generation and execution.  A final subject on which a broad consensus existed was the 
need to place greater emphasis on joint planning and combined operations within the military system.
65
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 Smith, p. 326.  Richard Betts is equally sensitive to the complex relationship between the quality of military 
advice moving up the chain of command and the quality of national security decision-making, and introduces 
another set of variables: “The constraints of policy, strategy, capabilities, organization, and doctrine are usually 
well recognized in decision making.”  Less well recognized are another pair of influences: “One is the role that 
experience plays in shaping advisers’ attitudes.  Another is the subtle way in which an adviser’s style and 
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fill them” (Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 
p. 164).  Constitutional theory, I would suggest, is particularly sensitive to the variety of personalities, 
temperaments and motives of the people who hold decision-making power in a republic. 
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 Smith, p. 325. 
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 MacKubin Thomas Owens offers us a concise summary of the charges against the JCS: the JCS “provides military 
advice of a questionable quality; the members of the JCS, who are also the Chiefs of their respective services, are 
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The major components of the legislation adopted these positions – as well as the assumptions and 
expectations that accompanied them – and reorganized the military in two principle ways: 
 
1) The Chairman of the JCS was designated the principle military advisor to the 
President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense (the responsibility 
had previously been assigned to the JCS collectively).  By increasing the independence of 
the Chairman with respect to the Service Chiefs, the Chairman would no longer have to 
reach a consensus with the four Chiefs.  The Chiefs became, in essence, his military 
advisors – subsidiary military advisors – and the Chairman was free to accept or reject 
their advice.  The Chairman was removed from the military chain of command and 
assigned six functional responsibilities: provide strategic direction of the armed forces; 
prepare strategic plans; prepare and review contingency plans; advise the Secretary of 
Defense on the budgetary process; formulate joint doctrine and policies; prepare a 
report on service roles and missions.  The primary intention here was to improve the 
quality of advice moving up the chain of command and to promote joint capabilities and 
operability. 
 
2) The power and influence of the CINCs was significantly increased and their 
responsibilities clarified.  Largely excluded from the planning process in the past, and 
lacking authority over subordinate commands in their areas of responsibility, they were 
linked directly to the Secretary of Defense in the chain of command in order to increase 
their involvement in the planning process.  They were also given responsibility for joint 
training, force organization, and force employment, regardless of the service to which 
the various forces under their command belonged, in order to make sure their authority 
over their forces was commensurate with their responsibilities.  The primary intention 
with these reforms was to promote jointness and improve war-fighting. 
 
The provisions in the Goldwater-Nichols Act borrowed heavily from General Jones’ original 
recommendations.
66
  The legislation also reflected General Meyer’s faith in the ability of a “liberated” 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
unable to set aside their parochial biases in order to provide objective military advice; since unanimity is required 
before the JCS can take a position, log-rolling is inevitable; the JCS will not address contentious issues for fear of 
bringing interservice rivalry into the open; the JCS decision-making process is cumbersome and unwieldy; and JCS 
staff work is poor, because of service parochialism and the fact that the services do not assign their best officers to 
the Joint Staff (MacKubin Thomas Owens, “The Hollow Promise of JCS Reform,” International Security, pp. 99-100). 
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 For thoughtful analyses of the legislation, see Vincent Davis, “Defense Reorganization and National Security,” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 517, New Directions in U.S. Defense Policy 




military high command to persuade civilian decision-makers to incorporate their expertise and advice 
into their decision-making.   As Lederman puts it, “By strengthening the Chairman and the CINCs and 
improving joint officer training, the Act aims to adjust DOD’s calibration of the three organizational 
tensions toward what Act supporters believed to be more appropriate balances between centralization 




 The Goldwater-Nichols Act has been widely praised.  As Christopher Bourne concludes, “The law 
increased cooperation and interoperability among the services, improved professional military 
education, and unified the national military command structure.”
68
  Les Aspin was more effusive in his 
praise (as were many of the bill’s congressional supporters).  Goldwater-Nichols, he wrote, was one of 
the “landmark laws in American history,” and represented perhaps the “greatest sea change in the 
history of the American military since the Continental Congress created the Continental Army in 1775.”
69
  
Reforms were clearly successful in promoting jointness and empowering the joint community.  Roman 
and Tarr declare that “a norm of jointness, imposed from the top down, is now clearly evident in how 
the military functions,” and that, prior to the passage of the legislation, “the joint or unified perspective 
was seriously compromised by the allegiance of the service chiefs to their own service interests, but the 
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 Lederman, p. 84.  In terms of the appropriate balance, the goal was to offset the influence of the individual 
services by bolstering centralization, geographic responsibility, and the generalist perspective. 
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 Christopher Bourne, “Unintended Consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act,” Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 
1998), p. 99. 
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 Les Aspin, quoted in Dennis Quinn, ed., The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year 
Retrospective (National Defense University Press. 1999), p. ix.  It was so successful, according to James R. Locher, 
because “It was not until the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that the military was freed, for the first time in 
the nation’s history, from crippling ideological, political, conceptual, and parochial constraints” (James R. Locher III, 
“Building on the Goldwater-Nichols Act,” in Dennis Quinn, ed., The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A 
Ten-Year Retrospective (National Defense University Press. 1999), p. 17). 
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Not all observers were equally impressed.  Don Snider acknowledges the improvement in joint 
operations and culture, but draws attention to a potentially problematic result. “Goldwater-Nichols 
focused primarily on dramatically strengthening the roles and powers of the JCS chairman and the 
CINCs,” he argues, “but in the process also strengthened the secretary of defense by stipulating that 
almost all of the chairman’s new powers were to be exercised ultimately through the secretary.”
71
  The 
problem with a chain of command that runs from the president to the secretary of defense, and from 
the secretary of defense directly to the joint and specified CINCs, excluding the JCS, is that, as another 
scholar puts it, “there is no guarantee that the executive branch will always turn to the JCS for candid 
advice.” Furthermore, even when presidents and secretaries of defense do solicit advice, it can simply 
be ignored if it turns out to be politically inconvenient or ideologically objectionable.
72
  James Forrestal, 
the first secretary of defense, originally understood the role of secretary as primarily coordinative.  He, 
along with the three civilian service secretaries and three service chiefs, would work largely as a 
committee of equals to bridge the gap between the NCS and the armed services.  This ideal, as I 
mentioned earlier, proved unworkable, and this partly explains why several rounds of reforms were 
designed to strengthen the position of the office of the secretary of defense.  An  intent of legislation 
was to give the secretary more effective control over the entire military: to compensate for the inability 
                                                           
70
 Roman and Tarr, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism to Jointness,” Political Science Quarterly, 
Vol. 113, No. 1 (Spring 1998), p. 92. 
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 Don M. Snider, “DOD Reorganization: Part I, New Imperatives,” Parameters (September 1987), p. 167. 
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 David Isenberg, “Missing the Point: Why the Reforms of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Won’t Improve U.S. Defense 
Policy,” CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No. 100 (1988), p. 12.  This is why General Jones, when reflecting on 
whether the chairman should be a member or merely an advisor to the NSC, was convinced it would not make 
much of a difference.  “My experience with four different presidents is that they listen to whomever they want, 
regardless of whether an individual is or is not on the NSC.”  And why, reflecting on whether or not the chief 
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Jones, “What’s Wrong with the Defense Establishment?” in Asa A. Clark IV, et al,  eds., The Defense Reform Debate: 
Issues and Analysis (John Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 341).  
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of the civilian secretaries and service chiefs to reach consensus on budgets, roles and missions
73
  As a 
scholar sensitive to the potential unintended consequences of the legislation puts it, “The shift in 
authority and responsibility within the highest levels of the military changed the distribution of power 
within the JCS and also altered both how the military generates advice and how the military leadership 
interacts with civilian authorities.”
74
  What too many reformers ignored, I would suggest, was that 
“revolutionizing” the relationship between civilian and military leaders, even if it proved beneficial in 




Constitutional Theory and Defense Reform 
 
 
What contribution did constitutional theory make to this round of defense reform debates?  I am pretty 
confident that I would not be writing this dissertation if the political science of the 1980s had more in 
common with the political science of the 1780s.  I do not mean to suggest that the political science of 
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 See Steven L. Reardon, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Formative Years, 1947-1950 
(Government Printing Office, 1984); and Richard R. Haynes, The Awesome Power (Louisiana University Press, 
1973). 
74
 Bourne, p. 100.  General Louis H. Wilson, a former Marine Corps Commandant, was critical of the role of civilian 
personnel in the Office of the Secretary of Defense prior to Goldwater-Nichols:  “We have numerous assistant and 
deputy assistant secretaries, each of whom, when they come in, build his own little empire … and thinks that he is 
obeying the law by exercising civilian control” (Organization, structure, and decisionmaking procedures of the 
Department of Defense: hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, p. 145). 
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 General Victor Krulak was a sharp critic of the centralization of civilian and military authority, going back to the 
National Security Act of 1947.  In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Forces, he recommended 
abolishing the position of the chairman, reinstituting the JCS committee system and diminishing the power of the 
secretary of defense.  He may not have appreciated the obstacles to jointness in the service-oriented system, but 
he was right, I would suggest, to be concerned about a decision-making process that had grown increasingly 
insulated.  “Today we have heard propositions that would focus the advice in the hands of a single military 
individual.  From the Congress’ and the President’s point of view, this would certainly be a lot easier because there 
would be no conflicting views, but the advice might not be as good and it might very well be worse … I would feel 
competitive advice on military matters is just as logical as competitive advice on economic matters or political 
matters” (Organization, structure, and decisionmaking procedures of the Department of Defense: hearings before 
the Committee on Armed Services, p. 99).  I would only add here that competitive advice on military matters is 
perhaps more vital, given the immediacy and irreversibility of decisions on the use of force.  
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the twentieth century is impoverished in comparison with the political science of the eighteenth 
century, only that political and constitutional theorists, a bit of a fringe group within the broader 




Lawrence Korb, a political scientist and student of the defense establishment, points out that 
the criticisms of the JCS in the twenty-five years after the founding of the national security state fell into 
three basic categories.  First, members of the JCS too often sacrifice JCS functions and responsibilities to 
service duties.  Second, service parochialism has eroded the quality of work done in the joint arena.  
And, third, the “chiefs have been politicized by the party in power and thus became partisan rather than 
military spokesman.”
77
  Reorganization efforts have focused on freeing members of the JCS to focus on 
joint responsibilities by delegating individual services duties to vice-chiefs and transferring operational 
responsibilities from the JCS to unified commanders.  These were also designed to reduce the influence 
of individual service traditions and perspectives on JCS deliberations by empowering the chairman of the 
JCS.  But equal consideration was not given to the need to protect military leaders from political 
pressures (much less to the challenge of consistently aligning political ends and military means).  This, I 
would suggest, is where the distinction between military reform and defense reform is particularly 
helpful.  Although reformers have expended a great deal of analytical energy on how to rationalize and 
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improve military organization (with mixed results), the broader subject of defense organization – of the 
constitution of the executive branch – has been widely neglected.
78
   
 Part of the explanation for this neglect, I would suggest, is that service parochialism is such an 
easy target for critics of our national security system that scholars were inadvertently distracted from 
questions related to the broader constitution of the executive branch.  Reformers are convinced that 
inter-service rivalry is the “root cause of all U. S. defense problems.”
79
  Samuel Huntington, an influential 
figure in defense reform since the founding of the national security state, exemplifies this position.  In 
his contribution to this particular round of defense reform debates, he argues that strategic planning 
involves first the “assessment of threats and of needs,” and then the determination of the appropriate 
types of forces, force dispositions, timing requirements, and weapons such an assessment entails.  “It 
also involves a whole series of closely related issues as to the circumstances under which and how 
American forces would be used on combat: for example, offensively or defensively, in long wars or short 
wars, unilaterally or in conjunction with allies, in gradual increments or in a massive initial 
commitment.”
80
  Huntington does not think it is wise for strategic planning to be dominated by civilian 
agencies, but he blames this development on the inability of the JCS to perform its responsibilities 
adequately.  Philip A. Odeen, another participant in these debates, concurs: even though civilian officials 
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in our country have a far greater involvement in the military affairs than in most other democratic 
countries, this is “a direct consequence of the failure of our system to provide sound, relevant advice by 
senior military officers.”
81
  The problem, according to Huntington, Odeen and other defense reformers, 
is that parochialism has had an adverse impact on almost all aspects of the national security system.  
The growth of civilian influence on strategy, the argument continues, is “directly attributable to the 
failure of the military to approach strategy freed from its service blinders.”
82
  Are we to assume – contra 
constitutional theory – that civilian and military visions would coalesce in the absence of service 
blinders, and that civilians would not encroach on military “prerogatives” even if the military presented 
a national military perspective?  Are we to assume – again, contra constitutional theory – that citizens 
and soldiers in the chain of command would share a rational-national point of view if we could 
somehow liberate them from their respective prejudices and parochialisms? 
 One of the great questions in the forefront of Madison’s mind as he formulated his 
constitutional theory, Robert Dahl reminds us, was the nature of the common good.  “Does a common 
good exist and, if so, can we know what it is?”
83
  Dahl was critical of Madison for his excessive faith in 
the likelihood of representation and pure reason collaborating routinely in his constitutional system, but 
we need not go into his arguments here.  What I want to point out is that if we assume that the 
common good – or, in our case, the national interest – can be ascertained by sharp and disinterested 
minds, then the challenge faced by institutional designers is not quite so acute.  What is surprising about 
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much of the literature on defense reform is that despite our more sophisticated philosophical position 
on the subjective nature of concepts such as the common good and national interest, it nevertheless 
assumes that the president and his closest civilian advisors know what the national interest is and, when 
making decisions about war and peace, act accordingly.  This assumption makes the task of defense 
reformers – in theory – much more manageable.  It means they never have to confront two crucial 
issues: first, the possibility that the president should not always be rewarded with the institutional 
structures and dynamics she wants; and, second, that whereas ineffectiveness may very well be a sign of 
design failure, intransigence can be a measure of constitutional success. 
The system must serve the president; all intra-executive resistance is bad; we need not think at 
all about how we want the system to respond in the event that the president does not have the nation’s 
interests at heart or if having her heart in the right place is not a sufficient qualification to disregard the 
experience and advice of military leaders.
84
  Here is an exemplary statement made by former national 
security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski before the Senate Committee on the Armed Services: “The national 
security decisionmaking system at the highest level is and should be a creature of the personal style of 
the President himself.  It would be a mistake so to formalize the process as to inhibit the President’s 
freedom to operate in a manner that is most congenial to him.  To be effective, the system and the 
process must be responsive to the President’s felt needs and to his personal predilections.”
85
  The fact 
that each new administration over a thirty year period conducted a major study of the defense 
establishment and generally concurred about both the need for reform and the shape such reform 
should take is evidence to most reformers that service parochialism is the primary impediment to better 
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national security policymaking.  It does not worry reformers that all of the aforementioned reports were 
commissioned by presidents and conducted by presidential advisors with a stated interest in protecting 
– and often expanding – presidential power.
86
  Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and 
Reagan, contemporary defense reformers point out, had to use a variety of informal mechanisms to 
compensate for the many failings of the JCS system.  They brought military expertise directly into the 
White House as special advisors and they turned to civilian officials at the Pentagon.  Presidents, the 
argument goes, simply had no other choice but to circumvent the JCS system.  But when is the use of 
informal mechanisms in national security decision-making a sign that civilians in the executive branch 
constitute a faction rather than a deliberative core and that this perversion of republican ideals 
represents a serious threat to our republic?  Must we praise unequivocally all and any “improvisational” 
techniques employed by the president and secretary of defense to realize their vision of the “national 
interest”? 
 Here, I would suggest, is the great constitutional challenge: how do we to create and maintain a 
set of national security institutions so that parochial interests are controlled and national interests 
prevail, especially in a national security crisis?  Madison is our preeminent theorist of the relationship 
between the particular features of institutional design and the promotion of a national perspective.  In 
his constitutional scheme, an extended republic is essential because it forces candidates for national 
political office to gain the confidence and support of a broad set of self-interested parties.   Service 
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parochialism – the target of most defense reformers over the last sixty years – certainly has something 
in common with the narrow, non-national interests Madison attempted to control as a constitutional 
theorist.  But even if reformers are right about the need to control service parochialism within the 
military, do they gain the benefits of a national perspective by doing so? 
They would only do so if military organization represented the entire defense establishment, 
which of course it does not.  The more comprehensive problem of faction, I would suggest, confronts us 
when precisely we reach the limit of what military organization can do to improve civilian decision-
making.  This is why I argue that we need to study the constitution of the entire executive branch – 
specifically the institutional dynamics between civilians and soldiers inside the executive branch – if we 




Madison teaches us that the quality of legislation increases dramatically when legislators have less than 
unlimited power in a republican system.  This is why he supported a strong executive branch.  But 
Madison’s design principles also teach us that there is no reason to believe that a president and 
secretary of defense with a monopoly of decision-making power within the civilian-military decision-
making nexus will make better decisions that a president and secretary of defense who must win the 
allegiance of a top military officer who possesses a degree of statutory independence.  No matter how 
sublime the advice that moves up the military chain of command, it will not have a persuasive impact on 









The premise of our free government, going right back to the 1787 Constitutional Convention, has 
been that our government institutions should be set up, not for the ideal people we may be 
blessed with at the moment, but for the distant and dimly foreseeable future – and for officials 
who are less than perfect, or careless, or even at times overly ambitious, or even unscrupulous. 
- John Kester 
 
Are the mechanisms that throughout American history have ensured civilian control of the 
military, and held civilian leaders properly accountable for the decision to shoulder arms, still 
operating properly? 
- David Kennedy 
 
We were, at the commencement of the late war, but novices in politics, and it is to be wished 
that we may not now be too indolent to correct our mistakes. 





My basic claim in this chapter is that constitutional theory can make a significant contribution to 
contemporary defense reform debates.  It would be more audacious to claim that the reform 
proposal I defend in the second half of this chapter – a limited veto in the hands of a chairman 
of the JCS who serves two or four-year terms on good behaviour – can make a significant 





  But I will make no such claim here because I am genuinely convinced that no 
one working in isolation can possibly anticipate the many unexpected consequences of 
whatever reform proposal his research, temperament and personal experience lead him to 
support, and that my proposal may not withstand the scrutiny of other scholars with different 
research interests, temperaments and personal experiences.   
 Constitutional theory should be taken seriously by defense reformers for two basic 
reasons.  First, the circumstances that led to the authors of The Federalist to adopt of the 
doctrine of absolute civilian control of the military have changed dramatically over the last 225 
years, and this transformation warrants a skeptical attitude toward the wisdom of its 
absolutism.
2
  Second, our experience with the structures of the national security state over the 
last sixty-five years suggests that we would be remiss not to reconsider the fundamental forms 
and principles on which it was founded. 
There are both theoretical and empirical reasons, in other words, to revisit the 
constitution of the executive branch.  Ten years under the Articles of Confederation taught the 
Founders a great deal about how the institutional dynamics of the national government had to 
be changed if the republic were to survive and flourish.  Sixty-five years of experience with the 
structure of the national security state may not be able to teach us as much about the national 
security state as the decade between independence and the Constitutional Convention taught 
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 The chairman of the JCS presently services a two-year term, renewable once, at the pleasure of the 
president.  Let me clarify here that I am not proposing a limited veto over any and all uses of military 
force.  The decision to use nuclear weapons, for example, or unmanned drones to attack a suspected 
terrorist, raise entirely different sets of questions and concerns than those addressed in this dissertation.  
It may not be easy to draw the line between the uses of military force that would require the participation 
of the chairman of the JCS and those that a president, under extreme time pressure, must be able to 
make alone – it will undoubtedly spark a spirited constitutional debate – but the intellectual and ethical 
burden of proof for defense reformers is not to propose a perfect alternative to the flawed system we 
presently have in place.  
2
 I am not entirely comfortable with attributing the doctrine of absolute civilian control of the military to 
the Founders.  If pressed, I would probably argue that the Founders adopted a doctrine of civilian control 
of the military that is less absolute that the one held by contemporary defense reformers, but this 
distinction is not particularly relevant to my larger argument.  
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the Founders – and the consequences of inaction may not be as great as they were in 1787 – but 
at least one problematic pattern of behavior – the corrosive influence of civil-military 
dysfunction on the informal process of ends-means alignment – has made itself sufficiently clear 
to warrant a constitutional level of analysis. 
 As a consequence of the institutionalization of two doctrines – the doctrine of the 
unitary executive and the doctrine of absolute civilian control of the military – factiousness in a 
national security crisis is presently massaged rather than controlled.
3
  The pride and judgment of 
the president, in other words, must be coddled by precisely those military officers most 
qualified to challenge his or her assumptions about the role and efficacy of the use of force.
4
  
Fidelity to these two principles clearly precludes the possibility of incorporating a formal 
deliberative process in the executive department.  A direct consequence of this is that the 
reason and experience of our most senior and qualified military officers can only hope for a 
receptive audience. 
Most political scientists, defense reformers, legal scholars and national security experts, 
I realize, would insist that informality and volunteerism are the only principles an institutional 
designer should consider when contemplating the organization of the executive branch.  The 
president must get his way, even when his top military advisors are convinced that his faith in a 
particular course of action is unfounded and he is deeply mistaken about the probability of 
success.  The president, after all, is the commander-in-chief, and his authority over the military 
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 I make a distinction between absolute civilian control of the military and effective civilian control of the 
military in the second part of this chapter. 
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 “Truth lives, in fact, for the most part on a credit system,” a famous American pragmatist has written.  
“Our thoughts and beliefs ‘pass,’ so long as nothing challenges them, just as bank notes pass so long as 
nobody refuses them.”  Substitute assumptions about the role and efficacy of military means for “truth” 
and we arrive at the fundamental problem with strictly hierarchical decision-making systems.  We need 
“agreement” between political ends and military means, and this is something that an informal 
deliberative process cannot reliably produce.  Recent history suggests that statesmen can be so fixated on 
particular political objectives that they pay little respect to the “process of conduction from a present idea 
to a future terminus” (William James, Pragmatism (Dover Publications, 1995), pp. 78, 83).  
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must be absolute.  But there are three very good reasons to question the wisdom of the 
doctrines of the unitary executive and absolute civilian control of the military and to reengage 
with the strong theory of faction that shapes our constitutional system.  First, Madison did not 
reflect in depth on the organization of the executive department, as he readily admitted.  His 
attention, as I mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, was on the pathologies of legislatures, not 
executive departments.  Second, even though many contemporary scholars trace the doctrines 
of the unitary executive and absolute civilian control of the military back to Hamilton, we must 
keep in mind that the constitution of the executive department he defends in The Federalist is 
designed for an insulated state.  The third reason to question the wisdom of these doctrines is 
that they largely ignore the “necessity” of harmonizing political ends and military means.
5
 
 Madison and Hamilton understood many of the dangers of factiousness in the executive 
branch.  This is partly why a two-thirds vote in the legislature overrides a presidential veto; 
treaties and executive appointments require the advice and consent of the Senate; and justices 
are granted permanent tenure on good behaviour (it is also why we have regular elections and a 
process by which the legislature can remove the president from office).  The debates that led to 
the adoption of these particular constitutional devices highlight the fact that the authors of The 
Federalist believed that the executive branch is vulnerable to the spirit of faction and that the 
chief executive should be controlled when possible – when, in other words, the loss of energy, 
secrecy, dispatch and decision that might result from additional constitutional checks and 
balances are justified by a compensatory increase in the quality of executive branch decision-
making. 
                                                           
5
 And I do not use “necessity” here in the romantic manner I criticize in Chapter 4.  By “necessity” I mean 
something very specific and precise.  If political ends and military means are insufficiently aligned – if the 
gap is wider than would be the case if there were a rigorous process of adjustment and adaptation – lives 
and treasure will be needlessly lost.  To minimize the loss of lives and treasure, political ends and military 
means must be properly aligned. 
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The Founders embraced one-man rule inside the executive branch (some more 
enthusiastically than others) because they were convinced that internal checks and balances 
would introduce a dangerous degree of inertia and dissent.  What they did not take into 
consideration was the fact that if war is to be a sensible, intelligent endeavour – rather than, at 
the opposite extreme, “an imbecilic confusion into which governments drive their subjects” – 
political ends and military means must be closely aligned.
6
  The problem is that ends-means 
alignment is not a goal easily realized in a strictly hierarchical system.  In an insulated state, ends 
and means must be harmonized primarily for purposes of self-defense – the president, for 
example, must possess the energy, secrecy, dispatch and decision to marshal sufficient material 
and spiritual forces to repulse an attack on native soil – and the narrow range of circumstances 
in which military force is required keeps to a minimum both the opportunities for factiousness 
and the potential size of the gap between ends and means.
7
  In a non-insulated state, however, 
the opportunities for factiousness are not only plentiful, but a factious president can, if he so 
desires, easily circumvent or disable the informal processes that presently exist in the executive 
department to guard against the tyranny of misalignment.
8
 
The goal of this dissertation, let me remind the reader, is to begin what I believe is a 
long-overdue conservation.  Political theorists have largely ignored the crucial challenge of ends-
                                                           
6
 W. B. Gallie, Philosophers of War and Peace: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Tolstoy (Cambridge 
University Press, 1979), pp. 100-132. 
7
 Bernard Brodie uses a different conceptual language than Hamilton but makes a similar point.  The main 
difference between and insulated and non-insulated state, or a modest power and a superpower, as that 
the latter “feels itself able to do something effective about a threat that remains as yet indirect or 
remote, which is not true of a small power except in token association with a large power.”  The power of 
the United States today, in contrast with its relative power in the last eighteenth century, gives the 
leaders of our country an opportunity of choice not available to lesser powers” (Bernard Brodie, War and 
Politics (Pearson, 1974), pp. 344, 347).  Hamilton and Madison, I think it is safe to assume, thought they 
were designing institutions for a nation whose national security choice-set would continue to be severely 
constrained for the foreseeable future. 
8
 I do not mean to suggest that the president has full discretion over decisions about the use of force – 
that public opinion, the legislature and the military, for example, do not impose significant constraints on 
the president’s choice set.  What I want to emphasize here are the immeasurable benefits of further 
narrowing the inevitable gap between political ends and military means.  
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means alignment, and defense reformers have generally failed to engage with constitutional 
theory at a level that would generate potential solutions to a seemingly irresolvable problem.  
With this objective in mind, this final chapter is divided into two parts.  The first section is 
designed to introduce political theorists to the main currents of thought in contemporary 
defense reform.  Improving jointness and interagency cooperation are two dominant themes in 
the literature, and I will discuss both briefly.  I also engage with Christopher Gibson’s argument 
that we need to adopt a “Madisionian approach” to defense reform.  He is the only scholar with 
whom I am familiar who invokes Madison in his research, but he argues solely for a new 
normative framework to improve civil-military relations, and this reflects a serious 
misunderstanding of Madison’s constitutional theory.  As for the subject of this dissertation, 
none of the proposals proffered by contemporary defense reformers directly address – much 
less mitigate – the problem of reconciling political ends and military means when civilian leaders 
shun informal deliberative processes. 
 In the second section I return to constitutional theory and defend my reform proposal.  I 
arrived at a deliberative separation of power inside the executive department – a limited veto in 
the hands of the chairman of the JSC – as a partial solution to the ends-means problem based on 
the importance of four key constitutional issues: the need for constitutional checks and balances 
to combat the violence of faction; the necessity of executive energy; the demand for wisdom 
and stability in the administration of government; and the positive correlation between the 
independence of political actors and the caliber of their performance.  Here is the passage in 
The Federalist that best captures the spirit of the limited veto I propose for the chairman of the 
JCS: “The first thing that offers itself to our observation,” Hamilton writes, “is the qualified 
negative of the President upon the acts or resolutions of the two houses of the legislature; or, in 
other words, his power of returning all bills with objections, to have the effect of preventing 
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their becoming laws, unless they should afterwards be ratified by two thirds of each of the 
component members of the legislative body.
9
  By a limited veto I mean that there must be an 
executive-legislative council the president could convene to override a veto and / or remove the 
chairman, if she believes the veto power is being abused.  Recall our earlier discussion of 
Madison: an institution with the “power to advance the public happiness involves a discretion 
which may be misapplied and abused.”  This is why he argues that, “in all cases where power is 
to be conferred, the point first to be decided is, whether such a power be necessary to the 
public good; as the next will be, in case of an affirmative decision, to guard as effectually as 
possible against a perversion of the power to the public detriment.
10
  I argue in the second part 
of this chapter that a deliberative separation of power is necessary to promote the public 
happiness – to promote the national interest – and that proper safeguards can be built into the 
system to guard against the ever-present potential for abuse. 
 
 
Contemporary Defense Reform 
 
 
This section will be regrettably brief, since this is not a dissertation on contemporary defense 
reform alone.  In a few pages I will obviously not be able to do justice to the diverse concerns of 
contemporary scholars.  But even an abbreviated introduction to the subject will alert the 
reader to the kinds of constitutional forms and principles presently in circulation, and those 
which are being largely ignored. 
 
                                                           
9
 Hamilton, No. 73, Paragraph 4. 
10
 Madison, No. 41, Paragraph 3. 
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1. Jointness.  Unsurprisingly, most of the national security experts and defense reformers who 
supported Goldwater-Nichols argue that the legislation has proven to be a great success.  Even a 
scholar with doubts about the overall wisdom of the legislation agrees that the law “increased 
cooperation and interoperability among the services, improved professional military education, 
and unified the national military command structure.”
11
  The 1991 Gulf War is widely cited as an 
example of the benefits of increased cooperation and integration inside the military: there were 
genuine improvements in joint operations and the worst redundancies and inefficiencies of the 
era of service independence were curtailed.  On the weight of this evidence, reformers advocate 
for a renewed effort to pass legislation that would build upon the principles that guided 
Goldwater-Nichols.  To simplify, what perturbed these defense reformers in the 1980s continues 
to trouble them today.
12
  The perpetuation of incompatible and often hostile service cultures, 
they argue, impairs not only our unity of effort on the battlefield but inter-service decision-
making in the Pentagon.  Officers are too deeply attached to traditional service prerogatives to 
voluntarily support the creation of effective joint institutions.
13
  Prior to the passage of the 
Goldwater-Nichols legislation, as one widely cited commentator puts it, the military services 
“fiercely resisted” the notion of a unified military structure.  It was only with the passage of this 
legislation – legislation that the services bitterly and selfishly resisted – that the military was 
                                                           
11
 Christopher M. Bourne, “Unintended Consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act,” Joint Force 
Quarterly (Spring 1998), p. 99. 
12
 Robert Adolph, Charles Stiles and Franklin Hitt argue reasonably that although Goldwater-Nichols 
expanded the statutory role of the chairman of the JCS, the legislation “failed to provide him with the 
wherewithal to do the job in four key areas all relating to joint readiness” (Robert B. Adolph, Jr., Charles 
W. Stiles, and Franklin D. Hitt, Jr. “Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn’t Go Far Enough,” Joint Force Quarterly, 
No. 7 (Spring 1995), p. 48.  The issues on which the law is vague and thus hampers the chairman’s ability 
to perform his duties are developing joint doctrine; conducting net assessments of military capabilities; 
evaluating joint readiness; and evaluating overall military preparedness. 
13
 Reformers who are critical of the military are highly sensitive to the fact that soldiers are not likely to 
cooperate voluntarily.  This is why they argue we need to combat service parochialism through 
centralization and consolidation.  The irony here is that these skeptics of voluntary cooperation in the 
military ignore the fact that civilian leaders are by nature as uncooperative and factious as military 
leaders.  They should be as just as skeptical of voluntary cooperation among civilians as they are of 
voluntary cooperation among soldiers. 
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General Jones and General Meyer, who jumpstarted the defense reform movement in 
the early 1980s, are still cited with great respect and admiration.  James Locher contends that 
General Jones “started a profound revolution in military affairs and changed the course of 
American military history.”
15
  At the very least, he did start a mini-revolution in terms of the 
organization of the military: it was Jones’ testimony before Congress on February 3, 1982, as I 
mentioned in the previous chapter, which proved the catalyst for the legislation that would be 
passed four years later.  What most reformers seem to forget – or never to have appreciated in 
the first place – is that General Jones was convinced that even with military reform, the 
organizational structure of the broader defense department would remain inadequate to meet 
the national security needs of the nation.  In the previous chapter I made a distinction between 
defense and military reform, and argued that General Jones was an advocate of both.  
Contemporary defense reformers, however, almost unanimously associate General Jones’ 
criticism of the organizational structure of the defense department with a criticism of the 
performance and effectiveness of the military services.  Locher argues that the military resisted 
reform because “the majority of military officers were then giving priority to service interests 
over genuine national interests and somehow had come to believe that their behavior in doing 
so was correct.”
16
  It is certainly true that representatives of the services were sometimes 
unable to clearly differentiate between service and national interests, and often conflated the 
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 James R. Locher, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater–Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon  (Texas A&M 
University Press, 2002), p. 17. 
15
 Ibid, p. 18. 
16





  But are not parochial interests and national interests, as Madison and Hamilton teach us, 
entangled in all of our thoughts? 
Psychological theories of human motivation aside, we must not lose sight of the two-
fold nature of the arguments put forth by General Jones and General Meyers.  What made them 
insightful reformers is that they combined the sensitivity to organizational inefficiencies of a 
civilian policymaker with the understanding of the limits of military reform that a soldier gains 
through years of operational and administrative experience.
18
  What they understood is that, 
given the present constitution of the executive branch, the performance of the military 
ultimately hinges on the wisdom – the deliberative instincts, we could say – of civilian decision-
makers.  The relationship between the quality of civilian decision-making and the caliber of 
military performance – rather than merely the caliber of military performance – should be at the 
center of defense reform debates.  It is indeed advantageous to have a military counterbalance 
to the individual services – to reduce service parochialism and promote a national military 
perspective.  Likewise, it is important to have the best possible advice moving up the chain of 
command.  But military performance depends on how thoroughly civilian decision-makers 
absorb and digest this advice, and this is something that military reform alone cannot not 
address. 
                                                           
17
 A good argument for interservice rivalry is provided by Owens: “Interservice rivalry has the beneficial 
effect of spurring innovation in defense policy and in the development of doctrine and equipment in 
support of a strategic or tactical approach that may seem irrelevant at the time.  When a single strategic 
view is forced upon a nation’s policymakers, flexibility and adaptability to changing circumstances may 
suffer.”  Interservice rivalry, he argues, is largely a scapegoat.  Confused statutory relationships and 
functional responsibilities inside the defense structure; poor interagency cooperation inside the executive 
branch; and the uncontrolled growth of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, he argues, are far more 
responsible for the problems reformers attribute to interservice rivalry. 
18
 What made Madison and Hamilton such insightful reformers, I would suggest, were similarly rich bodies 
of practical experience. 
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How, then, do we create and maintain a set of national security institutions so that 
parochial interests are controlled – civilian as well as military – and a national perspective 
prevails?  No matter how refined the advice that moves up the chain of command, it will not 
have a reliably persuasive impact on civilian decision-makers as long as no constitutional checks 
and balances are in place to control the spirit of faction.   And no matter how successful military 
reform might be at discouraging service parochialism and promoting jointness, the 
appropriateness of the force to the political objective it is supposed to serve is surely the most 
reliable indicator of military success. 
 
2. Interagency Cooperation.  A second strain of thought unites many contemporary defense 
reformers: the imperative of greater interagency cooperation.
19
  The legal framework put in 
place by the National Security Act and amended by Goldwater-Nichols, these scholars argue, has 
created a national defense structure that is adequate to meet present and future national 
security challenges.  The president, secretary of defense, and Congress collectively exercise 
civilian control over the military despite the increased power and authority of the chairman of 
the JCS.  There is a healthy competition for resources, roles and missions among the semi-
autonomous services.  There have been genuine improvements in military cooperation and 
                                                           
19
 Bob Ulin explains the upsurge in attention to interagency cooperation in recent years as a reflection of 
failed coordination efforts in natural disasters and foreign contingencies: “Interagency cooperation has 
become a hot topic in the military services. It gained renewed traction shortly after the shock and awe 
campaign to depose Saddam Hussein from Iraq. General Colin Powell is reported to have remarked that 
“if you break it, you own it.” Indeed, we broke the back of the Hussein regime, toppled the government of 
Iraq, caused the Republican Guard to flee, disbanded the army and subsequently put everyone out of 
work thereby fueling the insurgency. It became evident that military power alone was insufficient to 
rebuild Iraqi society, the rule of law and the economy. Suddenly the military found itself trying to re-
establish what it had broken and put in place the infrastructure that sustains health, safety and 
governance. However, the military is neither equipped nor trained adequately to conduct nation building. 
While the military is often augmented by other governmental agencies in support of contingency 
operations abroad, the “system” or lack thereof, to ensure effective interagency coordination poses a 
challenge” (Bob Ulin, “About Interagency Cooperation,” Arthur D Simon Center (Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, 2010), available at: the simonscenter.org/about-interagency-cooperation. 
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worst redundancies and inefficiencies of the pre-Goldwater-Nichols years have been curtailed.  
The basic institutions of an effective national security state are in place.  
 What worries these reformers is that our national security system does not integrate all 
of the knowledge and expertise presently at its disposal.  “The problem of interagency 
coordination is well recognized, and has been for at least the better part of a century, but it has 
not been resolved.  The roles and responsibilities for national security among agencies, advisors, 
secretaries, committees, and the White House are persistently characterized by conflicts of 
authority, disagreement, and a lack of coordination.”
20
  Improved coordination is an admirable 
goal.  Reform proposals and recommendations geared toward getting the “many disparate parts 
of the U.S. national security structure to row together, in both planning and execution,” are 
perfectly sensible.  The challenge is to “identify ways to better integrate efforts while retaining 
the goodness inherent in agencies' distinctive knowledge and approaches to issues.”
21
  The 
principle that inspires these reformers is simple: strategic and operation planning would lead to 
better outcomes if it were done on an interagency basis.
22
  The present national security system 
simply “cannot integrate and resource the expertise and capabilities required to secure the vital 
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 Project for National Security Reform: Forging a New Shield (Project for National Security Reform, 2008), 
p. 43. 
21
 Michele A. Flournoy and Clark A. Murdock, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense 
Reform for a New Strategic Era (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), p. 6. 
22
 Not all scholars are as upbeat about the potential for improving the interagency process.  “The 
interagency process coordinates among U.S. Government agencies, and occasionally international 
Governmental Organizations or Non-Governmental Organizations, to craft policy initiatives and responses 
to events as they unfold. It usually involves the delegation of a lead agency responsible for determining 
the agenda, extracting agreement, and implementing decisions. The phrase imparts a notion of a well-
oiled policy machine. It is largely a myth. Neither adaptation nor control is possible given the crazy quilt of 
organizations and players in the national security arena. The sheer difficulty of holding a meeting, even a 
conference call, is daunting. The “system” that we now have is too large, unwieldy, and complex to 
respond effectively or initiate the changes that are required” (Grant Hammond, “Time for a Revolution: 
The Transformation from National Defense to International Security,” in Douglas Stuart, ed., Organizing 
for National Security (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000), p. 153). 
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interests of the nation.”
23
  Interagency cooperation, in other words, is presently not the norm, 
and in the absence of reform, even if certain actors in the system were inclined to cooperate, 




 Here is a good example of the kind of reform proposal that emerges from a concern 
with interagency cooperation.  The authors of the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols report recommend 
“enhancing planning capacity for complex contingency operations in civilian agencies and 
creating rapidly deployable Interagency Crisis Planning Teams, comprised of regional and 
functional experts from all of the participating agencies, charged with developing truly 
interagency campaign plans.”
25
  This kind of innovation is unlikely to cause harm, and might very 
well improve performance on the margins.  But if factionalism is allowed to go largely 
unchecked inside the executive branch, agencies that are well prepared to deal with a national 
security emergency may have very little input into the decision-making process.  It is certainly 
logical to argue that “by planning together, training together, and operating together, the U.S. 
agencies involved in national security could for the first time bring to bear coherent capabilities 
far greater than the sum of their parts.”
26
  But the only way to capture the benefits of greater 
interagency cooperation on a consistent basis is through constitutional reform.  If the 
constitution of the executive branch is off-limits, as most defense reformers assume, the best 
we can hope for in a national security emergency is that our president and his advisors are 
                                                           
23
 Project for National Security Reform, p. 492. 
24
 The challenge is certainly an enormous one: “There are no interagency schools, rules or unifying 
authority except for the President of the United States who sits at the top of the entire U.S. government. 
Each federal department or federal agency has its own leader, budget, career progression and mission. 
There is little incentive to cooperate. In fact, the struggle for budget authority is usually a zero sum game. 
While one might think that broad governmental experience by any federal employee is a plus, service 
outside of one’s own agency or department is rarely seen as career enhancing” (Ulin, “About Interagency 
Cooperation”). 
25
 Flournoy, p. 8. 
26
 Flournoy, p. 9. 
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deliberative by nature and that their initial interpretation of a national security threat, if 
inaccurate or incomplete, is not impervious to reason.  It is certainly true that “rational analysis 
of merit must decide which ideas prevail,” but in a strictly hierarchical organization, rationality is 
in competition with factionalism, and factionalism unchecked, as we know, is more likely to 
jettison rational analysis than incorporate it into a constructive dialogue.
27
  I do not mean to 
suggest that the establishment of new offices responsible for interagency coordination is 
unwise, or that enhancing operational capacity at the U.S. Agency for International 
Development is unproductive.  But these coordinating mechanisms, no matter how robust, are 
likely to be overwhelmed by the spirit of faction.  
If the executive branch is arranged in a strictly hierarchical fashion – if we insist upon 
the doctrine of absolute civilian control of the military – then we are at the mercy of faction and 
engaged primarily in wishful thinking when the integration and collaboration we hope for 
depends on the voluntary cooperation of the chief magistrate and his top civilian advisors.  If we 
do not consider relaxing the doctrine of absolute civilian control of the military we must put all 
of our hopes for improving the quality of crisis decision-making in the deliberative instincts of 
our commander-in-chief. 
 
3. A “Madisonian Approach” to Civil-Military Relations.  Most scholars in the defense reform 
community appreciate the extent to which dysfunctional civil-military relations have a perverse 
impact on policy effectiveness.
28
  The fact that this correlation holds as reliably in the unhurried 
domains of budgeting and procurement as it does in a national security crisis means that 
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 Ibid., p. 18. 
28
  By civil-military relations, as I mentioned in an earlier chapter, I am referring to civil-military relations 
inside the executive branch, not between the military and the society at large. 
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increasing the functionality of civil-military relations is an almost universal goal.  But a functional 
relationship between top civilian and military leaders inside the executive cannot insulate a 
republic from policy mistakes and operational failures.  Dysfunction in this relationship – 
dysfunction being a euphemism for varying degrees of hostility, distrust, evasiveness and 
incomprehension – is a reliable indicator that mistakes and miscalculations will occur that could 
have been avoided.  Examples of dysfunction are easy to identify.  Much more challenging for 
defense reformers is to propose effective solutions.  How do we transform a frequently 
dysfunctional relationship into a reliably constructive collaboration? 
Conventional wisdom informs us that the most important decisions on matters of war 
and peace must be made by our elected civilian leaders.  This is how the doctrine of civilian 
control of the military is generally interpreted.  Military leaders are expected to share their 
expertise with civilian decision-makers and then use the means at their disposal to fulfill the 
political objectives determined by their civilian counterparts, whichever particular objectives 
they ultimately choose to pursue.  The problem with this description of civil-military relations is 
that it mistakenly assumes that aligning political objectives and military means is a largely 
natural and inevitable process.   
 Christopher Gibson is the only contemporary scholar with whom I am familiar who 
invites Madison into the defense reform conversation.  Behind American’s elected leaders, he 
writes, “stands the civil-military nexus – the top civilians and military advisors to the President 
and Congress who offer strategic analysis, develop options, and convey recommendations.”  
This group of civilian and military leaders engages in what he calls “decision-support activity.”  





  This is because dysfunctional relations inside the executive branch 
often promote anti-deliberative practices.  What makes Gibson’s research especially interesting 
in the context of this dissertation, and why it is worth engaging with his arguments at some 
length, is that, while he applies what he calls a “Madisonian approach” to civil-military relations, 
he misconstrues the relationship between normative and institutional structures in Madison’s 
constitutional system. 
 Gibson argues that we need checks and balances to moderate relations inside the civil-
military nexus for the same reason we need checks and balances in our broader constitutional 
system.  A reliance on parchment barriers alone will not create a productive relationship 
between civilians and soldiers in the civil-military nexus any more than they will between the 
three great departments of government.  A neat division of responsibilities between civilian and 
military leaders – a pure separation of “powers” – is impossible to maintain in practice, given 
the complexity of the issues that must be resolved. 
 Here is how Gibson defines civil-military relations: 
 
Civil-military relations is defined as the delineation of duties among top-level 
civilian and military leaders as found in existing US legal structure (provisions in 
the US Constitution and US statutes) and in the norms that guide behaviour in 
view of how these leaders contribute individually and collectively to the national 
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 Christopher Gibson, Securing the State: Reforming the National Security Decisionmaking Process at the 
Civil-Military Nexus (Ashgate, 2008), p. 1. 
30
 Gibson, p. 5. 
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Gibson understands that for the civil-military decision-making nexus to be effective, elected 
leaders must have access to strategic analysis, a diverse set of options, and advice from both 
political appointees and the military prior to making weighty national-security decisions.  He 
also argues that dysfunction in civil-military relations cannot be reduced to a tolerable level by 
focusing strictly on the military side of the equation.  Despite the recognition of the two-fold 
nature of the problem, however, he still argues, as most defense reformers do, that elected 
leaders must continue to exercise absolute control of the armed forces.  As long as key actors in 
the civil-military nexus adopt his new normative framework, he claims, no actual constitutional 
interventions – no checks and balances – are actually required, even though he argues that 
reducing dysfunction in the civil-military nexus is a constitutional problem.  
Gibson wants to create a more balanced relationship between civilian and military 
leaders – a more respectful “partnership” – but his fidelity to a conventional understanding of 
the constitutional theory upon which our republic was founded prevents him from identifying 
potential solutions to the dysfunction he deplores.  Gibson diagnoses the problem – a lack of 
constitutional mechanisms inside the executive branch to force decision-makers to deliberate – 
but his solution – to promote a new normative framework – is hardly Madisionian at all, since it 
relies on an intervention that is no more likely to control the factiousness of political actors than 
parchment barriers.  It is certainly important to have “clearly established expectations and 
standards” in order to appreciate what, on the military side, constitutes dereliction or 
inappropriate behavior, and what, on the civilian side, is unproductive micromanaging or 
excessive domination.
31
  Gibson is correct to argue that military leaders should not interpret the 
doctrine of absolute civilian control of the military to mean that all disagreement and dissent 
has to end once their civilian counterparts have made a decision.  Similarly, he states a truism 
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when he insists that civilian leaders should not interpret the same doctrine to mean that they 
should ignore or fire top generals who disagree with them in a national security crisis.  But as 
much as Madison appreciated the influence of norms on political life, he did not believe that 
normative injunctions against anti-deliberative practices alone could solve the problem of 
faction.  “Without an anchor, a set of agreed upon interrelated principles, without normative 
theory,” Gibson writes, “we are unlikely to see a functional balance in civil-military relations.”
32
  
If we want a functional balance in civil-military relations, I would suggest, we need more than 
changes in the norms that guide civil-military relations.  Is it simply not consistent with 
Madison’s constitutional theory to expect the relationship between political actors to change 
significantly and durably in the absence of constitutional reform.   
 
 





If civil-military relations inside the executive were somehow immune to serious dysfunction, the 
lack of a formal process of ends-means adjustment and adaptation would not trouble a 
constitutional theorist.  But as things presently stand, there are only informal deliberative 
mechanisms inside the executive branch, and a high level of dysfunction is the norm.
33
  If we 
continue to rely on only informal deliberative bodies – on informal checks and balances inside 
the executive department – we should expect this pattern of dysfunction to continue. 
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 I do not mean to suggest that civil-military relations are dysfunctional in all administrations or at all 
times in an administration that suffers from periods of dysfunction. 
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Despite these reasonable expectations, the underlying assumption of most 
contemporary defense reformers is that the decision-making structures and processes a 
president uses to plan and execute defense policy are sub-constitutional features of 
government.  This is why most reformers end up stressing the importance of informal 
deliberative groups inside the executive branch: they understand the positive correlation 
between executive-branch deliberation and the quality of executive branch decision-making, 
but, with the constitution of the executive off limits, they cannot conceive of any reforms that 
would actually increase the likelihood that decision-making processes will be genuinely 
deliberative.  The constitutional problem – when civilian and military leaders in an 
administration disagree about the consistency of political ends and military means, as they 
inevitably will, the decision-making process is highly vulnerable to faction – remains unresolved. 
 If Madison and Hamilton were contemporary defense reformers – if they were, let us 
say, recruited by a legislative subcommittee to study the constitution of the executive 
department in our national security state – would they approve of its internal organization?  We 
cannot know, of course, how they would respond to the realities of the modern world, the 
modern national security state, the modern presidency.  But I think we can safely assume that 
they would be at least willing to debate the wisdom of incorporating additional constitutional 
checks and balances into the executive branch.  And thanks to the detailed notes Madison took 
at the Constitutional Convention, the essays Madison and Hamilton contributed to The 
Federalist, and the work of distinguished historians of the founding era such as Max Farrand, 
Charles Thach and Jack Rakove, we have a reasonably good idea of how such a debate would 
unfold.
34
  Madison would wonder if faction could be controlled inside the executive department 
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– if the national security decision-making process could be made less prone to the violence of 
faction – without compromising its energy.  Hamilton would initially be quite skeptical of any 
scheme that compromised executive unity (skeptical, perhaps, to the point of being a bit 
dismissive).  His instincts would lead him to seriously doubt whether any advantages could flow 
from a deliberative body in the executive department, however limited its powers.  Despite 
these different starting points, however, both Madison and Hamilton, I suspect, would be drawn 
to the following incongruity: the executive branch was designed to balance the requisites to 
energy and safety in a relatively weak, insulated state, and might not be able to maintain this 




1. An institutional conception of the national interest. If war is to be sensible, the political ends 
in war – not just the military means – must be vetted, disciplined, controlled.  Clausewitz 
teaches us that there must be a process of adjustment and adaptation between political ends 
and military means – but we need Madison – an updated Madison – to understand how we 
might incorporate such a process into a constitutional system.  What Madison teaches us is that 
misalignment between political ends and military means is best understood as a consequence of 
the excessive influence of faction.  He also teaches us that the greatest advantage of a well-
constructed republic is its tendency to break and control the violence of faction, and that we 
should endorse “any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, 
provides a proper cure for it.”
36
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Constitutional History (Liberty Fund, 2007); Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the 
Making of the Constitution, (Vintage, 1997). 
35
 Other fundamental problems would surely come to mind – such as the power dynamics between the 
three main departments of government – but as I mentioned elsewhere in this dissertation, these issues 
have been explored at length by other scholars, and no workable, reform-friendly consensus seems 
forthcoming. 
36
 Madison, The Federalist, No. 10, Paragraph 1. 
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 How do we ensure that factions within the executive branch – be they comprised of 
civilians or soldiers – are strongly discouraged from initiating a war in which political objectives 
and military resources are poorly aligned?  In Chapter 3, in a discussion of Madison’s theory of 
faction, I argued that identifying the national interest is a hopelessly subjective, hopelessly 
political endeavor, unless we define the national interest from an institutional perspective.  An 
institutional conception to the national interest – which I derived from Madison’s institutional 
conception of the public interest – suggests that the national interest is best understood as the 
creation and maintenance of a policymaking process that ensures a reasonably close alignment 
of political ends and military means in a national security crisis.
37
  A national security faction, 
following the same institutional logic, is an individual or group of decision-makers in the 
executive that attempts to disable or circumvent this process.  What complicates this analogy 
between the public interest and the national interest, of course, is that the deliberative devices 
in the executive branch that are designed to control faction and improve the quality of national 
security decision-making are informal, and therefore remain vulnerable to factious 
manipulation.  
 Alexander George, a widely admired authority on national security and presidential 
decision-making, has studied the influence of factiousness in national security crises.
38
  
Policymakers, he writes, often operate with “primitive theories of questionably validity that are, 
                                                           
37
 I argued in Chapters 2 and 3 that deliberation is the lynchpin in Madison’s constitutional system.  
Constitutional checks and balances are required not only to prevent interdepartmental usurpation but to 
improve the quality of lawmaking.  Constitutional checks and balances certainly have a limited utility – 
deployed in excess they are as likely to degrade the quality of lawmaking and statecraft as improve them 
– but Madison argued that the quality of lawmaking and statecraft would be intolerably poor if lawmakers 
and statesmen were not to some extent forced to deliberate.   
38
 The study of rationality and irrationality in decision-making is a crowded field.  In national security, 
foreign policy and international relations, the work of Robert Jervis stands out (Robert Jervis, Perception 
and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).  For an excellent 
review of new work in cognitive social psychology and behavioral decision theory that has implications for 
national security policymaking, see J. M. Goldgeier, J. M. and P. E. Tetlock, “Psychology and International 
Relations Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science (Annual Reviews, 2001).   
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moreover, not well articulated.”
39
  The policy choices that confront every executive often arouse 
in him “a variety of motives and interests that are in fact extraneous to the values associated 
with even a very broad conception of the national interest.”
40
  No one who has studied 
presidential decision-making seems to doubt the massive and often irrational influence of 
personalities and beliefs, and yet most defense reformers nevertheless work under the 
assumption either that the president has the national interest at heart, or that a factious 
president must get what he wants, no matter how modest or inflexible his cognitive resources. 
 George is not a constitutional theorist by training and does not engage with Madison’s 
conceptual vocabulary.  Nevertheless, he presents a persuasive case for why we need to extend 
Madison’s theory of faction to the national security state.  George argues that a handful of 
procedural tasks are essential components of effective decision-making.  The decision-making 
process must provide decision-makers with incisive, valid diagnoses of complex problems; 
ensure that all the values and interests at stake are flushed out for consideration; generate and 
evaluate a wide range intended and unintended consequences; remain alert to policy 
effectiveness; and be nimble enough to learn from experience.  The national security state, I 
would submit, relies on forms and principles that work against all of these critical ingredients.  
 Here is a list of nine decision-making pathologies – all relevant to our discussion – that 
George and an impressively credentialed group of collaborators compiled for a study of national 
security decision-making: 
 
1. When the decisionmaker and his advisors agree too readily on the nature of 
the problem facing them and on a response to it. 
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2. When advisors and policy advocates take different positions and debate 
them before the executive, but then disagreements do not cover the full 
range of relevant hypotheses and alternative options. 
3. When there is no advocate for an unpopular policy option. 
4. When advisors to the executive hash out their disagreements over policy 
without the executive knowing and confront him with a unanimous 
recommendation. 
5. When advisors agree privately among themselves that the executive ought 
to face up to a difficult decision, but no one is willing to alert him to the 
need to do so. 
6. When the executive, faced with an important problem to decide, is 
dependent upon a single channel of information. 
7. When the key assumptions and premises of a plan which the executive is 
asked to adopt have been evaluated only by advocates of that option. 
8. When the executive asks advocates for their opinions on a preferred course 
of action but does not request a qualified group to examine more carefully 
the negative judgments offered by one or more advisors. 
9. When the executive is impressed by the consensus among his advisors on 
behalf of a particular option but fails to ascertain how firm the consensus is, 




If aligning political ends and military means were not so important, we would not need to worry 
about executive-branch faction.  And if this very important process were not vulnerable to most 
if not all of the decision-making pathologies listed above, we would not need to question our 
fidelity to the doctrine of absolute civilian control of the military.  But these pathologies are 
primarily pathologies of dependence, I would suggest, and they draw our attention to precisely 
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 Ibid, p. xi.  Partly why we shifted from the JCS committee system to a strong chairman was to address 
decision-making pathology number four.  The committee system was criticized for presenting the 
president with unanimous recommendations that were “unanimous” only because they reflected the 
least common denominator of the disparate positions held by the respective service chiefs.  As for the 
other eight pathologies, most military historians and defense reformers would probably check off many in 
not most of them as accurate descriptions of the decision-making processes that have authorized the use 
of force in American over the last sixty-five years.  H. R. McMaster and Thomas Ricks, to mention two 
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in the lead up to war.  See H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (Harper Perennial, Reprint Edition, 1998); and 
Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (Penguin Books, 2006).   
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 After a republican government is able to control the people, it must be able to control 
itself.  The structural innovation that contributed the most to solving this problem was our 
separation of powers system.  Because parchment barriers – in our case, informal deliberative 
bodies – do not offer protection against the encroachment and usurpation, political actors in a 
republican government must be equipped with the constitutional means and personal motives 
to defend their constitutional powers.  Powers must not only be separated but creatively mixed.  
In the absence of these kinds of constitutional checks and balances, the spirit of faction will 
dominate the individual departments of government and threaten the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community.
43
    
 Madison teaches us that constitutional checks and balances improve the quality of 
lawmaking and statecraft: in addition to obstructing factious projects and discouraging such 
projects through the threat of obstruction, they improve the quality of lawmaking and statecraft 
by forcing lawmakers and statesmen to deliberate.  What we cannot learn directly from 
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 An additional decision-making pathology familiar to students of national security: most statesmen are 
not the most sophisticated military historians.  See, for example, Ernst R. May, “Lessons” of the Past 
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 A separation of powers system, as I explained in Chapters 2 and 3, has to do two seemingly 
contradictory things well: first, is has to ensure the independence of each department, in order to control 
faction; second, it needs to promote inter-department deliberation, in order to secure the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community. 
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Madison, however, is how to incorporate a deliberation separation of powers into the executive 
branch.   To answer this question, we need to turn to Hamilton’s eleven essays in The Federalist 
on the constitution of the executive branch.  Hamilton’s defense of the particular features of the 
executive department suggests both how a deliberative separation of power would work in 
theory, and why we have good reason to believe it would perform as intended.  
 
2. Energy and the constitution of the executive branch, reconsidered.  In a national security crisis, 
the quality of decision-making in our republic presently hinges on the productivity of a 
relationship – the relationship between top civilian and military leaders – that, from an 
institutional perspective, privileges power and dependency over judgment and stability.
44
  
Military leaders serve at the pleasure of the president.  As a result of the preeminence of the 
pleasure-principle in the constitution of the executive branch – as a result of the 
uncompromisingly hierarchical structures it stipulates – the civil-military decision-making nexus 
has evolved into a kind of “vortex” in which civilians now play the role of an unchecked 
legislature and the military plays the role of an executive department that lacks both the 
constitutional means to defend itself against “encroachment” and the ability to improve the 
quality of crisis decision-making.  This dynamic may be a less than ideal situation that is 
nevertheless our only viable alternative.  This is certainly the argument most defense reformers 
and constitutional theorists would make.
45
  Democracy has an Achilles Heel.  And the wish for 
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 Other relationships are of course very important in a national security crisis – those between, for 
example, the legislature and the executive, members of the cabinet, and various executive agencies and 
departments – but our last line of defense against the senseless use of violence is the relationship 
between civilian and military leaders in the upper echelon of the military chain of command. 
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 I. M. Destler, for example, acknowledges that presidents are partisan politicians who do fall far short of 
the “rational ideal of the wise, unbiased decision-maker.”  He quotes a former Johnson aide who likened 
the president to a monarch: he is “treated with such deference and so insulated from the political give-
and-take which once served to sharpen his political judgment and sensitivity that he is almost bound to 
blunder badly on critical issues.”  But to such monarch-like partisans he nevertheless defers: “Ultimately, 
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immortality – a constitutional system without flaws – is, as Greek poetry and drama teaches us, 
a dangerous ambition.
46
  What I will argue in this section is that introducing a deliberative 
separation of powers into the executive branch to improve the quality of crisis decision-making 
need not put in jeopardy other values, principles and objectives that deserve to be weighted 
more heavily in its constitution.  It is possible, in other words, for a constitutional system to 
exert greater control over intra-executive faction without compromising the energy of the 
executive department or the safety of the republic.   
 Hamilton, as I mentioned in Chapter 4, was strongly in favor of a single executive.  
Whereas a legislature is “best adapted to deliberation and wisdom,” only a single hand is 
capable of exercising the kind of energy without which a political community will flounder.  
Energy is essential for “the protection of the community against foreign attacks”; “the steady 
administration of the laws”; “the protection of property”; and “the security of liberty against the 
enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.”
47
  Given the privileged position 
of executive energy in Hamilton’s constitutional theory, the first issue we must explore is 
whether the high level of energy he endorses in The Federalist would be compromised by a 
tightly circumscribed deliberative separation of power. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
however, one comes back to the fact that there is no other choice” (I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, 
and Foreign Policy (Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 86-88). 
46
 As evidence of my impartiality in controversial matters (the poetry-philosophy divide), let me add that, 
as Peter Euben explains, Socratic philosophy and politics both emphasize “our need for others to 
compensate for our one-sidedness and incompleteness, which is what philosophical dialogue and political 
deliberation ideally accomplish.”  Socrates argues that people who claim to possess the truth, “both in the 
sense of exclusivity and finality, are, like the sophists, presumptively wise but actually ignorant.  
Knowledge is not an object that can be finished or completed.  To suppose otherwise is to embrace those 
tyrannical impulses that transform politics into command and obedience and wisdom into abstract 
knowledge” (Peter Euben, The Tragedy of Political Theory (Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 210, 
214). 
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 The answer at first appears to be obvious: energy in the executive can be destroyed 
“either by vesting the power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or by 
vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and co-operation of 
others in the capacity of counselors to him.”
48
  The danger of a plural executive is the potential 
for rivalry: if rivalry leads to dissention, and dissention assails the executive magistracy, it might 
“impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government in the most critical 
emergencies of the state.”  Even worse, they might “split the community into the most violent 
and irreconcilable factions.”
49
  Hamilton is convinced that “no favourable circumstances palliate 
or atone for the disadvantages of dissension in the executive department.” Dissension merely 
serves to “embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate, 
from the first step to the final conclusion of it.”
50
 
 A deliberative separation of power inside the executive would indeed involve a breach 
of unity – hence our instinctive discomfort with such a constitutional device.  But would a 
chairman of the JCS, armed only with a limited veto – a limited veto over a tightly circumscribed 
power – be a magistrate of “equal dignity and authority”?  Would such an official combine with 
the president to form the kind of “executive council” that destroys energy and judgment?  I do 
not mean to suggest that the great liability of pluralism – the kind of bitter dissension that can 
“impede and frustrate the most important measures of government in the most critical 
emergencies of state” – would never characterize civil-military relations if the chairman were 
granted a degree of independence.  In any separation of powers system – any collaborative 
human project, for that matter – friction, irritability and dissention are inevitable.  The purpose 
of a deliberative separation of power would not be to eliminate civil-military friction.  The 
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purpose would be to reduce it to a level that facilitates the alignment of political ends and 
military means.  In this spirit – in Madison’s spirit of controlling rather than eliminating faction
51
 
– my claim is simply that our national security system is far more likely to split the executive into 
“violent and irreconcilable factions” as presently constituted.
52
  Constitutional theory teaches us 
that human nature is compatible with popular self-government only when the institutional 
dynamics of a regime suppress certain impulses and channel others.  Given the present 
constitution of the executive branch, I would suggest, we have no reason to believe that the 
spirit of faction will not have an adverse impact on civil-military relations or that “violent and 




 Hamilton ends his defense of the constitution of the proposed executive department 
with a rhetorical question.  Although he insists on the necessity of an energetic executive, he 
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management and administrative theory.  I argued that both sets of ideas should be consulted by defense 
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controlling principle in Wilson’s political theory – ‘the more power is divided the more irresponsible it 
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Political Theory of the Compound Republic (Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1987), p. 183).  
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Constitutional Convention, Mason argued that the executive should be elected by the legislature and 
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revisit the arguments in favor of the present constitution of the executive branch – as we extract 
principles and forms that might contribute to a solution to the ends-means problem – the question we 
must ask ourselves is not, what is the ideal solution to a particular problem, but, which among a handful 
of proposed solutions is liable to the fewest objections?   
53
 History provides plenty of anecdotal evidence to support constitutional theory’s predictions, but I am 
not a military historian and do not want to base my argument for a deliberative separation of power in 




also argues that executive energy in our constitutional system does not come at the expense of 
safety.  The president is elected by the representatives of the people; he can be impeached and 
removed from office for bad or criminal behavior; and those powers that might otherwise have 
been subject to abuse by the executive have been intermixed in a manner such that they are 




 What I want to point out here is that Hamilton’s seemingly disarming question smuggles 
in a great deal of complexity.  He and his co-founders were confident that the proposed 
executive branch combined the requisites to energy and safety in the right proportion because 
they were recommending a constitutional system for a particular republic at a particular 
moment in time in world history.  In a nation as privileged by history and geography as America 
was in 1787, there might not have been much else an enlightened and reasonable people could 
desire, in terms of additional constitutional precautions to protect the people from an energetic 
executive.  We are still privileged by history and geography, but our relationship to the rest of 
the world has changed in dramatic, once-unimaginable ways.  Hamilton argues in The Federalist 
that a vote for disunion would amount to an act of collective suicidal.  Disunion, I would suggest, 
is a fairly accurate description of our present state of affairs.  Not literally, of course, but in the 
sense that we now combine the “means of revenue” and the “science of finance” with a sense 
of “constant apprehension.”
55
  We have a standing army and remain in a permanent state of 
readiness for war, and this has led, as Hamilton feared, to a strengthening of the executive arm 
of government at the expense of the legislative authority.  We are certainly not among the 
nations of the world that have been compelled by circumstance to “resort for repose and 
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security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights.”
56
  But 
are we no longer the beneficiaries of a felicitously “insular situation.”  An extensive military 
establishment – which Hamilton and Madison both considered a threat to liberty – is now 
necessary for our security, irrespective of the particular ends for which we think it should be 
deployed.  As a result of this radical reorientation with respect to the rest of the world, what we 
have to fear from the power and energy of the executive branch is not that we will fall “victim to 
the absolute power of a single man,” but that the power of single man inside the executive 
branch is a serious impediment to quality decision-making in a national security crisis.
57
 
 My claim here is that the potential violence of executive-branch faction in a non-
insulated state demands that we consider a minor departure from the principle of unity.  When 
lives and treasure are at stake to the degree they are today – when the consequences of ends-
means disharmony as are profound as they are – it is more important to reconcile differences of 
opinion between civilians and soldiers than to suppress dissent.  Formalizing what is presently 
an informal deliberative body, I would suggest, would also be more likely to promote clarity and 
judgment than confusion and embarrassment; to discourage the formation of cabals that 
“distract” and “enervate” a system of administration than engender them; and to improve the 
quality of crisis decision-making than be a mere “clog” upon the president’s good intentions.   
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 Hamilton, No. 8, Paragraph 4.  There are of course numerous scholars and political commentators who 
have argued that civil liberties have been sacrificed when our nation has been at war, be it during World 
War II or our more recent war on terror.  As egregious as some think these infringements were, however, 
I would suggest they still fall short of the kind of tyranny that worried the founders. 
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 Critics and supporters of executive power agree that the president has gained in power relative to the 
legislature as a result of the emergence of the modern administrative state.  In The Executive Unbound: 
After the Madisonian Republic, conservative legal scholars Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue that 
a legally unbound executive need not worry us because executive power is in fact checked sufficiently by 
existing political restraints.  In a review piece that reflects the general liberal point of view, David Cole 
sharply disagrees (“Are We stuck with the Imperial Presidency,” New York Review of Books, June 7, 2012).  
I find Cole’s arguments more persuasive than Posner and Vermeule’s, but both sides of the debate ignore 
the central problem this dissertation explores.  
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3. Safety and the constitution of the executive branch, reconsidered.  The constitution of the 
executive department that Hamilton defends in The Federalist is designed to balance energy and 
safety in an insulated state – to simultaneously promote administrative excellence and curtail 
the abuse of executive power.  In a non-insulated state, I would suggest, at least one additional 
safeguard is necessary to counter the factiousness of the chief executive. 
 At this point in my defense of a new deliberative separation of power, a leap of faith is 
required.  A constitutional theorist cannot predict how new constitutional mechanisms will work 
in practice, no matter how compelling they may be in theory, and no matter how familiar we 
may be with their performance in other contexts.
58
  I happen to believe the leap required is a 
small one, and that it demands a greater leap of faith to assume that the system we presently 
have in place will perform adequately in the future.  Readers will have to decide for themselves 
which path they believe represents the lesser gamble.  What I will argue in this section is that 
the best way to rebalance the requisites to energy and safety in the execute branch is to create 
an “energetic” chairman of the JCS.
59
  A military leader, in other words, who is not entirely 
dependent on his civilian counterparts. 
Hamilton argues that two basic ingredients contribute to the people’s safety against a 
tyrannical executive: a dependence on the people and a due responsibility.  Both of these safety 
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 As Martin Diamond writes, “Institutions are subtle and recalcitrant things.  They are not neutral with 
respect to human purposes; rather each institution and process has its peculiar propensity to produce 
certain outcomes and not others.”  And, unfortunately, it is neither “easy to know these propensities,” 
nor to determine “which institutions and processes are best suited for what ends” (Martin Diamond, “The 
Ends of Federalism,” Publius, Vol. 3. No. 2 (Autumn 1973), p. 129.) 
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 It not only strikes me as the most logical and persuasive constitutional solution to the ends-means 
problem, but it would also require only a modest departure from the system we already have in place, 
which is an additional strength of any reform proposal, both because it represents the path of least 
resistance and because it recognizes that there are many things our present system does well.  As Charles 
Stevenson argues, “Any effort to make major changes in this 60-year-old law must recognize its enduring 
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National Security Act of 1947,” Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 1 (2008), p. 129). 
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mechanisms would be eroded by a pluralistic arrangement, he argues, despite the republican 
maxim that suggests power is safer in the hands of numerous men. 
 
It is evident from these considerations that the plurality of the Executive tends 
to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have for the 
faithful exercise of any delegated power: first, the restraints of public opinion, 
which lose their efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure 
attendant on bad measures among a number as on account of the uncertainty 
on whom it ought to fall; and, secondly, the opportunity of discovering with 
facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to 






A dependence on the people and a due responsibility are realized through three constitutional 
devices: presidential elections, presidential term limits, and the ability of the legislature to 
remove the president for bad behavior.  These safeguards have proven largely successful at 
protecting the people from domestic tyranny without diminishing the power and status of the 
president, I would suggest, but they have not proven nearly as successful at promoting high-
quality deliberative decision-making in a national security crisis.  They do not do so in practice, 
and were never designed to do so in theory.
61
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 Hamilton, No. 70, Paragraph 18.  A council in the executive disables the power of public opinion by 
making it harder for the appropriate authorities to identify which public servants are guilty of misconduct.  
A single man, in contrast, is “more narrowly watched and more readily suspected” (No. 70, Paragraph 22.) 
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 Would a minor departure from the principle of unity “deprive the people of the two greatest securities 
they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power”?  The specificity of the power I suggest 
should be intermixed, I would suggest, would increase rather than decrease transparency, and therefore 
clarify lines of responsibility.  As to how clear they are at present, Allan Millett argues that unity in the 
executive department is not always as generative of responsibility as Hamilton assumed it would be.  
“Much of the organizational complexity [of the defense department] is a façade, created in part to give a 
false sense of rationality and legitimacy to official actions, and accepted in part because it tends to diffuse 
responsibility for decisions gone wrong” (Allan Millett et al., The Reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(Pergamon and Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1986), p. 13). 
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 The need for a chairman of the JCS who is not entirely subordinate to the president – 
the need for an additional safeguard in the executive department to protect against the tyranny 
of misalignment – presents us with a classic design question.  How do we create a military 
officer who would be powerful enough to promote a process of ends-means alignment in a 
national security crisis without being so powerful that he would weaken civilian control of the 
military?  To address the decision-making pathologies I discussed in the previous section, the 
chairman would have to possess sufficient “energy” to force his civilian counterparts to 
participate in a deliberative process.  How much trust should we place in such a military figure?  
For a separation of powers system to work, Hamilton argues, each department must be 
furnished with the “constitutional arms for its own defense.”
62
  What, then, is the minimum 
amount of weaponry the military leadership would need to perform its “advisory” role 
effectively?  A chairman should only be independent enough – “energetic” enough – to defend 
the nation against the tyranny of misalignment.
63
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 In Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crisis, Richard Betts analyzes the institution of the JCS and 
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chorus of generals and admirals intimidating a pacific civilian establishment” is not supported by the 
evidence.  The second theme that permeates his work relates to the military’s attitude toward the use of 
force.  Whereas generals are usually more cautious than civilian leaders when it comes to the initial 
decision to send troops into battle, once the decision to engage an adversary has been made, they prefer 
to use “force quickly, massively, and decisively to destroy enemy capabilities rather than rationing it 
gradually to coax the enemy to change his intentions” (p. 5).  Military leaders have tended to be “more 
conservative and cautious” than their civilian counterparts, he argues, because of their “sensitivity to the 
operational complications implicit in any scenario of possible conflict and their responsibility for 
implementing any tactical operation” (p. 37).  I support a deliberative separation of powers in this 
dissertation not because I assume that all civilians will be military activists or that all soldiers will be 
reluctant warriors.  My claim is simply that a deliberative separation of powers in the executive – 
intermixing the power to determine if political ends and military means are properly aligned – would 
increase the odds that problem of consistency receives the attention it deserves. 
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The ingredients that constitute energy in the executive department, in addition to unity, 
are duration, adequate provision for its support, and competent powers.
64
  Let me briefly touch 
on the first two ingredients before engaging in a more substantial analysis of the last.  What I 
want to emphasize here are the characteristics of an executive – of a particular kind of public 
servant – that these ingredients are designed to inhibit or enhance.  A substantial duration in 
office increases personal firmness.  An insubstantial term, in contrast, produces feebleness and 
irresolution and an aversion to the kinds of inconveniences and hazards that define good 
leadership.  Eligibility for reelection promotes stability and continuity, while ineligibility would 
lead to constant turnover in subordinate stations and excessive instability.  A substantial term 
and re-eligibility combined provide the president – and would likely provide a chairman of the 
JCS with a limited veto, I would suggest – with “the inclination and the resolution to act his part 
well.”  
 Among the powers vested in the president by the Constitution – the qualified power to 
negate legislation; the power to direct war as commander-in-chief; the power to make treaties 
with the advice and consent of the Senate; the power to nominate subordinate officers, again 
with the advice and consent of the Senate; and the power to issues reprieves and pardons – the 
first four are particularly relevant to our discussion. 
 Here is what Hamilton has to say about the merits of a qualified negative: 
 
It not only serves as a shield to the Executive, but it furnishes an additional 
security against the enaction of improper laws.  It establishes a salutary check 
upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects 
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 Adequate provisioning is also one of the four main ingredients of energy, but it is more of a fixed 




of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which 




A qualified veto is essential in our constitutional system not because a single executive will likely 
possess superior wisdom than a numerous legislature, but because the latter will not be 
infallible, and because the love of power “may sometimes betray it into a disposition to 
encroach upon the rights of other members of the government.”  Hamilton worries that “a spirit 
of faction may sometimes pervert its deliberations,” and that “impressions of the moment may 
sometimes hurry it into measures which itself, on mature reflection, would condemn.”
66
 
 Is there a danger that a qualified negative would be as likely to prevent good laws as 
prohibit bad ones?  This objection, Hamilton argues: 
 
Will have little weight with those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of 
that inconstancy and mutability in the laws which form the greatest blemish in 
the character and genius of our governments.  They will consider every 
institution calculated to restrain the excess of law-making, and to keep things in 
the same state in which they happen to be at any given period, as much more 
likely to do good than harm; because it is favorable to greater stability in the 
system of legislation.  The injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few 






Would a limited veto be vulnerable to other kinds of abuse? 
 
                                                           
65
 Hamilton, No. 73, Paragraph 6. 
66
 Hamilton, No. 73, Paragraph 8. 
67
 Hamilton, No. 73, Paragraph 9. 
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The superior weight and influence of the legislative body in a free government, 
and the hazard to the Executive in a trial of strength with that body, afford 
satisfactory security that the negative would generally be employed with great 
caution; and there would oftener be room for a charge of timidity than of 




Hamilton argues that the power of the president to make treaties with the support of two-thirds 
of the senators present is one of “the best digested and most unexceptional parts of the plan.”
69
  
The power of making treaties, he argues, is not strictly legislative or executive.  A treaty is 
neither a rule for the regulation of society nor a law in need of execution.  The power seems to 
belong to a distinct department. 
 
The qualities elsewhere detailed as indispensable in the management of foreign 
negotiations, point out the Executive as the most fit agent in those transactions; 
while the vast importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, 
plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion of the legislative 




Those who object to the principle of intermixed powers, Hamilton writes, are indulging in a 
“trite topic.”  Treaty making requires both the agency of the chief magistrate – “indispensible in 
the movement of foreign relations” – and the trust and credibility bestowed upon such actions 
when they are supported by a significant portion of the legislature.  What I want to emphasize 
here – again, with civil-military relations in mind – is why Hamilton argues that an executive is 
unqualified to exercise the treaty-making power alone. 
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 Hamilton, No. 73, Paragraph 10. 
69
 Hamilton, No. 75, Paragraph 2. 
70
 Hamilton, No. 75, Paragraph 3. 
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The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human 
virtue which could make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate 
and momentous a kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of 
the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as 




If treaty-making is too delicate and momentous a power to trust to a single magistrate, what 




 The final power vested in the president is the power to appoint, with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, ambassadors, ministers, consuls, judges and all other inferior officers 
whose appointments fall outside the provisions of the Constitution.  Hamilton suggests there 
are two basic ways to apportion the power of appointment.  It could be vested either in “a single 
man, or in a select assembly of moderate number; or in a single man with the concurrence of 
such an assembly.”
73
  In our system the power of nomination is assigned to the president 
because the “sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of 
duty and a more exact regard to reputation.”
74
  The participation of the legislature in the 
appointment process is required to serve as a powerful check on the spirit of what Hamilton 
here calls favoritism, but we could also call faction.
75
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 Hamilton, No. 75, Paragraph 4. 
72
 Richard Morris argues that it is reasonable to infer from Hamilton’s unwillingness to commit such 
delicate and momentous interests to the president that, “regardless of how Hamilton would feel in the 
coming years, when he urged President Washington to take the field against the Whisky rebels, or when 
later he served as second-in-command of the army, Hamilton in 1788 was not prepared to interpret the 
President’s powers as commander in chief as extending beyond the defense against invasion absent 
legislative sanction” (Richard B. Morris, “The Origins of the Presidency,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 
17, No. 4 (Fall 1987), p. 680).   
73
 Hamilton, No. 76, Paragraph 3. 
74
 Hamilton, No. 76, Paragraph 5. 
75
 The consent of the legislature provides the president with a strong incentive to choose his political 
appointees responsibly.  A president would needed such public consent would be too concerned with his 
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 A discussion of the power to appoint naturally raises the question of how to distribute 
the power to remove.  In Hamilton’s last essay on the constitution of the executive department, 
he makes an argument that seems at odds with his reputation as one of our most bullish 
advocates of executive power.  The Senate, he argues, is as valuable in the displacement process 
as in the appointment process.  If the power to remove were vested in the President alone, the 
nation would be prone to violent and destabilizing revolutions in administration every four 
years.   
 
Those who can best estimate the value of a steady administration will be most 
disposed to prize a provision which connects the official existence of public men 
with the approbation or disapprobation of that body which, from the greater 
permanency of its own composition, will in all probability be less subject to 




The president needs to be discouraged from removing officers of the government simply 
because he would prefer more agreeable subordinates.  The preferences of the president – 
despite our contemporary understanding of the subject – cannot be wholly indulged in these 
administrative matters because what is best for the president is not always best for the nation.
77
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
reputation to risk displaying for the public a spirit of favoritism.  He would be “ashamed and afraid” to 
propose a candidate for a distinguished station whose only real merit was “possessing the necessary 
insignificance and pliancy to render them the obsequious instruments of his pleasure” (Hamilton, No. 76, 
Paragraph 9). 
76
 Hamilton, No. 77, Paragraph 1. 
77
 Jeremy Bailey points out that although Hamilton is associated with an expansive interpretation of 
executive power, most advocates of executive power conveniently overlook or dismiss his claim in The 
Federalist that the Senate should share the appointment and removal powers.  “Hamilton's initial 
argument for energy in the executive, even with its surprising praise of the Roman dictator, suggested 
that unity could complement and even perfect republican liberty. However, in his argument connecting 
unity to duration, Hamilton went out of his way to warn against the republican tendencies of a president 
who would have a fixed term and be eligible for reelection.  Because each president would want to curry 
favor with "his constituents" by removing executive officials associated with the repudiated ex-president, 
unity and republican principles would conspire against stability and thus steer the republican government 
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A partial restraint “would be salutary at the same time that it would not be such as to destroy a 
single advantage to be looked for from the uncontrolled agency of that Magistrate.”
78
  Hamilton 
is convinced that intermixed powers will produce a result more favorable to the nation that 
concentrating these powers in the hands of a single man.
79
  Most defense reformers and 
constitutional theorists would argue that the influence civilians wield over their military 
counterparts must be unlimited, and that undue influence is a misnomer, a rhetorical gimmick 
(even though the normative ideal is for close collaboration and mutual respect).  But even 




 What can we conclude from the totality of Hamilton’s arguments on the constitution of 
the executive department?  What can we learn from focusing on all eleven essays in The 
                                                                                                                                                                             
toward traditional republican vices” (Jeremy D. Bailey, “The New Unitary Executive and Democratic 
Theory: The Problem of Alexander Hamilton,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 102, No. 4 (Nov., 
2008), pp. 460-461).   
78
 Hamilton, No. 77, Paragraph 4. 
79
 Charles Thach argues that “nothing is more vital than the relations of the executive head to the chief 
officers of the administrative departments, and the relations of the latter to the legislature.  And yet the 
Constitution furnishes no final and authoritative decision on the question” (Creation of the Presidency, p. 
124).  The precise organization of the departments of war, foreign affairs and the treasury were left to the 
first session of the first Congress.  Twelve of the eighteen members of the Convention serving in the 
legislature at this time adopted the position that the president was “the head of all the administrative 
departments,” and that it was the right of the chief executive “to act through the instrumentality of 
agents subject to his choice and direction” (p. 142).  Madison, whose opinion is obviously very relevant to 
our discussion, concurred: “It is one of the most prominent features of the constitution, a principle that 
pervades the whole system, that there should be the highest degree of responsibility in all the executive 
officers,” he explained to his colleagues.  This makes all executive officers “responsible to the great 
executive power, and makes the President responsible to the public for the conduct of the person he has 
nominated and appointed to aid him in the administration of his department.”   The chain of dependence 
“therefore terminates in the supreme body, namely in the people, who will possess, besides, in aid of 
their original power, the decisive engine of impeachment” (Quoted in Thach, p. 130-131).  Madison clearly 
argued for placing the removal power solely in the hands of the executive, but he did so, we need to 
remember, in a constitutional order in which he expected the legislature to predominate.  What Madison 
does not address is the subject of this dissertation and Hamilton’s great implicit question: when we lose 
the advantages of being an insulated state and presidential elections and the threat of impeachment are 
no longer sufficient safeguards against the abuse of executive power, what changes to the constitution of 
executive department might have to be made? 
80
 Hamilton, No. 77, Paragraph 1. 
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Federalist, rather than merely on No. 70?  A degree of independence on the military side of the 
civil-military equation may be required if we want to promote a greater consistency between 
political ends and military means.
81
  What M. J. C. Vile has to say about the executive is 
suggestive: “if the executive was to be more than an errand boy he must have some 
independence of the legislature.”
82
  The constitutional theory Hamilton defends in The 
Federalist suggests that if we want our top military leader to act his part – to exhibit personal 
firmness and resolution and contribute judgment and constancy to matters of war and peace – 
he cannot serve merely at the pleasure of the president.  It also suggests that a power tightly 
circumscribed is not particularly vulnerable to abuse. 
 
4. Civil-military relations, reconsidered.  There is an important question – one that has probably 
been on the minds of readers at various points in this dissertation – I have yet to address 
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 Why is independence so important?  For two reasons: first, to combat the pathologies of dependence; 
and, second, to bring a degree of steadiness and impartiality to crisis decision-making.  The judiciary is 
obviously not an appropriate model for the military, but the logic behind an independent judiciary is 
relevant to our discussion.  Judicial power is separated from legislative and executive power in our 
constitutional system in order to ensure the independence without which justices would not be impartial 
and punishments would therefore not be meted out fairly.  The standard of good behavior for a chairman 
of the JCS would be, as it is for members of the judiciary, the “best expedient which can be devised in any 
government to ensure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.”
81
  A wholly dependent 
military – a chairman with no independent authority – is no more likely to bring impartiality and judgment 
to civil-military relations as a member of the judiciary who needs the support of the executive to remain 
in office.  To assume that any public servant, no matter how decorated on the battlefield, is immune to 
personal considerations such as professional status and job security is as naïve as assuming that 
presidents and justices would not succumb to obsequiousness if the legislature had a discretionary power 
of their salary and emoluments.  A lack of immunity to such mundane pressures surely goes a long toward 
explaining why “no service chief or field commander in the postwar era ever” resigned in protest over 
disagreements with his civilian counterparts (Betts, p. xii).  MacKubin Owens may be right that “Senior 
officers have a constitutional responsibility to ensure that a military voice is heard,” and that, “if the 
civilian leadership chooses not to accept military advice it is the duty of any commissioned officer to carry 
out the resulting policy or tender his resignation,” but this is a normative ideal in which a constitutional 
theorist would not place much faith (“Civilian Control: A National Crisis?” p. 83). 
82
 See M.J.C. Vile, “Chapter 6: The Doctrine in America,” in Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers 
(Liberty Fund, 1998).  I would not go so far as to argue that our most decorated soldiers have been 
reduced to errand boys, but I do believe their positive contribution to crisis decision-making has been less 
than it would have been had a deliberative separation of power been in place. 
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explicitly.  Would a chairman of the JCS armed with a limited veto weaken civilian control of the 
military?
83
  Civilian control of the military is obviously a fundamental principle in republican 
theory and unquestionably a condition that must be met for a republic to flourish.
84
  It is also a 
fairly nebulous concept that contemporary scholars have struggled to define.
85
  Military coups 
and certain acts of insubordination are easy to identify and condemn, but determining precisely 
which institutional or societal developments are related to a strengthening of civilian control, 
and which a weakening of civilian control, appears to be a task that only scholars with strong 
political and ideological preferences can perform with confidence.
86
  
 The traditional concern of students of civil-military relations was a direct seizure of 
political power by military officers.
87
  The military had to be strong enough to protect the 
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 To be more specific: a chairman with a limited veto over a single, tightly circumscribed power who 
served two or four-year terms on good behavior. 
84
 Perhaps one could argue that in certain unusual circumstances in the history of a republic a loss of 
civilian control could serve a republic well, but this kind of hypothetical question is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation.    
85
 See, for example, Nielsen, Suzanne C. and Don M. Snider, eds., American Civil-Military Relations: The 
Soldier and the State in a New Era (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). 
86
 I am aware that Samuel Huntington made a seminal contribution to civil-military relations theory.  He 
certainly brought the subject to the attention of political scientists and sociologists.  But his personal 
beliefs about the Cold War and the inadequacy of a liberal society in the face of a totalitarian threat 
suffuse even his most theoretical arguments.  Objective civilian control – the idea that civilian leaders 
should be responsible for determining the political goals for which the military was required, and then let 
military leaders identify the means of achieving these stated objectives – was his ideal for civil-military 
relations because he was already committed ideologically to the view that a liberal society with too much 
control over the military would indulge its liberal values and, by underestimating foreign threats and 
underfunding the military, put America’s long-term security in jeopardy.  Here is the crux of his argument: 
Military personnel are mostly conservative, civilian leaders are mostly liberal, and this divergence in 
values and attitudes (in light of Huntington’s conservative understanding of the realities of international 
politics) is dangerous, if civilians exercise too much control over defense policy.  His writing is provocative, 
in other words, but only as a point of departure for scholars who come to the subject without an 
ideological agenda.  I should also point out here that a noted critic of Huntington’s, Morris Janowitz, 
argued that although there was a clear difference in values and attitudes between most soldiers and 
civilians, civilian control of the military would be enhanced if they converged, and that this convergence 
should be encouraged because, in a world of nuclear weapons and limited war, closer collaboration 
between civilian and military decision-makers would be required.  See Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier 
and the State (Harvard University Press, 1957); and Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Free Press, 
1960). 
87
 This is why the Founders were unanimous in their opposition to a large standing army.  As I mentioned 
in Chapter 5, Hamilton believed that a large standing army would pose a danger not only to individual 
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country from external enemies, but a military so equipped posed a threat to the political 
authority that sanctioned its creation.  In a democracy characterized by weak structures of 
governance and underdeveloped administrative capacity, the boundary between political and 
military authority is vulnerable to transgression.
88
  But even critics of the size and influence of 
the American military do not think it poses a threat to political authority.  As Douglas Kinnard 
puts it, in the post-World War II period “the question of civilian supremacy over the military, 
which so occupied the Founding Fathers at Philadelphia and other political thinkers through the 
last century, is no longer an issue.”
89
  I do not think it is wise to completely dismiss the danger of 
political usurpation, but I am convinced we can improve the productivity of the relationship 
                                                                                                                                                                             
liberty but to the very existence of a republic.  An executive with a large standing army at his disposal, 
quite simply, cannot be trusted to make wise choices about the use of force in domestic or international 
affairs.  A weakness of contemporary defense reform is that many reformers write about the use of force 
in international affairs as though we were still an insulated state.  Peter Feaver writes that, “Like an 
automobile’s airbag, then, the military primarily exists as a guard against disaster” (Peter Feaver, “The 
Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces 
and Society, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter 1996), p. 152).    This may have been what the Founders had in mind – 
that we could trust a strong, unitary executive in our constitutional system because he was expected only 
to guard the nation against urgent and unambiguous threats – but American military power has clearly 
been used for much more creative purposes in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
88
 Samuel Finer studied civil-military relations in the less developed, less democratic world, and concludes 
that political instability coupled with weak structures of governance and a minimal administrative capacity 
create conditions favorable for military activism and increase the likelihood of a coup d’etat (Samuel E. 
Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (Westview Press, 1988).  See also Samuel 
Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style (Yale University Press, 1976). 
89
 Douglas Kinnard, “Civil-Military Relations: The President and the General,” Parameters, Vol. XV, No. 2 
(Summer 1985), p. 19.  His explanation for this development is that the United States found itself in a new 
role after the war, and this role “required the US to support substantial military forces in being, and 
necessitated a sustained and active involvement in world affairs no previously part of the American 
experience.  Given this new situation, the manner in which foreign and security problems were conceived, 
and the processes by which policies were developed and implemented to meet these problems, would 
have to be different from before the Second World War” (p. 19).  I include this passage here because it 
speaks to the distinction I have been emphasizing in this dissertation between insulated and non-
insulated states, and the implications of this distinction for constitutional theory.  On the negligible 
chance of an openly insubordinate military, see also Michael Desch, Civilian Control of the Military (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 30. 
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between civilians and military decision-makers in a national security crisis without increasing the 
probability of such an occurrence.
90
  
 Let me return to the question with which I opened this section.  Would a limited veto in 
the hands of the chairman of the JCS weaken civilian control of the military?   In order to answer 
this question, it is important to keep in mind that effective civilian control of the military is not 
synonymous with absolute civilian control of the military.  “The best indicator of the state of 
civilian control,” Michael Desch argues, “is who prevails when civilian and military preferences 
diverge. If the military does, there is a problem; if the civilians do, there is not.’’
91
  This is an 
indicator not of civilian control of the military, I would suggest, but of absolute civilian control of 
the military.  And absolute civilian control is problematic.  As Richard Betts argues, “undiluted 
military autonomy” and “unbridled presidential ambition” both have serious drawbacks.
92
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 Sociological debates that derive from the two-cultures understanding of the military and society 
dominate the scholarly literature on civilian control.  Here the question is less about the military 
encroaching on political authority than the military imposing its distinct values on a more liberal society.  
See, for example, Richard H. Kohn, ‘‘Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations.’’ The National 
Interest, No. 35, (Spring 1994); and, for a rebuttal, Colin Powell, et al. ‘‘An Exchange on Civil-Military 
Relations.” The National Interest, No. 36 (Summer 1994).  For a more scholarly collection of essays, see 
Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American 
National Security, (MIT Press, 2001).  Andrew Bacevich was among the many scholars who responded to 
Kohn’s “crisis” piece.  “The Cold War legacy,” he wrote, “invests the military with a capacity to tilt the 
debate in ways that advance its interests but do not necessarily serve the common good.”  As a 
consequence of the military’s supposedly excessive influence on national policy, we need to “reinvigorate 
civilian control,” by which he means, if I am not mistaken, recommit our nation to the ideal of objective 
civilian control of the military.  This is why he concludes that, “Although returning to the era of George 
Marshall may be impossible, a fresh and stringent delineation of allowing military prerogatives is in order” 
((JFQ, Autumn / Winter 1994-1995, p. 79).  This recommendation expresses a firm understanding of the 
politics of national security decision-making, but the ideal of objective civilian control of the military, I 
argue in this section, is not only an antiquated ideal but an obstacle to thinking constitutionally about how 
to ensure political ends and military means are more closely aligned in a national security crisis. 
91
 Michael Desch, Civilian Control of the Military (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 5. 
92
 Richard Betts pursues several very interesting questions in his research, one of which is pertinent here: 
How should presidents choose and organize their military advisors?  Ideally, presidents would find the 
right balance in their appointments of military officers between “maximizing professionalism and 
expertise and maximizing executive political control.”  Betts calls these two extremes modes of 
appointment routine-professional and exceptional-political.  The former, though preferred by the military 
and Congress, is uncommon because executives are usually interested in having allies and spokesmen as 
military advisors.  “Exceptional-political appointments, on the other hand, derogate traditional 
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Another prominent student of civil-military decision-making, Lawrence Korb, insists that “civilian 
control must not be exercised in such a manner than military opinions and expertise are 
excluded or downgraded within the decisionmaking process.”
93
  Mackubin Thomas Owens 
makes the same point with greater conviction.  Civilian control of the military “is not merely 
bureaucratic control of senior officers by DOD officials,” he argues.  The idea that the military 
“should not debate a policy advanced by bureaucrats, no matter how bare-brained it may be,” is 
not how we should understand civilian control.
94
  There is also no evidence to suggest that 
absolute civilian control is necessary to preserve civilian control of the military or that it 
improves national security decision-making.
95
  Allen Millett, a military historian whose approach 
to defense reform is an excellent point of departure for a constitutional theorist, proposes four 
tests for effective civilian control of the military.
96
  Civilians can be said to exercise control of the 
military if the following conditions are met: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
professional standards of leadership selection and maximize executive leverage over military leaders.”  
The ideal would be a compromise between the two methods of appointment.  A compromise method is 
desirable because “the danger implicit in either high autonomy or military alienation are greater than 
traditionalists or objective control theory admit and less than bureaucratic revisionists fear” (Betts, p. 74).  
A compromise – as is often the case in politics – is the ideal.  The government surely needs a measure of 
both expertise and political control.  But in the absence of a constitutional intervention, I would suggest, 
there is no way to bring this ideal closer to reality. 
93
 Lawrence Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff (Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 223. 
94
 Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Civilian Control: A National Crisis? Joint Force Quarterly, No. 66 (Autumn / 
Winter 1994-1995). 
95
 Michael Desch argues that “civilians meddling in matters of military expertise … is almost as bad as the 
military involving itself in politics,” and that the country suffers “whenever the civil-military balance is off-
kilter in either direction (Desch, Michael, “Bush and the Generals,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 3 (May / 
June 2007).  On the lack of empirical evidence, see Allan Millett, Williamson Murray and Kenneth 
Watman, “The Effectiveness of Military Organizations,” International Security, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Summer 
1986); and Suzanne C. Nielsen, “Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness,” Public 
Administration and Management, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Spring 2005). 
96
 Millett brings a very unusual perspective to defense reform.  As a military historian, he is as skeptical of 
the lessons of history as he is of the claim that history has nothing important to teach us.  As a defense 
reformer, he is as skeptical of the motives of civilians as he is of the motives of soldiers.  His consistently 




1) The armed forces do not impose their unique values upon civilian institutions 
and organizations. 
2) The armed forces have no independent access to military resources of military 
utility. 
3) The policies of the armed forces on the recruitment, pay, education, training, 
treatment, promotion, and use of personnel are not inconsistent with basic civil 
liberties and individual rights (with some compromises for military discipline and 
combat effectiveness). 
4) The use of military force is not determined by the values of the military 
establishment alone, either for or against military action, either in the conduct 
of foreign or domestic policies.  Conversely, civilian decisions on the use of force 
should not disregard the relationship of policy ends and military institutional 





What these tests suggest is that it is a mistake to assume we either adhere to the doctrine of 
absolute civilian control of the military or the state will be dominated by the military.  This 
assumption turns out to be as dogmatic as the other great either / or I criticize in this 
dissertation: energy or deliberation.  Too much civilian control of the military may not present 
as grave a threat to a republic as too little, but the danger cannot be ignored.  Civilian leaders 
should not disregard the relationship between policy ends and military institutional restraints, 
most defense reformers agree, and yet our institutional fidelity to the doctrine of absolute 
civilian control of the military, I would suggest, increases the odds that they will. 
The frequency with which civilians have in fact disregarded military advice since the 
creation of the national security state is why so many defense reformers continue to promote 
the antiquated notion that civilian leaders should determine the political aims of military action 
and military leaders should then decide upon the most effective way to obtain these 
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 Allan Millett, “The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military: A Historical 





  This is the ideal of objective civilian control of the military.
99
  But as Eliot Cohen 
and other scholars argue, the shift from total to limited war in the postwar period – the 
emphasis on small wars and counterinsurgency operations – has made it nearly impossible to 
distinguish between political and military problems.  Military historian William Emerson 
expresses a similar opinion: “In war a very narrow line separates decisions of policy, the sphere 
of civilian leadership, from decisions of strategy, the sphere of military commanders; the 
massive pressures of modern total war, furthermore, and the growing professionalization of 
military command have well nigh obliterated that line.”
100
  As a result of these developments 
and complexities, the ideal of objective control is impractical.
101
  The consequences for civil-
military relations – more specifically, crisis decision-making – is that we need an alternative to 
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 One of the original conclusions Richard Betts arrived at in his 1977 survey of the postwar role of 
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strong chairman system, which designated the chairman as the principle military advisor to the president 
and secretary of defense and sharply diminished the influence of the service chiefs. 
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 As we discussed Chapter 3, it is precisely because these two spheres of activity have always been 
partially inseparable that Clausewitz thought a process of mutual adjustment and adaptation was 
necessary to ensure that war was a sensible endeavor.  Bernard Brodie, a student of Clausewitz, argues 
that, “Unless it is in pursuit of a reasonable political objective, any nation resorting to war is simply 
perpetuating wanton destruction of life and goods on a vast scale.”  Brodie is surely correct to argue that 
political objectives must be reasonable if war is to be sensible, but he is not a defense reformer or 
constitutional theorist and does not suggest how a republic might increase the odds of reasonableness.  
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the ideal of political and operational autonomy.
102
  And we need an alternative decision-making 
model not only because of the kinds of wars we now fight but because there was always a 
debilitating assumption at work in the ideal of objective civilian control of the military: the 
assumption that political objectives and military means would align in the absence of a formal 
process of adjustment and adaptation.
103
  Defense reformers and constitutional theorists must 
keep in mind that political ends and military means do not align by default; would not align with 
sufficient regularity even if the ideal of objective civilian control of the military were realized; 
and that misalignment puts lives and treasure unnecessarily at risk.
104
  Despite the centrality of 
the political purpose in war – the absurdity of allowing means to act independently of political 
purposes – the political aim must also not be allowed to act as a tyrant.  Given the present 
organization of the executive branch, however, the president – and, by extension, the secretary 
of defense, if he has the support of the president – possesses in civil-military relations in 
general, and decisions on the use of force in particular, the equivalent of “monarchical powers.” 
As Hamilton puts it, describing a king unbound by the resolutions of a constitutional council, our 
president is, in his relationship with the military, “the absolute master of his own conduct in the 
exercise of his office, and may observe or disregard the counsel given to him at his sole 
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 Cohen focuses in his book on four democratic leaders who did not respect the political-operational 
norm: Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion.  I do not want to debate the details of these cases 
or the implications he draws from them, but I have no objection to the argument that these two spheres 
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 I do not at all mean to suggest that civilians should defer to military judgment.  My intention is to 
control national security factions and combat the politicization of crisis decision-making.  To accomplish 
this goal – to at least approximate this goal – civilian leaders, who can easily subvert deliberative 
processes in our strictly hierarchical system if they choose to do so, must be “forced” to deliberate.  See 
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 As I argued in a previous chapter, the assumption that the doctrine of absolute civilian control of the 
military solves the ends-means problem has not withstood the test of time.  Simply entrusting all decision-
making authority to civilians in the executive department – assuming that as long as generals are fully 





  But the political aim must “adapt itself to its chosen means” if war is to be fought 
wisely and sensibly.  And the only way to ensure that the process of adaptation and adjustment 
is respected and productive is to apply the lessons of constitution theory to the structures of our 
modern national security state.
106
 
 Let me end this section with a summary of my basic argument.  A chairman of the JCS 
with a limited veto over a tightly circumscribed power would not weaken effective civilian 
control of the military.  My proposal would not strengthen the chairman with respect to the 
legislature or, for that matter, the service chiefs, the service secretaries or combatant 
commanders.  The position of the chairman is presently closer to that of an ambassador than a 
justice of the peace, meaning that and the chairman is often chosen more for his loyalty to the 
administration than the quality of his independent advice, and his advice, even when it is 
independent and of high quality, can be easily ignored.  A chairman of the JCS simply cannot 
play a sufficiently constructive role in a national security crisis if he remains entirely dependent 
on his civilian counterparts.  Even with a deliberative separation of power in place, the president 
would only “depend” on his top military advisor to the extent that he must participate in a 
formal deliberative process if he decides to use military means to pursue his political objectives.  
Despite a minor departure from the principle of unity, the decision to use military force would 
remain the president’s alone.  No matter what the chairman advises or recommends – no 
matter how strongly he might disagree with the judgment of his civilian counterparts – the 
president would be under no obligation to use force if he thinks that doing so would be unwise 
or ineffective.  And even with this deliberative device inside the executive department, the 
                                                           
105
 Hamilton, No. 70, Paragraph 19. 
106
 Betts, p. 87. 
285 
 
president would still be able to override the chairman’s veto and remove the chairman from his 






Charles Stevenson, a military historian and political scientist, argues that the military’s dual 
civilian leaders – the president and congress – have effectively exercised civilian control over 
strategy, rules of engagement, force size, equipment and organization.
108
  Contrary to some 
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 There are numerous possibilities for the composition of this council.  As long as it were small and could 
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method of subjective control of the military not seen since the Johnson administration and the McNamara 
Pentagon” (Securing the State, p. 14).  What I want to suggest here is that doubt and distrust are not just 
psychological burdens.  At a certain level they surely have an impact on how faithfully and how effectively 
the military carries out its responsibilities. 
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 The problem with the congressional side of civilian control: “Congress has historically felt that the 
President should use almost any legal means and organizational scheme he deems necessary to perform 
his duties as Commander in Chief” (Christopher Bourne, “Unintended Consequences of the Goldwater-
Nichols Act,” Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1998), p. 102). 
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prominent scholars he does not believe there is any kind of crisis in civil-military relations.  He 
also believes that the lack of a crisis is partly due to the fact that the US military is treated by the 
president as having a veto over decisions on the use of force.  It does not exercise this unofficial 
veto in a formal sense, but there is evidence to suggest that the military is “usually granted 
terms and conditions for the planned use of force.”
109
  The logic behind this assertion is that 




The evidence to support the claim that the terms and conditions for the use of force 
recommended by the military are usually accepted, I would suggest, is ambiguous at best.  
Certainly there are plenty of military historians who would argue for an adverb that suggests 
much less regularity.  But even if civilian leaders have deferred with some regularity to military 
judgment on operational matters, we can attribute this deference to two other factors: 
presidents being deliberative by nature (or by principle), and the understanding of civilians that 
the operational side of the ends-means equation was outside their competence.  The former 
represents too great a gamble for constitutional theory, while the latter has not held since the 
old distinction between war and peace began to blur in the middle of the last century and the 
“chasm between pre-intervention political decision making on the one hand and expert non-
political execution of decision on the other” narrowed significantly.
111
 
My question to scholars who believe that a hypothetical veto serves an essential 
purpose is this: why not vest the military with a formal veto power?  Why put so much faith in 
informal deliberative mechanisms when the constitutional theory on which our republic was 
founded teaches us they will not be any more effective at promoting deliberation between 
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civilian and military leaders than parchment barriers are at inspiring the three great branches of 
government to cooperate?  We have a problem and a paradox: “In the strategic sphere, in all 
that concerns the structure and deployment of military forces,” William Emerson writes, 
“political leadership must be responsive to technical military opinion and advice, but it must, at 
whatever cost, shape and direct the military instrument to support and serve its own higher 
political purposes.”
112
  If we want to resolve this apparent contradiction – if we want to increase 
the likelihood that our political leadership will be responsive to military advice and direct the 
military instrument to support its higher political purposes – we need to think constitutionally 
about civil-military relations in our modern national security state.  
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The study of history provides no clear, certain path for understanding the future. At best its 
lessons are uncertain and ambiguous. No matter how sophisticated and eloquent historians may 
be, they can only present rough approximations of the past, much less the present or the future.  
Yet, history, writ large, still represents the best available laboratory mankind possesses for 
understanding the future. 
- Williamson Murray 
 
The question for a nation, particularly for a very powerful nation, is whether the necessary 
exercise of its virtue in meeting ruthlessness and the impressive nature of its power will blind it to 
the ambiguity of all human virtues and competencies. 
- Reinhold Niebuhr 
 
However it may be in other spheres in life – the artistic, the religious, or the pursuit of purely 
theoretical truth – in political thought and endeavor a man’s reward are with the living, and his 
work is approved not by any finality of achievement, but in terms of further tasks and problems, 
further efforts and anxieties, dangers and rescues, which it makes possible. 





Let me end this dissertation with a quote from Clausewitz.  He is not only a great and 
provocative theorist of war, but it is his sensitivity to the politics of war that that draws our 
attention to a fundamental problem that was neglected by the constitutional theory upon which 




The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the 
statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of 
war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it 




This act of judgment – the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching in war and peace – is simply 
beyond the capacity of a single man, or a single faction within the executive branch, to perform 
adequately.  It is a decision, a process, I would suggest, which requires a formal separation of 
powers between the civilian and military leaders who collectively hold the fate of our nation in 
their hands. 
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